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ABSTRACT
Differential privacy is a framework to quantify to what extent individual privacy in a statis-
tical database is preserved while releasing useful aggregate information about the database.
This dissertation studies the fundamental trade-off between privacy and utility in differential
privacy in the most basic problem settings.
We first derive the optimal -differentially private mechanism for single real-valued query
function under a very general utility-maximization (or cost-minimization) framework. The
class of noise probability distributions in the optimal mechanism has staircase-shaped prob-
ability density functions which are symmetric (around the origin), monotonically decreasing
and geometrically decaying. The staircase mechanism can be viewed as a geometric mixture
of uniform probability distributions, providing a simple algorithmic description for the mech-
anism. Furthermore, the staircase mechanism naturally generalizes to discrete query output
settings as well as more abstract settings. We explicitly derive the parameter of the optimal
staircase mechanism for `1 and `2 cost functions. Comparing the optimal performances with
those of the usual Laplacian mechanism, we show that in the high privacy regime ( is small),
the Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal as → 0; in the low privacy regime ( is
large), the minimum magnitude and second moment of noise are Θ(∆e−

2 ) and Θ(∆2e−
2
3 ) as
→ +∞, respectively, while the corresponding figures when using the Laplacian mechanism
are ∆

and 2∆
2
2
, where ∆ is the sensitivity of the query function. We conclude that the gains
of the staircase mechanism are more pronounced in the low privacy regime.
We also show the optimality of the staircase mechanism for -differentially privacy in
the multiple dimensional setting where the query output has multiple components, e.g.,
histogram query function. We prove that when the dimension is two, for the `1 cost func-
tion, the noise probability distribution in the optimal mechanism has a multiple dimensional
staircase-shaped probability density function. We explicitly derive the parameter of the
optimal two-dimensional staircase mechanism, and study the asymptotical performance of
optimal mechanism in the high and low privacy regimes. Comparing the optimal perfor-
mances with those of the usual Laplacian mechanism, we show that in the high privacy
regime ( is small), the Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal as → 0; in the low
ii
privacy regime ( is large), the optimal cost is Θ(e−

3 ), while the cost of the Laplacian mech-
anism is 2∆

. We conclude that the gains of the staircase mechanism are more pronounced
in the low privacy regime.
Lastly, we study the optimal mechanisms in (, δ)-differential privacy for integer-valued
query functions under a utility-maximization/cost-minimization framework. We show that
the (, δ)-differential privacy is a framework not much more general than the (, 0)-differential
privacy and (0, δ)-differential privacy in the context of `1 and `2 cost functions, i.e., minimum
expected noise magnitude and noise power. In the same context of `1 and `2 cost functions,
we show the near-optimality of uniform noise mechanism and discrete Laplacian mechanism
in the high privacy regime (as (, δ)→ (0, 0)).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Background
Due to the advances of information technology and the prevalence of social networks, vast
amounts of personal information can be efficiently collected and processed. The availability
of such big data enables us to produce a number of useful applications by analyzing the col-
lected information. For example, Netflix, an online DVD-rental service, can use subscribers’
preferences for movies to build a movie recommendation system; a user on Amazon.com, the
world’s largest online retailer, can use other users’ reviews and ratings to decide which item
might be good and reliable.
While releasing the statistics of collected data has great potential use for analysis, with-
out proper statistical disclosure mechanisms, the privacy of individuals in the dataset can be
jeopardized. In 2006, Netflix hosted the Netflix prize contest, an open competition in which
contestants designed algorithms to make predictions on user ratings for movies from the re-
leased dataset by Netflix. The training dataset provided by Netflix consisted of 100,480,507
ratings that 480,189 users gave to 17,770 movies [1]. To protect the privacy of customers
in the released training dataset, Netflix anonymized the dataset by removing users’ person-
al information, e.g., name, from the dataset, and only used integer IDs. However, these
anonymization approaches were not sufficient to preserve customers’ privacy. By connecting
the released anonymized dataset by Netflix and the Internet Movie Database as background
knowledge, Narayanan and Shmatikov [2] successfully de-anonymized and identified some
Netflix records of known users.
As can be seen from the Netflix prize example, one difficulty for defining a notion of
privacy which is resilient to attacks is to model the side information of adversaries.
Differential privacy is a recent formal notion of privacy, and it separates the issues of
modeling adversary side information by requiring the indistinguishability of whether an
individual is in the dataset or not based on the released information. The key idea of
differential privacy is that the presence or absence of any individual data in the database
should not affect the final released statistical information significantly, and thus it can give
1
strong privacy guarantees against an adversary with arbitrary auxiliary information. For
more motivation and background of differential privacy, we refer the readers to the survey
by Dwork [3].
The basic problem setting in differential privacy for a statistical database is as follows:
suppose a dataset curator is in charge of a statistical database which consists of records of
many individuals, and an analyst sends a query request to the curator to get some aggregate
information about the whole database. The curator can simply compute the query output
by applying the query function to the whole database and send the query output directly
to the analyst. However, this approach may not provide privacy guarantees on each individ-
ual record in the database. To satisfy the differential privacy constraint, a query-releasing
mechanism needs to send a randomized query output to the analyst in a way such that the
probability distribution of the query output does not differ too much, whether or not any
individual record is in the database.
The standard mechanism to achieve differential privacy is to perturb the query output
by adding random noise. If noise is sufficiently large and random, it will help preserve
the differential privacy while the utility which the analyst can get from the query output
will deteriorate. On the other hand, if the noise is very small, while the analyst can get
high utility, it may not satisfy the given privacy constraint. Clearly, there exists a trade-off
between privacy and utility.
In many existing works studying the trade-off between accuracy and privacy in differential
privacy, the usual metric of accuracy is the variance, or magnitude expectation of the noise
added to the query output. For example, Hardt and Talwar [4] study the trade-off between
privacy and error for answering a set of linear queries over a histogram in a differentially
private way, where the error is defined as the worst expectation of the `2-norm of the noise
among all possible query output. Hardt and Talwar [4] derive lower and upper bounds on
the error given the differential privacy constraint. Nikolov, Talwar, and Zhang [5] extend the
result on the trade-off between privacy and error to the case of (, δ)-differential privacy. Li
et al. [6] study how to optimize linear counting queries under differential privacy, where the
error is measured by the mean squared error of query output estimates, which corresponds
to the variance of the noise added to the query output to preserve differential privacy.
More generally, the error can be a general function depending on the additive noise
(distortion) to the query output. Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [7] study a very
general utility-maximization framework for a single count query with sensitivity one under
differential privacy, where the utility (cost) function can be a general function depending
on the noise added to the query output. They show that there exists a universally optimal
mechanism (adding geometric noise) to preserve differential privacy for a general class of
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utility functions under a Bayesian framework. Brenner and Nissim [8] show that for general
query functions, no universally optimal differential privacy mechanisms exist. Gupte and
Sundararajan [9] generalize the result of [7] to a minimax setting.
The main theme of this dissertation is to delve into fundamental limits of data privacy
and derive the optimal mechanisms to preserve differential privacy in the most basic problem
settings, as opposed to preserving privacy for each and every application setting, as is done
in most works in the literature.
1.2 Our Contribution
In this dissertation, we study the fundamental trade-off between privacy and utility of d-
ifferential privacy in the most basic problem settings. Our results can be summarized as
follows:
• -differential privacy in the single dimensional setting :
Given the differential privacy constraint, we derive the optimal differentially private
mechanism for a single real-valued query function under a general utility-maximization
(or cost-minimization) framework. The class of noise probability distributions in the
optimal mechanism has staircase-shaped probability density functions which are sym-
metric (around the origin), monotonically decreasing and geometrically decaying. The
staircase mechanism can be viewed as a geometric mixture of uniform probability dis-
tributions, providing a simple algorithmic description for the mechanism. Furthermore,
the staircase mechanism naturally generalizes to discrete query output settings as well
as more abstract settings. We show that adding query-output independent noise with
staircase distribution is optimal among all randomized mechanisms (subject to a mild
technical condition) that preserve differential privacy.
We explicitly derive the optimal noise probability distributions with minimum expec-
tation of noise amplitude and power. Comparing the optimal performances with those
of the Laplacian mechanism, we show that in the high privacy regime, the Laplacian
mechanism is asymptotically optimal; in the low privacy regime, the staircase mecha-
nism significantly outperforms the Laplacian mechanism. We conclude that the gains
are more pronounced in the low privacy regime.
• -differential privacy in the multiple dimensional setting :
We extend the staircase mechanism from the single dimensional setting to the multi-
ple dimensional setting. We show that for histogram-like query functions, when the
3
dimension of the query output is two, the multiple dimensional staircase mechanism is
optimal for the `1 cost function. We study the asymptotical performance of optimal
mechanisms in the high and low privacy regimes. Comparing the optimal performances
with those of the Laplacian mechanism, we conclude that in the multiple dimensional
setting, the Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal in the high privacy regime,
and the staircase mechanism significantly outperforms the Laplacian mechanism in the
low privacy regime.
• (, δ)-differential privacy :
We study the optimal mechanisms in (, δ)-differential privacy for integer-valued query
functions under a utility-maximization/cost-minimization framework. We show that
the (, δ)-differential privacy is a framework not much more general than the (, 0)-
differential privacy and (0, δ)-differential privacy in the context of `1 and `2 cost func-
tions, i.e., minimum expected noise magnitude and noise power. In the same context of
`1 and `2 cost functions, we show the near-optimality of the uniform noise mechanism
and the discrete Laplacian mechanism in the high privacy regime (as (, δ)→ (0, 0)).
1.3 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 studies the optimal mechanism
in the standard -differential privacy setting for a single real-valued query function, and
presents our main result on the optimality of the staircase mechanism for a general class
of cost functions. Chapter 3 shows the optimality of the staircase mechanism in the multi-
dimensional setting in which the query output has multiple components for the `1 cost
function. Chapter 4 studies the (approximately) optimal mechanisms in (, δ)-differential
privacy. We concludes this dissertation in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 2
THE OPTIMAL MECHANISM IN -DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY: SINGLE DIMENSIONAL SETTING
In this chapter, we study the optimal mechanism in -differential privacy under a utility-
maximization framework. We first give the background on differential privacy in Section 2.1,
then give the precise problem formulation in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 gives an overview of our
main results on the optimality mechanism in -differential privacy. We show the optimality of
query-output independent perturbation in Section 2.4, and present the optimal differentially
private mechanism, staircase mechanism, in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, we apply our main
result to derive the optimal noise probability distribution with minimum expectation of
noise amplitude and power, respectively, and compare the performances with the Laplacian
mechanism. Section 2.7 presents the asymptotic properties of γ∗ in the staircase mechanism
for momentum cost functions, and suggests a heuristic choice of γ that appears to work
well for a wide class of cost functions. Section 2.8 generalizes the staircase mechanism for
integer-valued query functions in the discrete setting, and Section 2.9 extends the staircase
mechanism to the abstract setting. Section 2.10 discusses the connection between our work
and the literature.
2.1 Background on Differential Privacy
The basic problem setting in differential privacy for a statistical database is as follows:
suppose a dataset curator is in charge of a statistical database which consists of records of
many individuals, and an analyst sends a query request to the curator to get some aggregate
information about the whole database. Without any privacy concerns, the database curator
can simply apply the query function to the dataset, compute the query output, and send
the result to the analyst. However, to protect the privacy of individual data in the dataset,
the dataset curator should use a randomized query-answering mechanism such that the
probability distribution of the query output does not differ too much, whether or not any
individual record is in the database.
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Formally, consider a real-valued query function
q : Dn → R,
where Dn is the set of all possible datasets. The real-valued query function q will be applied
to a dataset, and the query output is a real number. Two datasets D1, D2 ∈ Dn are called
neighboring datasets if they differ in at most one element, i.e., one is a proper subset of the
other and the larger dataset contains just one additional element [3]. A randomized query-
answering mechanism K for the query function q will randomly output a number whose
probability distribution depends on query output q(D), where D is the dataset.
Definition 2.1 (-Differential Privacy [3]). A randomized mechanism K gives -differential
privacy if for all data sets D1 and D2 differing in at most one element, and all S ⊂ Range(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D2) ∈ S], (2.1)
where K(D) is the random output of the mechanism K when the query function q is applied
to the dataset D.
The differential privacy constraint (2.1) essentially requires that for all neighboring
datasets, the probability distributions of the output of the randomized mechanism should be
approximately the same. Therefore, for any individual record, its presence or absence in the
dataset will not significantly affect the output of the mechanism, which makes it hard for
adversaries with arbitrary background knowledge to make inferences about any individual
from the released query output information. The parameter  ∈ (0,+∞) quantifies how
private the mechanism is: the smaller  is , the more private the randomized mechanism is.
2.1.1 Operational Meaning of -Differential Privacy in the Context of
Hypothesis Testing
As shown by [10], one can interpret the differential privacy constraint (2.1) in the context
of hypothesis testing in terms of false alarm probability and missing detection probability.
Indeed, consider a binary hypothesis-testing problem over two neighboring datasets, H0 : D1
versus H1 : D2, where an individual’s record is in D2 only. Given a decision rule, let S be
the decision region such that when the released output lies in S, H1 will be rejected, and
when the released output lies in SC (the complement of S), H0 will be rejected. The false
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alarm probability PFA and the missing detection probability PMD can be written as
PFA = P (K(D1) ∈ SC),
PMD = P (K(D2) ∈ S).
Therefore, from (2.1) we get
1− PFA ≤ ePMD.
Thus
ePMD + PFA ≥ 1.
Switch D1 and D2 in (2.1), and we get
Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D1) ∈ S].
Therefore,
1− PMD ≤ ePFA,
and thus
PMD + e
PFA ≥ 1.
In conclusion, we have
ePMD + PFA ≥ 1,
PMD + e
PFA ≥ 1.
The -differential privacy constraint implies that in the context of hypothesis testing, PFA
and PMD cannot both be too small. We plot the regions of PFA and PMD under -differential
privacy in Figure 2.1.
2.1.2 Laplacian Mechanism
The standard approach to preserving -differential privacy is to perturb the query output
by adding random noise with Laplacian distribution proportional to the sensitivity ∆ of the
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Figure 2.1: The Region of PFA and PMD under -Differential Privacy
query function q, where the sensitivity of a real-valued query function is defined as
Definition 2.2 (Query Sensitivity [3]). For a real-valued query function q : Dn → R, the
sensitivity of q is defined as
∆ := max
D1,D2∈Dn
|q(D1)− q(D2)|, (2.2)
for all D1, D2 differing in at most one element.
Formally, the Laplacian mechanism is:
Definition 2.3 (Laplacian Mechanism [11]). For a real-valued query function q : Dn → R
with sensitivity ∆, the Laplacian mechanism will output
K(D) := q(D) + Lap(
∆

),
where Lap(λ) is a random variable with probability density function
f(x) =
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ , ∀x ∈ R.
Consider two neighboring datasets D1 and D2 where |q(D1) − q(D2)| = ∆. It is easy
to compute the trade-off between the false alarm probability PFA and the missing detection
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Figure 2.2: The Region of PFA and PMD under the Laplacian Mechanism
probability PMD under the Laplacian mechanism, which is
PMD =

1− ePFA PFA ∈ [0, 12e−)
e−
4PFA
PFA ∈ [12e−, 12)
e−(1− PFA) PFA ∈ [12 , 1]
(2.3)
The region of PFA and FMD under the Laplacian mechanism for two neighboring datasets
D1 and D2 such that |q(D1)− q(D2)| = ∆ is ploted in Figure 2.2.
Since its introduction in [11], the Laplacian mechanism has become the standard tool
in differential privacy and has been used as the basic building block in a number of works
on differential privacy analysis in other more complex problem settings, e.g., [6, 12–46].
Given this near-routine use of the query-output independent adding of Laplacian noise, the
following two questions are natural:
• Is query-output independent perturbation optimal?
• Assuming query-output independent perturbation, is Lapacian noise distribution op-
timal?
In this dissertation we answer the above two questions. Our main result is that given
an -differential privacy constraint, under a general utility-maximization (equivalently, cost-
minimization) model, for a single real-valued query function (assuming local sensitivity is
the same as global sensitivity),
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• adding query-output independent noise is indeed optimal (under a mild technical con-
dition), and
• the optimal noise distribution is not Laplacian distribution; instead, the optimal one
has a staircase-shaped probability density function.
We also generalize the same result to the discrete setting where the query output is
integer-valued and to more abstract settings.
2.2 Problem Formulation
We formulate a utility-maximization (cost-minimization) problem under the differential pri-
vacy constraint.
2.2.1 Differential Privacy Constraint
A general randomized releasing mechanism K is a family of noise probability distributions
indexed by the query output (denoted by t), i.e.,
K = {Pt : t ∈ R},
and given dataset D, the mechanism K will release the query output t = q(D) corrupted by
additive random noise with probability distribution Pt:
K(D) = t+Xt,
where Xt is a random variable with probability distribution Pt.
The differential privacy constraint (2.1) on K is that for any t1, t2 ∈ R such that |t1−t2| ≤
∆ (corresponding to the query outputs for two neighboring datasets),
Pt1(S) ≤ ePt2(S + t1 − t2),∀ measurable set S ⊂ R, (2.4)
where for any t ∈ R, S + t := {s+ t | s ∈ S}.
10
2.2.2 Utility Model
The utility model we use in this dissertation is a very general one, which is also used in
the works by Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [7], Gupte and Sundararajan [9], and
Brenner and Nissim [8].
Consider a cost function L(·) : R → R, which is a function of the additive noise. Given
additive noise x, the cost is L(x). Given query output t ∈ R, the additive noise is a random
variable with probability distribution Pt, and thus the expectation of the cost is∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx).
The objective is to minimize the worst-case cost among all possible query outputs {t ∈ R},
i.e.,
minimize sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx). (2.5)
2.2.3 Optimization Problem
Combining the differential privacy constraint (2.4) and the objective function (2.5), we for-
mulate a functional optimization problem:
minimize
{Pt}t∈R
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx) (2.6)
subject to Pt1(S) ≤ ePt2(S + t1 − t2),∀ measurable set S ⊆ R, ∀|t1 − t2| ≤ ∆. (2.7)
2.3 An Overview of Our Results
2.3.1 Adding Query-Output Independent Noise Is Optimal
Our first result is that under a mild technical condition, adding query-output independen-
t noise is optimal, i.e., we can assume that Pt ≡ P for all t ∈ R for some probability
distribution P .
For any positive integer n, and for any positive real number T , define
KT,n ,{ {Pt}t∈R | {Pt}t∈R satisfies (2.7), Pt = Pk T
n
, for t ∈ [kT
n
, (k + 1)
T
n
), k ∈ Z,
and Pt+T = Pt,∀t ∈ R }.
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Theorem 2.1. Given any family of probability distribution {Pt}t∈R ∈ ∪T>0 ∪n≥1KT,n, there
exists a probability distribution P∗ such that the family of probability distributions {P∗t }t∈R
with P∗t ≡ P∗ satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.7) and
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P∗t (dx) ≤ sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx).
Theorem 2.1 states that if we assume the family of noise probability distributions is
piecewise constant (the length of pieces can be arbitrarily small) over t, and periodic (the
period can be arbitrary) over t, then in the optimal mechanism we can assume Pt does not
depend on t. We conjecture that the technical condition can be done away with.
2.3.2 Optimal Noise Probability Distribution
Due to Theorem 2.1, adding query-output independent noise is optimal, and thus we only
need to study what the optimal noise probability distribution is. Let P denote the probability
distribution of the noise added to the query output. Then the optimization problem (2.6)
and (2.7) is reduced to
minimize
P
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx)
subject to P(S) ≤ eP(S + d),∀ measurable set S ⊆ R, ∀|d| ≤ ∆.
Consider a staircase-shaped probability distribution with probability density function
(p.d.f.) fγ(·) defined as
fγ(x) =

a(γ) x ∈ [0, γ∆)
e−a(γ) x ∈ [γ∆,∆)
e−kfγ(x− k∆) x ∈ [k∆, (k + 1)∆) for k ∈ N
fγ(−x) x < 0,
where
a(γ) , 1− e
−
2∆(γ + e−(1− γ))
is a normalizing constant to make
∫
x∈R fγ(x)dx = 1.
Our main result is
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Theorem 2.2. If the cost function L(·) is symmetric and increasing, and supx≥T L(x+1)L(x) <
+∞ for some T > 0, the optimal noise probability distribution has a staircase-shaped proba-
bility density function fγ∗(·), where
γ∗ = arg min
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)fγ(x)dx.
We plot the probability density functions of the Laplacian mechanism and the staircase
mechanism in Figure 2.3. Figure 2.4 in Section 2.5 gives a precise description of the staircase
mechanism.
The staircase mechanism is specified by three parameters: , ∆, and γ∗, which is de-
termined by  and the cost function L(·). For certain classes of cost functions, there are
closed-form expressions for the optimal γ∗.
(a) Laplacian Mechanism (b) Staircase Mechanism
Figure 2.3: Probability Density Functions of the Laplacian Mechanism and the Staircase
Mechanism
2.3.3 Applications: Minimum Noise Magnitude and Noise Power
We apply our main result Theorem 2.4 to two typical cost functions L(x) = |x| and L(x) =
x2, which measure noise magnitude and noise power, respectively. We derive the closed-
form expressions for the optimal parameters γ∗ for these two cost functions. Comparing
the optimal performances with those of the Laplacian mechanism, we show that in the high
privacy regime ( is small), the Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal as  → 0;
in the low privacy regime ( is large), the minimum expectation of noise amplitude and
the minimum noise power are Θ(∆e−

2 ) and Θ(∆2e−
2
3 ) as → +∞, respectively, while the
expectation of noise amplitude and the noise power using the Laplacian mechanism are ∆

and 2∆
2
2
, respectively, where ∆ is the sensitivity of the query function. We conclude that the
gains are more pronounced in the low privacy regime.
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2.3.4 Extension to the Discrete Setting
Since for many important practical applications, query functions are integer-valued, we also
derive the optimal differentially private mechanisms for answering a single integer-valued
query function. We show that adding query-output independent noise is optimal under
a mild technical condition, and the optimal noise probability distribution has a staircase-
shaped probability mass function, which can be viewed as the discrete variant of the staircase
mechanism in the continuous setting.
This result helps us directly compare our work and the existing works [7, 9] on integer-
valued query functions. Our result shows that for integer-valued query functions, the optimal
noise probability mass function is also staircase-shaped, and in the case the sensitivity ∆ = 1,
the optimal probability mass function is reduced to the geometric distribution, which was
derived in [7, 9]. Therefore, this result can be viewed as a generalization of [7, 9] in the
discrete setting for query functions with arbitrary sensitivity.
2.4 Optimality of Query-Qutput Independent Perturbation
Recall that the optimization problem we study in this work is
minimize
{Pt}t∈R
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx) (2.8)
subject to Pt1(S) ≤ ePt2(S + t1 − t2),∀ measurable set S ⊆ R, ∀|t1 − t2| ≤ ∆, (2.9)
where Pt is the noise probability distribution when the query output is t.
Our claim is that in the optimal family of probability distributions, Pt can be independent
of t, i.e., the probability distribution of noise is independent of the query output. We prove
this claim under a technical condition which assumes that {Pt}t∈R is piecewise constant and
periodic (the period can be arbitrary) in terms of t.
For any positive integer n, and for any positive real number T , define
KT,n ,{ {Pt}t∈R | {Pt}t∈R satisfies (2.7), Pt = Pk T
n
, for t ∈ [kT
n
, (k + 1)
T
n
), k ∈ Z,
and Pt+T = Pt,∀t ∈ R }.
Theorem 2.3. Given any family of probability distribution {Pt}t∈R ∈ ∪T>0 ∪n≥1KT,n, there
exists a probability distribution P∗ such that the family of probability distributions {P∗t }t∈R
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with P∗t ≡ P∗ satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.7) and
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P∗t (dx) ≤ sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx).
Proof. Here we briefly discuss the main proof technique. For the complete proof, see Ap-
pendix A.1. The proof of Theorem 2.3 uses two properties on the family of probability
distributions satisfying differential privacy constraint (2.7). First, we show that for any
family of probability distributions satisfying (2.7), any translation of the probability distri-
butions will also preserve differential privacy, and the cost is the same. Second, we show that
given a collection of families of probability distributions each of which satisfies (2.7), we can
take a convex combination of them to construct a new family of probability distributions
satisfying (2.7), and the new cost is not worse. Due to these two properties, given any family
of probability distributions {Pt}t∈R ∈ ∪T>0 ∪n≥1 KT,n, one can take a convex combination
of different translations of {Pt}t∈R to construct {P∗t }t∈R with P∗t ≡ P∗, and the cost is not
worse.
Theorem 2.3 states that if we assume the family of noise probability distributions is
piecewise constant (over intervals with length T
n
) in terms of t, and periodic over t (with
period T ), where T, n can be arbitrary, then in the optimal mechanism we can assume Pt
does not depend on t. We conjecture that the technical condition can be done away with.
2.5 Optimal Noise Probability Distribution
Due to Theorem 2.3, to derive the optimal randomized mechanism to preserve differential
privacy, we can restrict our attention to noise-adding mechanisms where the noise probability
distribution does not depend on the query output. In this section we state our main result
Theorem 2.4 on the optimal noise probability distribution.
Let P denote the probability distribution of the noise added to the query output. Then
the optimization problem in (2.6) and (2.7) is reduced to
minimize
P
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) (2.10)
subject to P(S) ≤ eP(S + d),∀ measurable set S ⊆ R, ∀|d| ≤ ∆. (2.11)
We assume that the cost function L(·) satisfies two (natural) properties.
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Figure 2.4: The Staircase-Shaped Probability Density Function fγ(x)
Property 2.1. L(x) is a symmetric function, and monotonically increasing for x ≥ 0, i.e,
L(x) satisfies
L(x) = L(−x),∀x ∈ R,
and
L(x) ≤ L(y),∀0 ≤ x ≤ y.
In addition, we assume L(x) satisfies a mild technical condition which essentially says
that L(·) does not increase too fast (while still allowing it to be unbounded).
Property 2.2. There exists a positive integer T such that L(T ) > 0 and L(x) satisfies
sup
x≥T
L(x+ 1)
L(x) < +∞. (2.12)
Consider a staircase-shaped probability distribution with probability density function
(p.d.f.) fγ(·) defined as
fγ(x) =

a(γ) x ∈ [0, γ∆)
e−a(γ) x ∈ [γ∆,∆)
e−kfγ(x− k∆) x ∈ [k∆, (k + 1)∆) for k ∈ N
fγ(−x) x < 0,
(2.13)
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where
a(γ) , 1− e
−
2∆(γ + e−(1− γ))
is a normalizing constant to make
∫
x∈R fγ(x)dx = 1. It is easy to check that for any γ ∈ [0, 1],
the probability distribution with p.d.f. fγ(·) satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.11).
Indeed, the probability density function fγ(x) satisfies
fγ(x) ≤ efγ(x+ d),∀x ∈ R, |d| ≤ ∆,
which implies (2.11).
Let SP denote the set of all probability distributions satisfying (2.11). Our main result
on the optimal noise probability distribution is:
Theorem 2.4. If the cost function L(x) satisfies Property 2.1 and Property 2.2, then
inf
P∈SP
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)fγ(x)dx.
Proof. Here we briefly discuss the main proof idea and technique. First, by deriving several
properties on the probability distributions satisfying the -differential privacy constraint, we
show that without loss of generality, one can “discretize” any valid probability distribution,
even for those which do not have probability density functions. Second, we show that to
minimize the cost, the probability density function of the discretized probability distribution
should be monotonically and geometrically decaying. Lastly, we show that the optimal prob-
ability density function should be staircase-shaped. For the complete proof, see Appendix
A.2.
Therefore, the optimal noise probability distribution to preserve -differential privacy for
any real-valued query function has a staircase-shaped probability density function, which is
specified by three parameters , ∆, and γ∗ = arg min
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R L(x)fγ(x)dx.
A natural and simple algorithm to generate random noise with staircase distribution is
given in Algorithm 1.
In the formula,
X ← S ((1−B) ((G+ γU)∆) +B ((G+ γ + (1− γ)U)∆)) ,
where
• S determines the sign of the noise,
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Algorithm 1 Generation of a Random Variable with Staircase Distribution
Input: , ∆, and γ ∈ [0, 1].
Output: X, a random variable (r.v.) with staircase distribution specified by ,∆, and
γ.
Generate a r.v. S with Pr[S = 1] = Pr[S = −1] = 1
2
.
Generate a geometric r.v. G with Pr[G = i] = (1− b)bi for integer i ≥ 0, where b = e−.
Generate a r.v. U uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
Generate a binary r.v. B with Pr[B = 0] = γ
γ+(1−γ)b and Pr[B = 1] =
(1−γ)b
γ+(1−γ)b .
X ← S ((1−B) ((G+ γU)∆) +B ((G+ γ + (1− γ)U)∆)).
Output X.
• G determines which interval [G∆, (G+ 1)∆) the noise lies in,
• B determines which subinterval of [G∆, (G+γ)∆) and [(G+γ)∆, (G+ 1)∆) the noise
lies in,
• U helps to uniformly sample the subinterval.
2.6 Applications
In this section, we apply our main result Theorem 2.4 to derive the parameter γ∗ of the stair-
case mechanism with minimum expectation of noise magnitude and noise second moment,
and then compare the performances with the Laplacian mechanism.
2.6.1 Optimal Noise Probability Distribution with Minimum Expectation
of Noise Amplitude
To minimize the expectation of amplitude, we have cost function L(x) = |x|, and it is easy
to see that it satisfies Property 2.1 and Property 2.2.
To simplify notation, define b , e−, and define
V (P) ,
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx)
for a given probability distribution P .
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Theorem 2.5. To minimize the expectation of the amplitude of noise, the optimal noise
probability distribution has probability density function fγ∗(·) with
γ∗ =
1
1 + e

2
,
and the minimum expectation of noise amplitude is
V (Pγ∗) = ∆ e

2
e − 1 .
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Next, we compare the performances of the optimal noise probability distribution and the
Laplacian mechanism. The Laplace distribution has probability density function
f(x) =
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ ,
where λ = ∆

. So the expectation of the amplitude of noise with the Laplace distribution is
VLap ,
∫ +∞
−∞
|x|f(x)dx = ∆

.
By comparing V (Pγ∗) and VLap, it is easy to see that in the high privacy regime (
is small) the Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal, and the additive gap from
optimal value goes to 0 as  → 0; in the low privacy regime ( is large), VLap = ∆ , while
V (Pγ∗) = Θ(∆e− 2 ). Indeed,
Corollary 2.6. Consider the cost function L(x) = |x|. In the high privacy regime ( is
small),
VLap − V (Pγ∗) = ∆
(

24
− 7
3
5760
+O(5)
)
,
as → 0.
And in the low privacy regime ( is large),
VLap =
∆

,
V (Pγ∗) = Θ(∆e− 2 ),
as → +∞.
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Figure 2.5: Optimal γ∗ for the Cost Function L(x) = x2
2.6.2 Optimal Noise Probability Distribution with Minimum Power
Given the probability distribution P of the noise, the power of noise is defined as ∫
x∈R x
2P(dx).
Accordingly, the cost function L(x) = x2, and it is easy to see it satisfies Property 2.1 and
Property 2.2.
Recall b , e−.
Theorem 2.7. To minimize the power of noise (accordingly, L(x) = x2), the optimal noise
probability distribution has probability density function fγ∗(·) with
γ∗ = − b
1− b +
(b− 2b2 + 2b4 − b5)1/3
21/3(1− b)2 ,
and the minimum power of noise is
V (Pγ∗) = ∆2 2
−2/3b2/3(1 + b)2/3 + b
(1− b)2 .
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
We plot γ∗ as a function of b for the cost function L(x) = x2 in Figure 2.5.
Next, we compare the performances of the optimal noise probability distribution and the
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Laplacian mechanism. The power of noise with Laplace distribution with λ = ∆

is
VLap ,
∫ +∞
−∞
x2
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ dx = 2
∆2
2
.
By comparing V (Pγ∗) and VLap, it is easy to see that in the high privacy regime (
is small) the Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal, and the additive gap from
optimal value is upper bounded by a constant as  → 0; in the low privacy regime ( is
large), VLap = Θ(
2∆2
2
), while V (Pγ∗) = Θ(∆2e− 23 ). Indeed,
Corollary 2.8. Consider the cost function L(x) = x2. In the high privacy regime ( is
small),
VLap − V (Pγ∗) = ∆2
(
1
12
− 
2
720
+O(4)
)
,
as → 0.
And in the low privacy regime ( is large),
VLap =
2∆2
2
,
V (Pγ∗) = Θ(∆2e− 23 ),
as → +∞.
2.7 Property of γ∗
In this section, we derive some asymptotic properties of the optimal γ∗ for moment cost
functions, and give a heuristic choice of γ which only depends on .
2.7.1 Asymptotic Properties of γ∗
In Section 2.6, we have seen that for the cost functions L(x) = |x| and L(x) = x2, the
optimal γ∗ lies in the interval [0, 1
2
] for all  and is a monotonically decreasing function of ;
and furthermore, γ∗ → 1
2
as  goes to 0, and γ∗ → 0 as  goes to +∞.
We generalize these asymptotic properties of γ as a function of  to all moment cost
functions. More precisely, given m ∈ N and m ≥ 1,
21
Theorem 2.9. Consider the cost function L(x) = |x|m. Let γ∗ be the optimal γ in the
staircase mechanism for L(x), i.e.,
γ∗ = arg min
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
|x|mfγ(x)dx.
We have
γ∗ → 1
2
, as → 0,
γ∗ → 0, as → +∞.
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Corollary 2.10. For all the cost functions L(·) which can be written as
L(x) =
n∑
i=1
αi|x|di ,
where n ≥ 1, αi ∈ R, di ∈ N and αi, di ≥ 0 for all i, the optimal γ∗ in the staircase mechanism
has the following asymptotic properties:
γ∗ → 1
2
, as → 0,
γ∗ → 0, as → +∞.
2.7.2 A Heuristic Choice of γ
We have shown that in general the optimal γ∗ in the staircase mechanism depends on both
 and the cost function L(·). Here we give a heuristic choice of γ which depends only on ,
and show that the performance is reasonably good in the low privacy regime.
Consider a particular choice of γ, which is
γ˜ :=
b
2
=
e−
2
.
It is easy to see that γ˜ has the same asymptotic properties as the optimal γ∗ for momen-
tum cost functions, i.e.,
γ˜ → 0, as b→ 0,
γ˜ → 1
2
, as b→ 1.
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Furthermore, the probability that the noise magnitude is less than e
−
2
∆ is approximately
1
3
in the low privacy regime (→ +∞). Indeed,
Pr[|X| ≤ e
−
2
∆] = Pr[|X| ≤ γ˜∆] = 2a(γ˜)γ˜∆ = 1− b
γ˜ + b(1− γ˜) γ˜ =
b− b2
3b− b2 ,
which goes to 1
3
as → +∞ (accordingly, b→ 0).
On the other hand, for the Laplacian mechanism,
Pr[|X| ≤ e
−
2
∆] =
∫ e−
2
∆
− e−
2
∆
1
2λ
e−
|x|
λ dx = 1− e− e
−
2 ,
which goes to zero as → +∞.
We conclude that in the low privacy regime as  → +∞, the staircase mechanism with
the heuristic parameter γ˜ = e
−
2
can guarantee with probability about 1
3
the additive noise is
very close to zero, while the probability given by the Laplacian mechanism is approximately
zero.
2.8 Extension to the Discrete Setting
In this section, we extend our main result Theorem 2.3 and Theorem 2.4 to the discrete
settings, and show that the optimal noise-adding mechanism in the discrete setting is a
discrete variant of the staircase mechanism in the continuous setting.
2.8.1 Problem Formulation
We first give the problem formulation in the discrete setting.
Consider an integer-valued query function1
q : Dn → Z,
where Dn is the domain of the databases. Let ∆ denote the sensitivity of the query function
q as defined in (2.2). Clearly, ∆ is an integer in this discrete setting.
In the discrete setting, a generic randomized mechanism K is a family of noise probability
1Without loss of generality, we assume that in the discrete setting the query output is integer-valued.
Indeed, any uniformly spaced discrete setting can be reduced to the integer-valued setting by scaling the
query output.
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distributions over the domain Z indexed by the query output (denoted by i), i.e.,
K = {Pi : i ∈ Z},
and given dataset D, the mechanism K will release the query output i = q(D) corrupted by
additive random noise with probability distribution Pi:
K(D) = i+Xi,
where Xi is a discrete random variable with probability distribution Pi.
Then, the -differential privacy constraint (2.1) on K is that for any i1, i2 ∈ Z such that
|i1− i2| ≤ ∆ (corresponding to the query outputs for two neighboring datasets), and for any
subset S ⊂ Z,
Pi1(j) ≤ ePi2(j + i1 − i2), ∀j ∈ Z, |i1 − i2| ≤ ∆, (2.14)
and the goal is to minimize the worst-case cost
sup
i∈Z
+∞∑
j=−∞
L(j)Pi(j)
subject to the differential privacy constraint (2.14).
2.8.2 Optimality of Query-Qutput Independent Perturbation
In this section, we show that query-output independent perturbation is optimal in the dis-
crete setting.
For any integer n ≥ 1, define
Kn , { {Pi}i∈Z| {Pi}i∈Z satisfies (2.14), and Pi+n = Pi,∀i ∈ Z}.
Theorem 2.11. Given any family of probability distribution {Pi}i∈Z ∈ ∪n≥1Kn, there exists
a probability distribution P∗ such that the family of probability distributions {P∗i }i∈Z with
P∗i ≡ P∗ satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.14) and
sup
i∈Z
+∞∑
j=−∞
L(j)P∗i (j) ≤ sup
i∈Z
+∞∑
j=−∞
L(j)Pi(j).
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Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 2.3, and thus is omitted.
Theorem 2.11 states that if we assume the family of noise probability distributions is
periodic in terms of i (the period can be arbitrary), then in the optimal mechanism we can
assume Pi does not depend on i. We conjecture that the technical condition can be done
away with.
2.8.3 Optimal Noise Probability Distribution
Due to Theorem 2.11, we only need to consider query-output independent perturbation
mechanisms.
Let q(D) be the value of the query function evaluated at dataset D. The noise-adding
mechanism K will output
K(D) = q(D) +X,
where X is the integer-valued noise added by the mechanism to the output of query function.
Let P be the probability distribution of the noise X. Then the optimization problem we
study is
minimize
P
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i) (2.15)
subject to P(i) ≤ eP(i+ d),∀i ∈ Z, d ∈ Z, |d| ≤ |∆|. (2.16)
It turns out that when the cost function L(·) is symmetric and monotonically increasing
for i ≥ 0, the solution to the above optimization problem is a discrete variant of the staircase
mechanism in the continuous setting.
As in the continuous setting, we also assume that the cost function L(·) is symmetric
and monotonically increasing for x ≥ 0, i.e.,
Property 2.3.
L(i) = L(−i), ∀i ∈ Z
L(i) ≤ L(i),∀i, j ∈ Z, 0 ≤ i ≤ j.
The easiest case is ∆ = 1. In the case that ∆ = 1, the solution is the geometric
mechanism, which was proposed in [7].
Recall b , e−.
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Figure 2.6: The Staircase-Shaped Probability Mass Function Pr(i)
Theorem 2.12. If the cost function L(·) satisfies Property 2.3 and ∆ = 1, then the geometric
mechanism, which has a probability mass function P with P(i) = 1−b
1+b
b|i|,∀i ∈ Z, is the
optimal solution to (2.15).
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
For fixed general ∆ ≥ 2, consider a class of symmetric and staircase-shaped probability
mass functions defined as follows. Given an integer 1 ≤ r ≤ ∆, denote Pr as the probability
mass function defined by
Pr(i) =

a(r) 0 ≤ i < r
e−a(r) r ≤ i < ∆
e−kPr(i− k∆) k∆ ≤ i < (k + 1)∆ for k ∈ N
Pr(−i) i < 0
(2.17)
for i ∈ Z, where
a(r) , 1− b
2r + 2b(∆− r)− (1− b) .
It is easy to verify that for any 1 ≤ r ≤ ∆, Pr is a valid probability mass function and it
satisfies the -differential privacy constraint (2.16). We plot the staircase-shaped probability
mass function Pr(i) in Figure 2.6.
Let SP be the set of all probability mass functions which satisfy the -differential privacy
constraint (2.16).
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Theorem 2.13. For ∆ ≥ 2, if the cost function L(x) satisfies Property 2.3, then
inf
P∈SP
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i) = min
{r∈N|1≤r≤∆}
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pr(i).
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Therefore, the optimal noise probability distribution to preserve -differential privacy
for integer-valued query function has a staircase-shaped probability mass function, which is
specified by three parameters , ∆, and r∗ = arg min
{r∈N|1≤r≤∆}
∑+∞
i=−∞ L(i)Pr(i). In the case ∆ = 1,
the staircase-shaped probability mass function is reduced to the geometric mechanism.
2.9 Extension to the Abstract Setting
In this section, we show how to extend the staircase mechanism to the abstract setting. The
approach is essentially the same as the exponential mechanism in [47], except that we replace
the exponential function by the staircase function.
Consider a privacy mechanism which maps an input from a domain Dn to some output
in a range R. Let µ be the base measure of R. In addition, we have a cost function
C : Dn ×R → [0,+∞).
Define ∆ as
∆ , max
r∈R, D1,D2⊆Dn:|D1−D2|≤1
|C(D1, r)− C(D2, r)|,
i.e., the maximum difference of cost function for any two inputs which differ only on one
single value over all r ∈ R [47].
A randomized mechanism K achieves -differential privacy if for any D1, D2 ⊆ Dn such
that |D1 −D2| ≤ 1, and for any measurable subset S ⊂ R,
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D2) ∈ S].
Definition 2.4 (Staircase Mechanism in the Abstract Setting). For fixed γ ∈ [0, 1], given
input D ∈ Dn, the staircase mechanism in the abstract setting will output an element in R
with the probability distribution defined as
PD(S) =
∫
r∈S fγ(C(D, r))µ(dr)∫
r∈R fγ(C(D, r))µ(dr)
,∀ measurable set S ⊂ R,
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where fγ is the staircase-shaped function defined in (2.13).
Theorem 2.14. The staircase mechanism in the abstract setting in Definition 2.4 achieves
2-differential privacy.
Proof. For any D1, D2 ∈ Dn such that |D1 −D2| ≤ 1, and for any measurable set S ⊂ R,
PD1(S) =
∫
r∈S fγ(C(D1, r))µ(dr)∫
r∈R fγ(C(D1, r))µ(dr)
≤ e
∫
r∈S fγ(C(D2, r))µ(dr)∫
r∈R fγ(C(D1, r))µ(dr)
≤ ee
∫
r∈S fγ(C(D2, r))µ(dr)∫
r∈R fγ(C(D2, r))µ(dr)
= e2PD2(S),
where we have used the property that fγ(C(D1, r)) ≤ efγ(C(D2, r)) and fγ(C(D2, r)) ≤
efγ(C(D1, r)) for all r ∈ R.
Therefore, the staircase mechanism in the abstract setting achieves 2-differential privacy
for any γ ∈ [0, 1].
In the case that the output range R is the set of real numbers R and the cost function
C(d, r) = |r − q(d)| for some real-valued query function q, the above mechanism is reduced
to the staircase mechanism in the continuous setting.
2.10 Connection to the Literature
In this section, we discuss the relations of our results and some directly related works in the
literature, and the implications of our results on other works.
2.10.1 Laplacian Mechanism vs. Staircase Mechanism
The Laplacian mechanism is specified by two parameters,  and the query function sensitivity
∆.  and ∆ completely characterize the differential privacy constraint. On the other hand,
the staircase mechanism is specified by three parameters, , ∆, and γ∗, which is determined
by  and the utility function/cost function. For certain classes of utility functions/cost
functions, there are closed-form expressions for the optimal γ∗.
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From the two examples given in Section 2.6, we can see that although the Laplacian mech-
anism is not strictly optimal, in the high privacy regime (→ 0), the Laplacian mechanism
is asymptotically optimal:
• For the expectation of noise amplitude, the additive gap from the optimal values goes
to 0 as → 0,
• For noise power, the additive gap from the optimal values is upper bounded by a
constant as → 0.
However, in the low privacy regime ( → +∞), the multiplicative gap from the optimal
values can be arbitrarily large. We conclude that in the high privacy regime, the Laplacian
mechanism is nearly optimal, while in the low privacy regime, significant improvement can be
achieved by using the staircase mechanism. We plot the multiplicative gain of the staircase
mechanism over the Laplacian mechanism for expectation of noise amplitude and noise power
in Figure 2.7, where VOptimal is the optimal (minimum) cost, which is achieved by the staircase
mechanism, and VLap is the cost of the Laplacian mechanism. We can see that for  ≈ 10,
the staircase mechanism has about 15-fold and 23-fold improvement, with noise amplitude
and power, respectively.
Since the staircase mechanism is derived under the same problem setting as the Laplacian
mechanism, the staircase mechanism can be applied wherever the Laplacian mechanism is
used, and it performs strictly better than the Laplacian mechanism (and significantly better
in low privacy scenarios).
(a) 0 <  ≤ 10 (b) 10 ≤  ≤ 20
Figure 2.7: Multiplicative Gain of the Staircase Mechanism over the Laplacian Mechanism
2.10.2 Relation to Ghosh et al. [7]
Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [7] show that for a single count query with sensi-
tivity ∆ = 1, for a general class of utility functions, to minimize the expected cost under a
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Bayesian framework the optimal mechanism to preserve differential privacy is the geometric
mechanism, which adds noise with geometric distribution.
We discuss the relations and differences between [7] and our work in the following: Both
[7] and our work are similar in that, given the query output, the cost function only depends
on the additive noise magnitude, and is an increasing function of noise magnitude. On the
other hand, there are two main differences:
• Ghosh et al. [7] works under a Bayesian setting, while ours minimizes the worst-case
cost.
• Ghosh et al. [7] studies a count query where the query output is integer-valued and
bounded, and the sensitivity is unity. In our work, we first study a general real-valued
query function where the query output can take any real value, and then generalize
the result to the discrete setting where query output is integer valued. In both cases,
the sensitivity of query functions can be arbitrary, not restricted to one.
2.10.3 Relation to Gupte and Sundararajan [9]
Gupte and Sundararajan [9] derive the optimal noise probability distributions for a single
count query with sensitivity ∆ = 1 for minimax (risk-averse) users. Their model is the same
as the one in [7] except that their objective function is to minimize the worst-case cost, the
same as our objective. Gupte and Sundararajan [9] show that although for a general class of
cost functions, there is no universally optimal solution to the minimax optimization problem
in [9], each solution (corresponding to different cost functions) can be derived from the same
geometric mechanism by randomly remapping.
As in [7], [9] assumes the query-output is bounded. Our results show that when the query
sensitivity is one, without any boundedness knowledge about the query-output, the optimal
mechanism is to add random noise with geometric distribution to the query output.
2.10.4 Relation to Brenner and Nissim [8]
While [7] shows that for a single count query with sensitivity ∆ = 1, there is a universally
optimal mechanism for a general class of utility functions under a Bayesian framework, Bren-
ner and Nissim [8] show that for general query functions, no universally optimal mechanisms
exist. Indeed, this follows directly from our results: under our optimization framework, the
optimal mechanism is adding noise with staircase-shaped probability distribution which is
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specified by three parameters ,∆, and γ∗, where in general γ∗ depends on the cost func-
tion. Generally, for different cost functions, the optimal noise probability distributions have
staircase-shaped probability density functions specified by different parameters.
2.10.5 Relation to Nissim, Raskhodnikova, and Smith [48]
Nissim, Raskhodnikova, and Smith [48] show that for certain nonlinear query functions,
one can improve the accuracy by adding data-dependent noise calibrated to the smooth
sensitivity of the query function, which is based on the local sensitivity of the query function.
In our model, we use the global sensitivity of the query function only, and assume that the
local sensitivity is the same as the global sensitivity, which holds for a general class of query
functions, e.g., count, sum.
2.10.6 Relation to Hardt and Talwar [4]
Hardt and Talwar [4] study the trade-off between privacy and error for answering a set of
linear queries over a histogram in a differentially private way. The error is defined as the
worst expectation of the `2-norm of the noise. The lower bound given in [4] is Ω(−1d
√
d),
where d is the number of linear queries. An immediate consequence of our result is that for
fixed d, when → +∞, an upper bound of Θ(e− 3dd√d) is achievable by adding independent
staircase-shaped noise with parameter 
d
to each component.
2.10.7 Relation to Other Works
Many existing works study how to improve the accuracy for answering more complex queries
under differential privacy, in which the basic building block is the standard Laplacian mech-
anism. For example, Hay et al. [49] show that one can improve the accuracy for a general
class of histogram queries, by exploiting the consistency constraints on the query output,
and Li et al. [6] study how to optimize linear counting queries under differential privacy
by carefully choosing the set of linear queries to be answered. In these works, the error is
measured by the mean squared error of query output estimates, which corresponds to the
variance of the noise added to the query output to preserve differential privacy. In terms
of , the error bound in these works scales linearly to 1
2
, because of the use of Laplacian
noise. If Laplacian distribution is replaced by staircase distribution in these works, one can
improve the error bound to Θ(e−C) (for some constant C which depends on the number of
queries) when → +∞ (corresponding to the low privacy regime).
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CHAPTER 3
THE OPTIMAL MECHANISM IN -DIFFERENTIAL
PRIVACY: MULTIPLE DIMENSIONAL SETTING
In this chapter, we extend the staircase mechanism from the single dimensional setting to
the multiple dimensional setting. We show that for histogram-like query functions, when
the dimension of the query output is two, the multiple dimensional staircase mechanism is
optimal for the `1 cost function. We give the problem formulation in Section 3.1, and present
the main result on the opitmality of the multiple dimensional staircase mechanism in Section
3.2. In Section 3.3, we study the asymptotical performance of the optimal mechanism in
the high and low privacy regimes. Comparing the optimal performances with those of the
Laplacian mechanism, we conclude that in the multiple dimensional setting, the Laplacian
mechanism is asymptotically optimal in the high privacy regime, and the staircase mechanism
significantly outperforms the Laplacian mechanism in the low privacy regime.
3.1 Problem Formulation
Consider a multiple dimensional real-valued query function
q : Dn → Rd,
where Dn is the domain of the databases, and d is the dimension of the query output. Given
D ∈ Dn, the query output can be written as
q(D) = (q1(D), q2(D), . . . , qd(D)),
where qi(D) ∈ R,∀1 ≤ i ≤ d.
The sensitivity of the query function q is defined as
∆ , max
D1,D2⊆Dn:|D1−D2|≤1
‖q(D1)− q(D2)‖1 =
d∑
i=1
|qi(D1)− qi(D2)|, (3.1)
where the maximum is taken over all possible pairs of neighboring database entries D1 and
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D2 which differ in at most one element, i.e., one is a proper subset of the other and the larger
database contains just one additional element [3].
Definition 3.1 (-Differential Privacy [3]). A randomized mechanism K gives -differential
privacy if for all data sets D1 and D2 differing in at most one element, and all S ⊂ Range(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[K(D2) ∈ S]. (3.2)
The standard approach to preserving the differential privacy is to add noise to the output
of the query function. Let q(D) be the value of the query function evaluated at D ⊆ Dn.
Then the noise-adding mechanism K will output
K(D) = q(D) +X = (q1(D) +X1, . . . , qd(D) +Xd),
where X = (X1, . . . , Xd) ∈ Rd is the noise added by the mechanism to the output of the
query function.
In the following, we derive the differential privacy constraint on the probability distribu-
tion of X from (3.2).
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[K(D2) ∈ S]
⇔ Pr[q(D1) +X ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[q(D2) +X ∈ S]
⇔ Pr[X ∈ S − q(D1)] ≤ e Pr[X ∈ S − q(D2)]
⇔ Pr[X ∈ S ′] ≤ e Pr[X ∈ S ′ + q(D1)− q(D2)], (3.3)
where S ′ , S − q(D1) = {s− q(D1)|s ∈ S}.
Since (3.2) holds for all measurable sets S ⊆ Rd, and ‖q(D1)− q(D2)‖1 ≤ ∆, from (3.3)
we have
Pr[X ∈ S ′] ≤ e Pr[X ∈ S ′ + t], (3.4)
for all measurable sets S ′ ⊆ R and for all t ∈ Rd such that ‖t‖1 ≤ ∆.
Consider a cost function L(·) : Rd → R which is a function of the added noise X. Our
goal is to minimize the expectation of the cost, subject to the -differential privacy constraint
(3.4).
More precisely, let P denote the probability distribution of X and let P(S) denote the
probability Pr[X ∈ S]. The optimization problem we study in this work is
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minimize
P
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd
L(x1, x2, . . . , xd)P(dx1dx2 . . . dxd) (3.5)
subject to P(S) ≤ eP(S + t),∀ measurable set S ⊆ Rd, ∀‖t‖1 ≤ ∆. (3.6)
We solve the above functional optimization problem and derive the optimal noise prob-
ability distribution for L(x1, . . . , xd) =
∑d
i=1 |xi|, with d = 2.
3.2 Main Result
In this section we state our main result, Theorem 3.1. The detailed proof is given in Appendix
B.1.
We consider the `1 cost function:
L(x1, x2, . . . , xd) =
d∑
i=1
|xi|,∀(x1, x2, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd.
Consider a class of multiple dimensional probability distributions with symmetric and
staircase-shaped probability density functions defined as follows. Given γ ∈ [0, 1], define Pγ
as the probability distribution with probability density function fγ(·) defined as
fγ(x) =
e−ka(γ) ‖x‖1 ∈ [k∆, (k + γ)∆) for k ∈ Ne−(k+1)a(γ) ‖x‖1 ∈ [(k + γ)∆, (k + 1)∆) for k ∈ N,
where a(γ) is the normalization factor to make∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd
fγ(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd = 1.
Define b , e−, and define
ck ,
+∞∑
i=0
ikbi,∀k ∈ N,
where by convention 00 is defined as 1. Then the closed-form expression for a(γ) is
a(γ) , d!
2d∆d
∑d
k=1
(
d
k
)
cd−k(b+ (1− b)γk)
.
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Figure 3.1: Multiple Dimensional Staircase-Shaped Probability Density Function for d = 2
It is straightforward to verify that fγ(·) is a valid probability density function and Pγ
satisfies the differential privacy constraint (3.6). Indeed, the probability density function
fγ(x) satisfies
fγ(x) ≤ efγ(x + t), ∀x ∈ Rd,∀t ∈ Rd s.t. ‖t‖1 ≤ ∆,
which implies (3.6).
We plot the probability density function fγ(x) in Figure 3.1 for d = 2. It is easy to see
that fγ(x) is multiple dimensionally staircase-shaped.
Let SP be the set of all probability distributions which satisfy the differential privacy
constraint (3.6). Our main result is
Theorem 3.1. For d = 2 and the cost function L(x) = ‖x‖1,∀x ∈ R2, then
inf
P∈SP
∫ ∫
R2
L(x)P(dx1dx2) = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
R2
L(x)fγ(x)dx1dx2.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
Therefore, the optimal noise probability distribution to preserve -differential privacy
for multiple dimensional real-valued query functions has a multiple dimensionally staircase-
shaped probability density function, which is specified by three parameters , ∆, and γ∗ =
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arg min
γ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
R2 L(x1, x2)fγ(x)dx1dx2.
3.3 Optimal γ∗ and Asymptotic Analysis
Note that the closed-form expressions for c0, c1 and c2 are
c0 =
1
1− b,
c1 =
b
(1− b)2 ,
c2 =
b2 + b
(1− b)3 .
For d = 2, we have
a(γ) =
1
2∆2 (2c1(b+ (1− b)γ) + c0(b+ (1− b)γ2))
=
1
2∆2
(
γ2 + 2b
1−bγ +
b+b2
(1−b)2
) .
Given the two-dimensional staircase-shaped probability density function fγ(x), the cost
is
V (Pγ) ,
∫ ∫
R2
(|x1|+ |x2|)fγ(x1, x2)P(dx1dx2)
= 4
(
+∞∑
i=0
∫ (i+γ)∆
i∆
tta(γ)e−idt+
+∞∑
i=0
∫ (i+1)∆
(i+γ)∆
tta(γ)e−(i+1)dt
)
=
4a(γ)∆3
3
(
+∞∑
i=0
bi(3i2γ + 3iγ2 + γ3) + b
+∞∑
i=0
bi(3i2 + 3i+ 1− 3i2γ − 3iγ2 − γ3)
)
=
4a(γ)∆3
3
(
3c2γ + 3c1γ
2 + c0γ
3 + b(3(1− γ)c2 + 3(1− γ2)c1 + (1− γ3)c0)
)
=
2∆
3
3c2γ + 3c1γ
2 + c0γ
3 + b(3(1− γ)c2 + 3(1− γ2)c1 + (1− γ3)c0)
γ2 + 2b
1−bγ +
b+b2
(1−b)2
=
2∆
3
c0(1− b)γ3 + 3c1(1− b)γ2 + 3c2(1− b)γ + b(c0 + 3c1 + 3c2)
γ2 + 2b
1−bγ +
b+b2
(1−b)2
=
2∆
3
γ3 + 3b
1−bγ
2 + 3(b
2+b)
(1−b)2 γ + b
1+4b+b2
(1−b)3
γ2 + 2b
1−bγ +
b+b2
(1−b)2
. (3.7)
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Figure 3.2: The Optimal γ∗ as a Function of b
Therefore, in the two-dimensional setting, the optimal γ∗ is
γ∗ = arg min
γ∈[0,1]
γ3 + 3b
1−bγ
2 + 3(b
2+b)
(1−b)2 γ + b
1+4b+b2
(1−b)3
γ2 + 2b
1−bγ +
b+b2
(1−b)2
.
By setting the derivative of (3.7) to be zero, we use Mathematica to get a closed-form
expression for γ∗, which is too complicated to show here. We plot γ∗ as a function of b in
Figure 3.2.
The optimal cost V ∗ = V (Pγ∗). We use Mathematica to analyze the asymptotic behavior
of V ∗ as → 0 and → +∞. Indeed, we have
Corollary 3.2. In the high privacy regime,
V ∗ =
2∆

− ∆
2
36
√
3
+O(3), → 0,
and in the low privacy regime,
V ∗ = 3
√
2∆e−

3 +
∆e−
2
3
3
√
2
+ o(e−
2
3 ), → +∞.
The Laplacian mechanism adds independent Laplacian noise to each component of the
query output, and the cost is 2∆

. Therefore, in the high privacy regime, the gap between
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optimal cost and the cost achieved by the Laplacian mechanism goes to zero, as → 0, and
we conclude the Laplacian mechanism is approximately optimal in the high privacy regime.
However, in the low privacy regime (as  → +∞), the optimal cost is proportional to e− 3 ,
while the cost of the Laplacian mechanism is proportional to 1

. We conclude the gap is
significant in the low privacy regime.
It is natural to compare the performance of the optimal multiple dimensional staircase
mechanism and the composite single dimensional staircase mechanism which adds indepen-
dent staircase noise to each component of the query output. If independent staircase noise
is added to each component of the query output, to satisfy the -differential privacy con-
straint, the parameter of the staircase noise is 
2
instead of , and thus the total cost will be
proportional to e−

4 , which is worse than the optimal cost Θ(e−

3 ).
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CHAPTER 4
THE OPTIMAL MECHANISM IN
(, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this chapter, we study the optimal mechanism in (, δ)-differential privacy for integer-
valued query functions. We show that the (, δ)-differential privacy is a framework not much
more general than the (, 0)-differential privacy and (0, δ)-differential privacy in the context
of `1 and `2 cost functions, i.e., minimum expected noise magnitude and noise power. In
the same context of `1 and `2 cost functions, we show the near-optimality of uniform noise
mechanism and the discrete Laplacian mechanism in the high privacy regime (as (, δ) →
(0, 0)).
We formulate the utility-maximization/cost-minimization under the (, δ)-differential pri-
vacy constraint as a linear programming problem in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we study
(0, δ)-differential privacy, and show the near-optimality of the simple uniform noise mech-
anism. In Section 4.4, we study the optimal mechanisms in (, δ)-differential privacy, and
show the optimality of the uniform noise mechanism and the Laplacian mechanism in the
regime (, δ)→ (0, 0) in the context of `1 and `2 cost functions. In Section 4.5, we extend the
results to the multiple dimensional setting where the query output is a vector of integers.
4.1 Introduction
(, δ)-differential privacy is a relaxed notion of privacy, compared to the standard -differential
privacy introduced in [11]. (, δ)-differential privacy includes as special cases:
• (, 0)-differential privacy. In this standard setting, the optimal mechanism for a general
cost minimization framework is the staircase mechanism as shown in [50]. In the high
privacy regime, the standard discrete Laplacian mechanism also performs well.
• (0, δ)-differential privacy. This setting requires that the total variation of the condi-
tional probability distributions of the query output for neighboring datasets should be
bounded by δ. We show that the uniform noise distribution is near-optimal in the
(0, δ)-differential privacy setting for a general class of cost functions.
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While the (, δ)-differential privacy setting is more general than the two special cases –
(, 0) and (0, δ)-differential privacy – our main result in this chapter is to show that it is only
more general by very little; this is done in the context of `1 and `2 cost functions. We show
the near-optimality of uniform noise mechanism and discrete Laplacian mechanisms in the
high privacy regime (as (, δ)→ (0, 0)) for `1 and `2 cost functions.
The near-optimality of the two mechanisms (designed for the special cases of (, 0) and
(0, δ) differential privacy settings) is proved by demonstrating a uniform bound on the ratio
between the costs of these two mechanisms and that of the optimal cost in the (, δ) differ-
ential privacy setting in the high privacy regime, i.e., as (, δ) → (0, 0) for `1 and `2 cost
functions.
4.1.1 Summary of Our Results
We summarize our results in the following. Let VLB denote the lower bound we derived for
the cost under the differential privacy constraint. Let V
Lap
UB and V
uniform
UB denote the upper
bounds for the cost achieved by the discrete Laplacian mechanism and the uniform noise
mechanism. We show that
• For integer-valued query functions,
– for (0, δ)-differential privacy with the global sensitivity ∆ = 1, the uniform noise
mechanism is optimal for all generic cost funtions,
– for (0, δ)-differential privacy with arbitrary global sensitivity ∆,
lim
δ→0
V uniformUB
VLB
= 1
for `1 and `2 cost functions,
– for (, δ)-differential privacy with `1 and `2 cost functions,
lim
(,δ)→(0,0)
min(V
Lap
UB , V
uniform
UB )
VLB
≤ C
for some numerical constant C.
• For multiple dimensional integer-valued query functions,
– for (0, δ)-differential privacy with the global sensitivity ∆ = 1, the multiple di-
mensional uniform noise mechanism is optimal for `1 and `2 cost funtions,
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– for (0, δ)-differential privacy with arbitrary global sensitivity ∆, limδ→0
VuniformUB
VLB
=
1 for `1 and `2 cost functions,
– for (, δ)-differential privacy with `1 and `2 cost functions,
lim
(,δ)→(0,0)
min(V
Lap
UB , V
uniform
UB )
VLB
≤ C
for some numerical constant C, which is independent of the dimension of the
query function.
4.2 Problem Formulation
Consider an integer-valued query function
q : Dn → Z,
where Dn is the domain of the databases.
The sensitivity of the query function q is defined as
∆ , max
D1,D2⊆Dn:|D1−D2|≤1
|q(D1)− q(D2)|, (4.1)
where the maximum is taken over all possible pairs of neighboring database entries D1 and
D2 which differ in at most one element, i.e., one is a proper subset of the other and the larger
database contains just one additional element [3]. Clearly, ∆ is an integer in this discrete
setting.
Definition 4.1 ((, δ)-Differential Privacy [18]). A randomized mechanism K gives -differential
privacy if for all data sets D1 and D2 differing in at most one element, and all S ⊂ Range(K),
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] + δ. (4.2)
4.2.1 Operational Meaning of (, δ)-Differential Privacy in the Context of
Hypothesis Testing
As shown by [10], one can interpret the differential privacy constraint (4.2) in the context
of hypothesis testing in terms of false alarm probability and missing detection probability.
Indeed, consider a binary hypothesis testing problem over two neighboring datasets, H0 : D1
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versus H1 : D2, where an individual’s record is in D2 only. Given a decision rule, let S be the
decision region such that when the released output lies in S, H1 will be rejected, and when
the released output lies in SC (the complement of S), H0 will be rejected. The false-alarm
probability PFA and the missing-detection probability PMD can be written as
PFA = P (K(D1) ∈ SC),
PMD = P (K(D2) ∈ S).
Therefore, from (4.2) we get
1− PFA ≤ ePMD + δ.
Thus
ePMD + PFA ≥ 1− δ.
Switch D1 and D2 in (4.2), and we get
Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] + δ.
Therefore,
1− PMD ≤ ePFA + δ,
and thus
PMD + e
PFA ≥ 1− δ.
In conclusion, we have
ePMD + PFA ≥ 1− δ,
PMD + e
PFA ≥ 1− δ.
The (, δ)-differential privacy constraint implies that in the context of hypothesis testing,
PFA and PMD cannot both be too small.
We plot the regions of PFA and PMD under (, δ)-differential privacy, and under two
special cases: (, 0) and (0, δ)-differential privacy, in Figure 4.1.
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(a) (, δ)-Differential Privacy
(b) (, 0)-Differential Privacy (c) (0, δ)-Differential Privacy
Figure 4.1: Regions of PMD and PFA in (, δ), (, 0) and (0, δ)-Differential Privacy
4.2.2 Cost-Minimization/Utility-Maximization Formulation
The standard approach to preserving the differential privacy is to add noise to the output
of query function. Let q(D) be the value of the query function evaluated at D ⊆ Dn, the
noise-adding mechanism K will output
K(D) = q(D) +X,
where X is the noise added by the mechanism to the output of query function. To make the
output of the mechanism be valid, i.e., q(D) +X ∈ Z, X can only take integer values.
Let P be the probability mass function of the noise X, and let Pi denote Pr[X = i]. For
a set S ⊂ Z, denote Pr[X ∈ S] by PS.
In the following we derive the differential privacy constraint on the probability distribu-
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tion of X from (4.2).
Pr[K(D1) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[K(D2) ∈ S] + δ
⇔ Pr[q(D1) +X ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[q(D2) +X ∈ S] + +δ
⇔ PS−q(D1) ≤ exp() PS−q(D2) + δ
⇔ PS′ ≤ exp() PS′+q(D1)−q(D2) + δ, (4.3)
where S ′ , S − q(D1) = {s− q(D1)|s ∈ S}.
Since (4.2) holds for any set S ⊆ Z, and |q(D1)− q(D2)| ≤ ∆, from (4.3), we have
PS ≤ exp() PS+d + δ, (4.4)
for any set S ⊆ Z and for all |d| ≤ ∆.
Consider a cost function L(·) : Z→ R, which is a function of the added noise X. Our goal
is to minimize the expectation of the cost subject to the (, δ)-differential privacy constraint
(4.4):
V ∗ := min
P
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i)
subject to PS ≤ exp() PS+d + δ, ∀S ⊂ Z, d ∈ Z, |d| ≤ |∆|.
We restrict our attention to the scenario when the cost function L(k) is symmetric
(around k = 0) and monotonically increasing for k ≥ 0. Furthermore, without loss of
generality, we assume L(0) = 0. Using the same argument in Lemma 28 in [50], we only
need to consider symmetric noise probability distributions.
4.3 (0, δ)-Differential Privacy
We first consider the simple case when  = 0, i.e., (0, δ)-differential privacy. The (0, δ)-
differential privacy constraint requires that the total variation of the conditional probability
distributions of the query output for neighboring datasets should be bounded by δ.
In the differential privacy constraint (4.4), by choosing the subset S = Sk := {` : ` ≥ k}
for k ∈ N and d = ∆, we see that the noise probability distribution P must satisfy the
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constraints
∆−1∑
`=0
Pk+` ≤ δ, ∀k ∈ N. (4.5)
4.3.1 ∆ = 1
In the special case ∆ = 1, the constraints in (4.5) are particularly simple:
pk ≤ δ; ∀k ≥ 0.
For symmetric cost functions L(k) that are monotonically increasing in k ≥ 0, we can now
readily argue that the uniform probability distribution is optimal.
To avoid integer rounding issues, assume 1
2δ
is an integer.
Theorem 4.1. If ∆ = 1, then
V ∗ =
1
2δ
−1∑
k=− 1
2δ
δL(k),
and the optimal noise probability distribution is
Pk =
δ − 12δ ≤ k ≤ 12δ − 10 otherwise . (4.6)
4.3.2 General Lower Bound for ∆ ≥ 2
We now turn to understanding near-optimal (0, δ) privacy mechanisms in terms of minimizing
the expected loss when the sensitivity ∆ ≥ 2.
Recall that in (0, δ)-differential privacy, the minimum cost V ∗ is the result of the following
optimization problem, which is a linear program:
V ∗ := min
+∞∑
k=−∞
L(k)Pk
such that pk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ N
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+∞∑
k=−∞
Pk = 1
PS ≤ PS+d + δ,∀S ⊂ Z, d ∈ Z, |d| ≤ |∆|. (4.7)
Since L(·) is a symmetric function, we can assume P is a symmetric probability distri-
bution. In addition, we relax the constraint (4.7) by choosing d = ∆ and S = Sk for k ∈ N.
Then we get a relaxed linear program, the solution of which is a lower bound for V ∗. More
precisely,
VLB := min 2
∞∑
k=1
L(k)Pk (4.8)
such that Pk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ N
P0
2
+
∞∑
k=1
Pk ≥ 1
2
(4.9)
−
∆−1∑
`=0
Pk+` ≥ −δ, ∀k ∈ N. (4.10)
To avoid integer rounding issues, assume 1
2δ
is a positive integer.
Theorem 4.2. If
L(1 + ∆
2δ
) ≥ 2
L(1) + 12δ∑
i=1
(L(1 + i∆)− L(i∆))
 , (4.11)
then
V ∗ ≥ VLB = 2δ
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆). (4.12)
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
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4.3.3 Uniform Noise Mechanism
Consider the noise with the uniform probability distribution:
Pk =
 δ∆ ∀ − ∆2δ ≤ k ≤ ∆2δ − 10 otherwise (4.13)
It is readily verified that this noise probability distribution satisfies the (0, δ) differential
privacy constraint. Therefore, an upper bound for V ∗ is
Theorem 4.3.
V ∗ ≤ VUB , 2
∆
2δ
−1∑
i=1
δ
∆
L(i) + δ
∆
L( ∆
2δ
). (4.14)
4.3.4 Comparison of VLB and VUB
We first apply the lower bound (4.12) and upper bound (4.14) to the `1 and `2 cost functions,
i.e., L(i) = |i| and L(i) = i2, in which V ∗ corresponds to the minimum expected noise
amplitude and minimum noise power, respectively.
Note that in the case L(i) = |i|, the condition (4.11) in Theorem 4.2 is
∆
2δ
≥ 1
δ
+ 1. (4.15)
When ∆ ≥ 3, (4.11) holds.
Corollary 4.4. For the cost function L(i) = |i|,
VLB =
∆
4δ
+ 1− ∆
2
,
VUB =
∆
4δ
,
and thus the additive gap
VUB − VLB = ∆
2
− 1
is a constant independent of δ.
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In the case L(i) = i2, the condition (4.11) in Theorem 4.2 is
∆
2δ2
(
∆
2
− 1) ≥ 1
δ
+ 1. (4.16)
When ∆ ≥ 3, (4.16) holds.
Corollary 4.5. For the cost function L(i) = i2,
VLB =
∆2
12δ2
− ∆
2
4δ
+ ∆(
1
2δ
− 1) + ∆
2
6
+ 1,
VUB =
∆2
12δ2
+
1
6
,
and thus the multiplicative gap
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
= 1.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Corollary 4.6. Given a positive integer m, consider the cost function L(i) = |i|m. Then
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
= 1.
Proof. By induction, it is easy to show that
∑n
i=1 i
m = Θ(n
m+1
m+1
), and
lim
n→+∞
∑n
i=1 i
m
nm+1
m+1
= 1.
Therefore,
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
= lim
δ→0
2 δ
∆
∑ ∆
2δ
−1
i=1 i
m + δ
∆
∆m
(2δ)m
2δ
∑ 1
2δ
−1
i=0 (1 + i∆)
m
= lim
δ→0
2 δ
∆
∆m+1
(2δ)m+1
m+1
2δ∆m
( 1
2δ
)m+1
m+1
= 1.
For general cost functions, we have the following bound on the multiplicative gap between
the lower bound and upper bound.
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Corollary 4.7. Given a cost function L(·) satisfying
sup
k≥T
L(k)
L(k −∆ + 1) ≤ C,
for some integer T ∈ N, and some positive number C ∈ R, then
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
≤ 1 + (1 + 1
2∆
)C.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
4.4 (, δ)-Differential Privacy
Recall that since L(·) is a symmetric function, without loss of generality, we can restrict
ourselves to symmetric noise probability distributions, i.e.,
Pk = P−k,∀k ∈ Z. (4.17)
The differential privacy constraint in (4.4) can be understood in some detail by choosing
the subset S = Sk := {` : ` ≥ k} for k ∈ N. In this case we see that the noise probability
distribution must satisfy the following constraints. For k = 0 and d = ∆,
PS0 ≤ ePS∆ + δ. (4.18)
By using the symmetry condition in (4.17) and the fact that
∑+∞
`=−∞P` = 1, from (4.18)
we get
P0 1 + e

2
+ e
∆−1∑
`=1
P` ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
.
For k = 1 and d = ∆, we have
PS1 ≤ ePS∆+1 + δ,
and thus
P0 e
 − 1
2
+ e
∆∑
`=1
P` ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
.
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For general k ≥ 2 and d = ∆, we have
PSk ≤ ePS∆+k + δ,
and thus
P0 e
 − 1
2
+ (e − 1)
k−1∑
`=1
P` + e
k+∆−1∑
`=k
P` ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
.
4.4.1 Lower Bound
By restricting the set S in (4.4) to be Sk := {` : ` ≥ k} for k ∈ Z and restricting d to be ∆,
we get the following relaxed linear program, the solution of which is a lower bound for V ∗:
VLB := min 2
∞∑
k=1
L(k)Pk
such that Pk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ N
P0
2
+
∞∑
k=1
Pk ≥ 1
2
(4.19)
P0 1 + 

2
+ e
∆−1∑
k=1
Pk ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
(4.20)
P0 e
 − 1
2
+ e
∆∑
k=1
Pk ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
(4.21)
P0 e
 − 1
2
+ (e − 1)
i−1∑
k=1
Pk + e
i+∆−1∑
k=i
Pk ≤ δ + e
 − 1
2
,∀i ≥ 2. (4.22)
Define
a ,
δ + e
−1
2
e
,
b , e−.
To avoid integer rounding issues, assume that there exists an integer n such that
n−1∑
k=0
abk =
1
2
.
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Theorem 4.8. If
n−1∑
i=1
e−i(2L(i∆)− L(1 + (i− 1)∆)− L(1 + i∆)) ≥ L(1),
then we have
V ∗ ≥ VLB = 2
n−1∑
k=0
δ + e
−1
2
e
e−kL(1 + k∆). (4.23)
Proof. See Appendix C.4.
4.4.2 Upper Bound: the Uniform Noise Mechanism and the Discrete
Laplacian Mechanism
Since (0, δ)-differential privacy implies (, δ)-differential privacy, we can use the uniform noise
mechanism with noise probability distribution defined in (4.13) to preserve (, δ)-differential
privacy, and the corresponding upper bound is
Theorem 4.9. For (, δ)-differential privacy, we have
V ∗ ≤ V uniformUB = 2
∆
2δ
−1∑
i=1
δ
∆
L(i) + δ
∆
L( ∆
2δ
). (4.24)
On the other hand, if we simply ignore the parameter δ (i.e., set δ = 0), we can use
a discrete variant of Laplacian distribution to satisfy the (, 0)-differential privacy, which
implies (, δ)-differential privacy.
More precisely, define λ , e− ∆ .
Theorem 4.10. The probability distribution P with
pk ,
1− λ
1 + λ
λ|k|,∀k ∈ Z,
satisfies the (, δ)-differential privacy constraint, and the corresonding cost is
+∞∑
k=−∞
pkL(k) = 2
+∞∑
k=1
1− λ
1 + λ
λkL(k).
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Corollary 4.11.
V ∗ ≤ V LapUB , 2
+∞∑
k=1
1− λ
1 + λ
λkL(k). (4.25)
4.4.3 Comparison of Lower Bound and Upper Bound
In this section, we compare the lower bound (4.23) and the upper bounds V uniformUB and
V
Lap
UB for (, δ)-differential privacy for the `
1 and `2 cost functions, i.e., L(i) = |i| and
L(i) = i2, in which V ∗ corresponds to the minimum expected noise amplitude and minimum
noise power, respectively. We show that the multiplicative gap between the lower bound and
upper bound is bounded by a constant as (, δ)→ (0, 0).
 ≤ δ Regime
We first compare the gap between the lower bound VLB and the upper bound V
uniform
UB in
the regime  ≤ δ as δ → 0.
Corollary 4.12. For the cost function L(k) = |k|, in the regime  ≤ δ, we have
lim
δ→0
V
uniform
UB
VLB
≤ 1
4(1− 2 log 3
2
)
≈ 1.32
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
Corollary 4.13. For the cost function L(k) = k2, in the regime  ≤ δ, we have
lim
δ→0
V
uniform
UB
VLB
≤ 1
12(2− 4 log(3
2
)− 2(log(3
2
))2)
≈ 5
3
.
Proof. See Appendix C.6.
δ ≤  Regime
We then compare the gap between the lower bound VLB and the upper bound V
Lap
UB in the
regime δ ≤  as → 0.
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Corollary 4.14. For the cost function L(k) = |k|, in the regime δ ≤ , we have
lim
→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
≤ 1
1− 2 log 3
2
≈ 5.29.
Proof. See Appendix C.7.
Corollary 4.15. For the cost function L(k) = k2, in the regime  ≤ δ, we have
lim
δ→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
≤ 2
(2− 4 log(3
2
)− 2(log(3
2
))2)
≈ 40.
Proof. See Appendix C.8.
4.5 (, δ)-Differential Privacy in the Multiple Dimensional Setting
In this section we consider the (, δ)-differential privacy in the multiple dimensional setting,
where the query output has multiple components and the global sensitivity ∆ is defined as
the maximum `1 norm of the difference of the query outputs over two neighboring datasets.
Let d be the dimension of the query output. Hence, the query output q(D) ∈ Zd. Let
P be the probability mass function of the additive noise over the domain Zd. Then the
(, δ)-differential privacy constraint on P in the multiple dimensional setting is that
PS ≤ PS+v + δ, ∀S ⊂ Zd,v ∈ Zd, ‖v‖1 ≤ ∆. (4.26)
Consider a cost function L(·) : Zd → R, which is a function of the added noise X.
Our goal is to minimize the expectation of the cost subject to the (, δ)-differential privacy
constraint (4.26):
V ∗ := min
P
∑
v∈Zd
L(v)P(v)
subject to PS ≤ PS+v + δ, ∀S ⊂ Zd,v ∈ Zd, ‖v‖1 ≤ ∆.
4.5.1 (0, δ)-Differential Privacy
We first consider the simple case when  = 0, i.e., (0, δ)-differential privacy. The (0, δ)-
differential privacy constraint requires that the total variation of the conditional probability
distributions of the query output for neighboring datasets should be bounded by δ.
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In the differential privacy constraint (4.26), by choosing the subset
S = Smk := {(i1, i2, . . . , id) ∈ Zd | im ≥ k}
for k ∈ N, m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}, and choosing v such that only one compoment is ∆ and all
other components are zero, we see that the noise probability distribution P must satisfy the
constraints ∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd:k≤im≤k+∆−1
P(i1, i2, . . . , id) ≤ δ, ∀k ∈ N,∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}.
To avoid integer-rounding issues, we assume that 1
2δ
is an integer.
Lower Bound on V ∗
We relax the constraint (4.26) by choosing S to be Smk and choosing v such that only one
compoment is ∆ and all other components are zero. Then we get a relaxed linear program,
the solution of which is a lower bound for V ∗. More precisely,
V ∗ ≥ VLB := min
∑
i∈Zd
P(i)L(i) (4.27)
such that P(i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Zd∑
i∈Zd
P(i) ≥ 1∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd:k≤im≤k+∆−1
P(i1, i2, . . . , id) ≤ δ, ∀k ∈ N,∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}.
Theorem 4.16. In the case L(i) = ‖i‖1,∀i ∈ Zd, we have
VLB ≥ d∆
4δ
− ∆− 1
2
d.
Proof. See Appendix C.9.
Theorem 4.17. In the case L(i) = ‖i‖22 =
∑d
m=1 i
2
m, ∀i = (i1, . . . , id) ∈ Zd, we have
VLB ≥ d∆
2
12δ2
+ (
1
∆
− 1)d∆
2
4δ
+
1−∆
2
d+
d∆2
6
.
Proof. See Appendix C.10.
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Uniform Noise Mechanism in the Multiple Dimensional Setting
Consider the noise with the uniform probability distribution:
P(i1, i2, . . . , id) =
 δ
d
∆d
−∆
2δ
≤ im ≤ ∆2δ − 1, ∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}
0 otherwise
. (4.28)
It is readily verified that this noise probability distribution satisfies the (0, δ) differential
privacy constraint (4.26). Therefore, an upper bound for V ∗ is
Theorem 4.18.
V ∗ ≤ VUB ,
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd | − ∆2δ≤im≤ ∆2δ−1,∀m∈{1,2,...,d}
δd
∆d
L(i1, i2, . . . , id). (4.29)
Corollary 4.19. In the case L(i) = ‖i‖1, ∀i ∈ Zd, we have
VUB =
d∆
4δ
.
Proof.
VUB =
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd | − ∆2δ≤im≤ ∆2δ−1,∀m∈{1,2,...,d}
δd
∆d
L(i1, i2, . . . , id)
=
∆
2δ
−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
· · ·
∆
2δ
−1∑
id=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
(|i1|+ · · ·+ |id|)
= d
∆
2δ
−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
· · ·
∆
2δ
−1∑
id=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
|i1|
= d
(
∆
δ
)d−1 ∆2δ−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
|i1|
= d
(
∆
δ
)d−1
δd
∆d
(
(1 + ∆
2δ
) ∆
2δ
2
+
∆
2δ
( ∆
2δ
− 1)
2
)
=
d∆
4δ
.
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Corollary 4.20. In the case L(i) = ‖i‖22 ,
∑d
m=1 i
2
m,∀i = (i1, . . . , id) ∈ Zd, we have
VUB =
d∆2
12δ2
+
d
6
.
Proof.
VUB =
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd | − ∆2δ≤im≤ ∆2δ−1,∀m∈{1,2,...,d}
δd
∆d
L(i1, i2, . . . , id)
=
∆
2δ
−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
· · ·
∆
2δ
−1∑
id=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
(|i1|2 + · · ·+ |id|2)
= d
∆
2δ
−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
· · ·
∆
2δ
−1∑
id=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
|i1|2
= d
(
∆
δ
)d−1 ∆2δ−1∑
i1=− ∆2δ
δd
∆d
|i1|2
= d
(
∆
δ
)d−1
δd
∆d
(
∆
2δ
(1 + ∆
2δ
)(∆
δ
+ 1)
6
+
( ∆
2δ
− 1) ∆
2δ
(∆
δ
− 1)
6
)
=
d∆2
12δ2
+
d
6
.
Comparison of Lower Bound and Upper Bound for the `1 Cost Function
Corollary 4.21. For the cost function L(i) = ‖i‖1,
VLB ≥ d∆
4δ
− ∆− 1
2
d,
VUB =
d∆
4δ
,
and thus the additive gap
VUB − VLB ≤ ∆− 1
2
d,
which is a constant independent of δ.
In the case that ∆ = 1, the additive gap ∆−1
2
d is zero, and thus VLB = VUB.
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Corollary 4.22. For the cost function L(i) = ‖i‖1, if ∆ = 1, then
V ∗ = VUB = VLB =
d∆
4δ
,
and thus the uniform noise mechanism is optimal in this setting.
Corollary 4.23. For the cost function L(i) = ‖i‖22,
VLB ≥ d∆
2
12δ2
+ (
1
∆
− 1)d∆
2
4δ
+
1−∆
2
d+
d∆2
6
,
VUB =
d∆2
12δ2
+
d
6
,
and thus
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
= 1.
In the case that ∆ = 1,
VLB ≥ d
12δ2
+
d
6
= VUB,
and thus VLB = VUB.
Corollary 4.24. For the cost function L(i) = ‖i‖22, if ∆ = 1, then
V ∗ = VUB = VLB =
d
12δ2
+
d
6
,
and thus the uniform noise mechanism is optimal in this setting.
4.5.2 (, δ)-Differential Privacy
The (, δ)-differential privacy constraint on the probability mass function P in the multiple
dimensional setting is that
PS ≤ ePS+v + δ, ∀S ⊂ Zd,v ∈ Zd, ‖v‖1 ≤ ∆.
We relax this constraint by choosing S to be Smk and choosing v such that only one
compoment is ∆ and all other components are zero. Then we get a relaxed linear program,
the solution of which is a lower bound for V ∗. More precisely,
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V ∗ ≥ VLB := min
∑
i∈Zd
P(i)L(i) (4.30)
such that P(i) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ Zd∑
i∈Zd
P(i) ≥ 1
∀k ∈ N,∀m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd:k≤im≤k+∆−1
P(i1, i2, . . . , id)− (e − 1)
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd:im≥k+∆
P(i1, i2, . . . , id) ≤ δ.
We are interested in characterizing V ∗ for the `1 and `2 cost functions in the high privacy
regime when (, δ)→ (0, 0).
Lower Bound for the `1 Cost Function
The dual linear program of (4.30) for the `1 cost function L(i) = ‖i‖1 is that
VLB := max µ− δ
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
such that y
(1)
i1
, y
(2)
i2
, . . . , y
(d)
id
≥ 0, ∀i1 ∈ Z, i2 ∈ Z, . . . , id ∈ Z
µ−
∑
i1∈[k1−∆+1,k1]
y
(1)
i1
+ (e − 1)
∑
i1≤k1−∆
y
(1)
i1
− · · · −
∑
id∈[kd−∆+1,kd]
y
(d)
id
+ (e − 1)
∑
id≤kd−∆
y
(d)
id
≤ |k1|+ |k2|+ · · ·+ |kd|,∀(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zd.
Given the parameters (, δ), let β = max(, δ). Since (β, β)-differential privacy is a relaxed
version of (, δ)-differential privacy, in the above dual program we can replace both  and δ
by β, and the optimal value of the objective function will still be a lower bound of V ∗. More
precisely,
V ∗ ≥ V ′LB := max µ− β
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
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such that y
(1)
i1
, y
(2)
i2
, . . . , y
(d)
id
≥ 0,∀i1 ∈ Z, i2 ∈ Z, . . . , id ∈ Z
µ−
∑
i1∈[k1−∆+1,k1]
y
(1)
i1
+ (eβ − 1)
∑
i1≤k1−∆
y
(1)
i1
− · · · −
∑
id∈[kd−∆+1,kd]
y
(d)
id
+ (eβ − 1)
∑
id≤kd−∆
y
(d)
id
≤ |k1|+ |k2|+ · · ·+ |kd|,∀(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zd.
Theorem 4.25. For the `1 cost function,
lim
max(,δ)→0
V ′LB
d∆
max(,δ)
≥ log 9
8
≈ 0.1178.
Proof. See Appendix C.11.
Similarly, for the `2 cost function, we have the lower bound
V ∗ ≥ V ′LB := max µ− β
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
such that y
(1)
i1
, y
(2)
i2
, . . . , y
(d)
id
≥ 0,∀i1 ∈ Z, i2 ∈ Z, . . . , id ∈ Z
µ−
∑
i1∈[k1−∆+1,k1]
y
(1)
i1
+ (eβ − 1)
∑
i1≤k1−∆
y
(1)
i1
− · · · −
∑
id∈[kd−∆+1,kd]
y
(d)
id
+ (eβ − 1)
∑
id≤kd−∆
y
(d)
id
≤ |k1|2 + |k2|2 + · · ·+ |kd|2,∀(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zd.
Theorem 4.26. For the `2 cost function,
lim
max(,δ)→0
V ′LB
d∆2
β2
≥ 0.0177.
Proof. See Appendix C.12.
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Upper Bounds: the Uniform Noise Mechanism and the Discrete Laplacian Mechanism
Since (0, δ)-differential privacy implies (, δ)-differential privacy and we have shown that the
uniform noise mechanism defined in (4.28) satisfies (0, δ)-differential privacy, an upper bound
for V ∗ for the `1 cost function is
V ∗ ≤ V uniformUB =
d∆
4δ
(4.31)
by Corollary 4.19.
In addition, (, 0)-differential privacy also implies (, δ)-differential privacy, and the dis-
crete Laplacian mechanism satisfies (, 0)-differential privacy. Consider the discrete Lapla-
cian mechanism in the multiple dimensional setting with probability mass function P defined
as
P(i1, i2, . . . , id) =
(
1− λ
1 + λ
)d
λ|i1|+|i2|+···+|id|,∀(i1, . . . , id) ∈ Zd,
where λ , e− ∆ .
The corresponding cost achieved by the Laplacian mechanism for the `1 cost function is
V
Lap
UB =
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd
(
1− λ
1 + λ
)d
λ|i1|+|i2|+···+|id|(|i1|+ |i2|+ · · ·+ |id|)
=
2dλ
1− λ2
=
2de−

∆
1− e−2 ∆
= Θ(
d∆

), (4.32)
as → 0.
Similarly, for the `2 cost function, we have
V uniformUB =
d∆2
12δ2
+
d
6
,
and
V
Lap
UB =
∑
(i1,i2,...,id)∈Zd
(
1− λ
1 + λ
)d
λ|i1|+|i2|+···+|id|(|i1|2 + |i2|2 + · · ·+ |id|2)
=
2dλ
(1− λ)2
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= Θ(
2d∆2
2
).
Comparison of Lower Bound and Upper Bounds
Compare the lower bound in Theorem 4.25 and the upper bounds (4.31) and (4.32), and we
conclude that for the `1 cost function, the multiplicative gap between the upper bound and
lower bound is upper bounded by a constant as (, δ)→ (0, 0). More precisely,
Corollary 4.27. For the `1 cost function, we have
V ′LB ≤ V ∗ ≤ min(V uniformUB , V LapUB ),
and as (, δ)→ (0, 0),
lim
(,δ)→(0,0)
min(V
uniform
UB , V
Lap
UB )
V ′LB
≤ 1
log 9
8
≈ 8.49.
Similarly, for the `2 cost function, we have
Corollary 4.28. For the `2 cost function, we have
V ′LB ≤ V ∗ ≤ min(V uniformUB , V LapUB ),
and as (, δ)→ (0, 0),
lim
(,δ)→(0,0)
min(V
uniform
UB , V
Lap
UB )
V ′LB
≤ 2
0.0177
≈ 113.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Differential privacy is a framework to quantify to what extent individual privacy in a statis-
tical database is preserved while releasing useful aggregate information about the database.
The purpose of this dissertation is to delve into fundamental limits of data privacy and derive
the optimal mechanisms to preserve differential privacy in the most basic problem settings,
as opposed to doing privacy for each and every application setting as in most works in the
literature. The main contributions of this dissertation can be summarized as follows.
• -differential privacy in the single dimensional setting :
Given the differential privacy constraint, we derive the optimal differentially private
mechanism for a single real-valued query function under a general utility-maximization
(or cost-minimization) framework. The class of noise probability distributions in the
optimal mechanism has staircase-shaped probability density functions which are sym-
metric (around the origin), monotonically decreasing, and geometrically decaying. The
staircase mechanism can be viewed as a geometric mixture of uniform probability dis-
tributions, providing a simple algorithmic description for the mechanism. Furthermore,
the staircase mechanism naturally generalizes to discrete query output settings as well
as more abstract settings. We show that adding query-output independent noise with
the staircase distribution is optimal among all randomized mechanisms (subject to a
mild technical condition) that preserve differential privacy.
We explicitly derive the optimal noise probability distributions with minimum expec-
tation of noise amplitude and power. Comparing the optimal performances with those
of the Laplacian mechanism, we show that in the high privacy regime, the Laplacian
mechanism is asymptotically optimal; in the low privacy regime, the staircase mecha-
nism significantly outperforms the Laplacian mechanism. We conclude that the gains
are more pronounced in the low privacy regime.
• -differential privacy in the multiple dimensional setting :
We extend the staircase mechanism from the single dimensional setting to the multi-
ple dimensional setting. We show that for histogram-like query functions, when the
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dimension of query output is two, the multiple dimensional staircase mechanism is
optimal for the `1 cost function. We explicitly derive the parameter of the optimal
two-dimensional staircase mechanism, and study the asymptotical performance of the
optimal mechanism in the high and low privacy regimes. Comparing the optimal per-
formances with those of the usual Laplacian mechanisms, we show that in the high
privacy regime ( is small), the Laplacian mechanism is asymptotically optimal as
 → 0; in the low privacy regime ( is large), the optimal cost is Θ(e− 3 ), while the
cost of the Laplacian mechanism is 2∆

. We conclude that the gains of the staircase
mechanism are more pronounced in the low privacy regime.
• (, δ)-differential privacy :
We study the optimal mechanisms in (, δ)-differential privacy for integer-valued query
functions under a utility-maximization/cost-minimization framework. We show that
the (, δ)-differential privacy is a framework not much more general than the (, 0)-
differential privacy and (0, δ)-differential privacy in the context of `1 and `2 cost func-
tions, i.e., minimum expected noise magnitude and noise power. In the same context of
`1 and `2 cost functions, we show the near-optimality of the uniform noise mechanism
and the discrete Laplacian mechanism in the high privacy regime (as (, δ)→ (0, 0)).
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 2
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3
We first give two lemmas on the properties of {Pt}t∈R which satisfies (2.7).
Lemma A.1. Given {Pt}t∈R satisfying (2.7), and given any scalar α ∈ R, consider the
family of noise probability measures {P(α)t }t∈R defined by
P(α)t , Pt+α,∀t ∈ R. (A.1)
Then {P(α)t }t∈R also satisfies the differential privacy constraint, i.e., ∀|t1 − t2| ≤ ∆,
P(α)t1 (S) ≤ eP(α)t2 (S + t1 − t2). (A.2)
Furthermore, {Pt}t∈R and {P(α)t }t∈R have the same cost, i.e.,
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx) = sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(α)t (dx). (A.3)
Proof. Since by definition the family of probability measures {P(α)t }t∈R is a shifted version
of {Pt}t∈R, (A.3) holds.
Next we show that {P(α)t }t∈R satisfies (A.2). Given any t1, t2 such that |t1 − t2| ≤ ∆,
then for any measurable set S ⊂ R, we have
P(α)t1 = Pt1+α(S)
≤ ePt2+α(S + (t1 + α)− (t2 + α))
= ePt2+α(S + t1 − t2)
= eP(α)t2 (S + t1 − t2).
This completes the proof.
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Next we show that given a collection of families of probability measures each of which
satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.7), we can take a convex combination of them
to construct a new family of probability measures satisfying (2.7) and the new cost is not
worse. More precisely,
Lemma A.2. Given a collection of finite number of families of probability measures {P [i]t }t∈R
(i ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}), such that for each i, {P [i]t }t∈R satisfies (2.7) and
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P [i]t (dx) = Q,∀i,
for some real number Q, consider the family of probability measures {ν˜t}t∈R defined by
ν˜t ,
n∑
i=1
ciP [i]t ,∀t ∈ R,
i.e., for any measurable set S ⊂ R,
ν˜t(S) =
n∑
i=1
ciP [i]t (S),
where ci ≥ 0, and
∑n
i=1 ci = 1.
Then {ν˜t}t∈R also satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.7), and
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)ν˜t(dx) ≤ Q.
Proof. First we show that {ν˜t}t∈R also satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.7). In-
deed, ∀ |t1 − t2| ≤ ∆, ∀ measurable set S ⊂ R,
ν˜t1(S) =
n∑
i=1
ciP [i]t1 (S)
≤
n∑
i=1
cie
P [i]t2 (S + t1 − t2)
= eν˜t2(S + t1 − t2).
Next we show that the cost of {ν˜t}t∈R is no bigger than Q. Indeed, for any t ∈ R,∫
x∈R
L(x)ν˜t(dx) =
n∑
i=1
ci
∫
x∈R
L(x)ν˜ [i]t (dx)
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≤
n∑
i=1
ciQ
= Q.
Therefore,
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)ν˜t(dx) ≤ Q.
Applying Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2, we can prove the conjecture under the assumption
that the family of probability measures {Pt}t∈R is piecewise constant and periodic over t.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. We first prove that for any family of probability measures {Pt}t∈R ∈
KT,n, there exists a new family of probability measures {P˜t}t∈R ∈ KT,n such that P˜t = P˜ for
all t ∈ R, i.e., the added noise is independent of query output t, and
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P˜t(dx) ≤ sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx).
Indeed, consider the collection of probability measures {P(i
T
n
)
t }t∈R for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , n−
1}, where {P(α)t } is defined in (A.1). Due to Lemma A.1, for all i, {P(i
T
n
)
t }t∈R satisfies the
differential privacy constraint (2.7), and the cost is the same as the cost of {Pt}t∈R.
Define
P˜t =
n−1∑
i=0
1
n
P(i
T
n
)
t .
Then due to Lemma A.2, {P˜t}t∈R satisfies (2.7), and the cost of is not worse, i.e.,
sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)P˜t(dx) ≤ sup
t∈R
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pt(dx).
Furthermore, since {Pt}t∈R ∈ KT,n, for any t ∈ R,
P˜t =
n−1∑
i=0
1
n
P(i
T
n
)
t =
n−1∑
i=0
1
n
PiT
n
.
Hence, P˜t is independent of t.
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Therefore, among the collection of probability measures in ∪T>0 ∪n≥1 KT,n, to minimize
the cost we only need to consider the families of noise probability measures which are inde-
pendent of the query output t. Then due to Theorem 2.4, the staircase mechanism is optimal
among all query-output independent noise-adding mechanisms. This completes the proof of
Theorem 2.3.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2.4
In this section, we give detailed and rigorous proof of Theorem 2.4.
A.2.1 Outline of Proof
The key idea of the proof is to use a sequence of probability distributions with piecewise
constant probability density functions to approximate any probability distribution satisfying
the differential privacy constraint (2.11). The proof consists of 8 steps in total, and in
each step we narrow down the set of probability distributions where the optimal probability
distribution should lie:
• Step 1 proves that we only need to consider symmetric probability distributions.
• Step 2 and Step 3 prove that we only need to consider probability distributions which
have symmetric and piecewise constant probability density functions.
• Step 4 proves that we only need to consider those symmetric and piecewise constant
probability density functions which are monotonically decreasing for x ≥ 0.
• Step 5 proves that the optimal probability density function should periodically decay.
• Step 6, Step 7, and Step 8 prove that the optimal probability density function over the
interval [0,∆) is a step function, and they conclude the proof of Theorem 2.4.
A.2.2 Step 1
Define
V ∗ , inf
P∈SP
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
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Our goal is to prove that V ∗ = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R L(x)Pγ(dx).
If V ∗ = +∞, then due to the definition of V ∗, we have
inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ(dx) ≥ V ∗ = +∞,
and thus infγ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R L(x) = V ∗ = +∞. So we only need to consider the case V ∗ < +∞,
i.e., V ∗ is finite. Therefore, in the rest of the proof, we assume V ∗ is finite.
First, we prove that we only need to consider symmetric probability measures.
Lemma A.3. Given P ∈ SP, define a symmetric probability distribution Psym as
Psym(S) , P(S) + P(−S)
2
,∀ measurable set S ⊆ R, (A.4)
where the set −S , {−x | x ∈ S}. Then Psym ∈ SP, i.e., Psym satisfies the differential
privacy constraint (2.11), and∫
x∈R
L(x)Psym(dx) =
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
Proof. It is easy to verify that Psym is a valid probability distribution. Due to the definition
of Psym in (A.4), we have
Psym(S) = P(S) + P(−S)
2
= Psym(−S),
for any measurable set S ⊆ R. Thus, Psym is a symmetric probability distribution.
Next, we show that Psym satisfies (2.11). Indeed, ∀ measurable set S ⊆ R and ∀|d| ≤ ∆,
Psym(S) = P(S) + P(−S)
2
≤ e
P(S + d) + eP(−S − d)
2
(A.5)
=
eP(S + d) + eP(−(S + d))
2
= ePsym(S + d),
where in (A.5) we use the facts P(S) ≤ eP(S + d) and P(−S) ≤ eP(−S − d).
Lastly, since L(x) is symmetric,∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) =
∫
x∈R
L(x) + L(−x)
2
P(dx)
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=∫
x∈R
L(x)Psym(dx).
Therefore, if we define
SPsym , {Psym|P ∈ SP},
due to Lemma A.3,
Lemma A.4.
V ∗ = inf
P∈SPsym
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
A.2.3 Step 2
Next we prove that for any probability distribution P satisfying differential privacy constraint
(2.11), the probability Pr(X = x) = 0,∀x ∈ R, and P([y, z]) 6= 0 for any y < z ∈ R.
Lemma A.5. ∀P ∈ SP ,∀x ∈ R, P({x}) = 0. And, for any y < z ∈ R, P([y, z]) 6= 0.
Proof. Given P ∈ SP , suppose P({x0}) = p0 > 0, for some x0 ∈ R. Then for any x ∈
[x0, x0 + ∆],
P({x}) ≥ e−,
due to (2.11).
So P({x}) is strictly lower bounded by a positive constant for an uncountable number
of x, and thus P([x0, x0 + ∆]) = +∞, which contradicts with the fact P is a probability
distribution.
Therefore, ∀P ∈ SP , ∀x ∈ R, P({x}) = 0.
Suppose P([y, z]) = 0 for some y < z ∈ R. Then from (2.11) we have for any |d| ≤ ∆,
P([y + d, z + d]) ≤ eP([y, z]) = 0,
and thus P([y + d, z + d]) = 0. By induction, for any k ∈ Z, P([y + kd, z + kd]) = 0, which
implies that P((−∞,+∞)) = 0. Contradiction. So for any y < z ∈ R, P([y, z]) 6= 0.
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A.2.4 Step 3
In this subsection, we show that for any P ∈ SPsym with
V (P) ,
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) < +∞,
we can use a sequence of probability measures {Pi ∈ SPsym}i≥1 with symmetric and piecewise
constant probability density functions to approximate P with limi→+∞ V (Pi) = V (P).
Lemma A.6. Given P ∈ SPsym with V (P) < +∞, any positive integer i ∈ N , define Pi
as the probability distribution with a symmetric and piecewise constant probability density
function fi(x) defined as
fi(x) =
ak ,
P([kD
i
,(k+1)D
i
)
D
i
x ∈ [kD
i
, (k + 1)D
i
) for k ∈ N
fi(−x) x < 0
.
Then Pi ∈ SPsym and
lim
i→+∞
V (Pi) = V (P).
Proof. First we prove that Pi ∈ SPsym, i.e., Pi is symmetric and satisfies the differential
privacy constraint (2.11).
By definition fi(x) is a symmetric and nonnegative function, and∫ +∞
−∞
fi(x)dx = 2
∫ +∞
0
fi(x)dx
= 2
∫
x∈[0,+∞)
P(dx)
= 2
∫
x∈(0,+∞)
P(dx) (A.6)
= 1, (A.7)
where in (A.6) we used the fact P({0}) = 0 due to Lemma A.5. In addition, due to Lemma
A.5, ak > 0,∀k ∈ N.
So fi(x) is a valid symmetric probability density function, and thus Pi is a valid symmetric
probability distribution.
Define the density sequence of Pi as the sequence {a0, a1, a2, . . . , an, . . . }. Since P satisfies
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(2.11), it is easy to see that
aj ≤ eaj+k and aj+k ≤ eaj,∀j ≥ 0, 0 ≤ k ≤ i.
Therefore, for any x, y such that |x− y| ≤ ∆, we have
fi(x) ≤ efi(y) and fi(y) ≤ efi(x),
which implies that Pi satisfies (2.11). Hence, Pi ∈ SPsym.
Next we show that
lim
i→+∞
V (Pi) = V (P).
Since L(x) satisfies Property 2.2, we can assume there exists a constant B > 0 such that
L(x+ 1) ≤ BL(x),∀x ≥ T.
Given δ > 0, since V (P) is finite, there exists integer T ∗ > T such that∫
x≥T ∗
L(x)P(dx) < δ
B
.
For any integers i ≥ 1, N ≥ T ∗,∫
x∈[N,N+1)
L(x)Pi(dx) ≤ Pi([N,N + 1))L(N + 1)
= P([N,N + 1))L(N + 1)
≤
∫
x∈[N,N+1)
BL(x)P(dx).
Therefore, ∫
x∈[T ∗,+∞)
L(x)Pi(dx) ≤
∫
x∈[T ∗,+∞)
BL(x)P(dx)
≤ B δ
B
= δ.
For x ∈ [0, T ∗), L(x) is a bounded function, and thus by the definition of Riemann-Stieltjes
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integral, we have
lim
i→∞
∫
x∈[0,T ∗)
L(x)Pi(dx) =
∫
x∈[0,T ∗)
L(x)P(dx).
So there exists a sufficiently large integer i∗ such that for all i ≥ i∗∣∣∣∣∫
x∈[0,T ∗)
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
x∈[0,T ∗)
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ.
Hence, for all i ≥ i∗
|V (Pi)− V (P)|
=
∣∣∣∣ ∫
x∈R
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣
= 2
∣∣∣∣ ∫
x∈[0,T ∗)
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
x∈[0,T ∗)
L(x)P(dx)
+
∫
x∈[T ∗,+∞)
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
x∈[T ∗,+∞)
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2
∣∣∣∣ ∫
x∈[0,T ∗)
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
x∈[0,T ∗)
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣
+2
∫
x∈[T ∗,+∞)
L(x)Pi(dx) + 2
∫
x∈[T ∗,+∞)
L(x)P(dx)
≤ 2(δ + δ + δ
B
)
≤ (4 + 2
B
)δ.
Therefore,
lim
i→+∞
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pi(dx) =
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
Define SP i,sym , {Pi|P ∈ SPsym} for i ≥ 1, i.e., SP i,sym is the set of probability distri-
butions satisfying differential privacy constraint (2.11) and having symmetric and piecewise
constant (over intervals [k∆
i
, (k + 1)∆
i
) ∀k ∈ N ) probability density functions.
Due to Lemma A.6,
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Lemma A.7.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,sym
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
Therefore, to characterize V ∗, we only need to study probability distributions with sym-
metric and piecewise constant probability density functions.
A.2.5 Step 4
Next we show that indeed we only need to consider those probability distributions with
symmetric and piecewise constant probability density functions which are monotonically
decreasing when x ≥ 0.
Lemma A.8. Given Pa ∈ SP i,sym with a symmetric and piecewise constant probability
density function f(·), let {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } be the density sequence of f(·), i.e,
f(x) = ak, x ∈ [k∆
i
, (k + 1)
∆
i
) ∀k ∈ N.
Then we can construct a new probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,sym the probability density
function of which is monotonically decreasing when x ≥ 0, and∫
x∈R
L(x)Pb(dx) ≤
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pa(dx).
Proof. Since ak > 0, ∀k ∈ N, and
+∞∑
k=0
ak
∆
i
=
1
2
,
we have limk→+∞ ak = 0.
Given the density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }, construct a new monotonically decreasing
density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } and a bijective mapping pi : N→ N as follows
I0 = arg max
k∈N
ak, (A.8)
pi(0) = min
n∈I0
n, i.e., the smallest element in I0,
b0 = api(0),
(A.9)
∀m ∈ N and m ≥ 1,
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Im = arg max
k∈N\{pi(j)|j<m}
ak, (A.10)
pi(m) = min
n∈Im
n, i.e., the smallest element in Im,
bm = api(m).
Since the sequence {ak} converges to 0, the maximum of {ak} always exists in (A.8) and
(A.10). Therefore, Im is well defined for all m ∈ N.
Note that since
∑∞
k=0 ak
∆
i
= 1
2
and the sequence {bk}k∈N is simply a permutation of
{ak}k∈N,
∑∞
k=1 bk
∆
i
= 1
2
.
Therefore, if we define a function g(·) as
g(x) =
bk x ∈ [kDi , (k + 1)Di ) for k ∈ Ng(−x) x < 0
then g(·) is a valid symmetric probability density function, and∫
x∈R
L(x)g(x)dx ≤
∫
x∈R
L(x)f(x)dx.
Next, we prove that the probability distribution Pb with probability density function g(·)
satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.11). Since {bk}k∈N is a monotonically decreasing
sequence, it is sufficient and necessary to prove that for all k ∈ N,
bk
bk+i
≤ e.
To simplify notation, given k, we define
a∗(k) = min
k≤j≤k+i
ak,
i.e., a∗(k) denotes the smallest number of {ak, ak+1, . . . , ak+i}.
First, when k = 0, it is easy to prove that b0
bi
≤ e. Indeed, recall that b0 = api(0) and
consider the i + 1 consecutive numbers {api(0), api(0)+1, . . . , api(0)+i} in the original sequence
{ak}k∈N. Then a∗(0) ≤ bi, since bi is the (i + 1)th largest number in the sequence {ak}k∈N.
Therefore,
b0
bi
=
api(0)
bi
≤ api(0)
a∗(0)
≤ e.
For k = 1, b1 = api(1) and consider the i+1 consecutive numbers {api(1), api(1)+1, . . . , api(1)+i}.
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If pi(0) /∈ [pi(1), pi(1) + i], then a∗(pi(1)) ≤ bi+1, and thus
b1
bi+1
=
api(1)
b1+i
≤ api(1)
a∗(pi(1))
≤ e.
If pi(0) ∈ [pi(1), pi(1) + i], then a∗(pi(0)) ≤ bi+1 and api(0)a∗(pi(0)) ≤ e. Therefore,
b1
bi+1
≤ b0
b1+i
≤ b0
a∗(pi(0))
≤ e.
Hence, bk
bk+i
≤ e holds for k = 1.
In general, given k, we prove bk
bk+i
≤ e as follows. First, if pij /∈ [pi(k), pi(k) + i],∀j < k,
then a∗pi(k) ≤ bk+i, and hence
bk
bi+k
=
api(k)
bi+k
≤ api(k)
a∗(pi(k))
≤ e.
If there exists j < k and pij ∈ [pi(k) + 1, pi(k) + i], we use Algorithm 2 to compute a number
j∗ such that j∗ < k and pij /∈ [pi(j∗) + 1, pi(j∗) + i],∀j < k.
Algorithm 2
j∗ ← k
while there exists some j < k and pij ∈ [pi(j∗) + 1, pi(j∗) + i] do
j∗ ← j
end while
Output j∗
It is easy to show that the loop in Algorithm 2 will terminate after at most k steps.
After finding j∗, we have j∗ < k, and a∗(pi(j∗)) ≤ bk+i. Therefore
bk
bi+k
≤ api(j∗)
bi+k
≤ api(j∗)
a∗(pi(j∗))
≤ e.
So bk
bk+i
≤ e holds for all k ∈ N. Therefore, Pb ∈ SP i,sym.
This completes the proof of Lemma A.8.
Therefore, if we define
SP i,md , {P|P ∈ SP i,sym, and the density sequence of P is monotonically decreasing},
then due to Lemma A.8,
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Lemma A.9.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,md
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
A.2.6 Step 5
Next we show that among all symmetric and piecewise constant probability density functions,
we only need to consider those which are periodically decaying.
More precisely, given positive integer i,
SP i,pd , { P | P ∈ SP i,md, and P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , }
satisfying
ak
ak+i
= e,∀k ∈ N},
then
Lemma A.10.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,pd
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
Proof. Due to Lemma A.9, we only need to consider probability distributions with symmetric
and piecewise constant probability density functions which are monotonically decreasing for
x ≥ 0.
We first show that given Pa ∈ SP i,md with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , }, if
a0
ai
< e, then we can construct a probability distributions Pb ∈ SP i,md with density sequence
{b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . , } such that b0bi = e and
V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb).
Define a new sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } by scaling up a0 and scaling down {a1, a2, . . . }.
More precisely, let δ = i
2D(( i
2D
−a0)e− a0ai +a0)
− 1 > 0, and set
b0 = a0(1 + δ),
bk = ak(1− δ′),∀ k ≥ 1,
where δ′ , a0δi
2D
−a0 > 0, and we have chosen δ such that
b0
bi
= a0
ak
i
2D
−a0
i
2D(1+δ)
−a0 = e
.
It is easy to see the sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . , } corresponds to a valid probability
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density function and it also satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.11), i.e.,
bk
bk+i
≤ e,∀k ≥ 0.
Let Pb be the probability distribution with {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . , } as the density sequence
of its probability density function. Next we show V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
It is easy to compute V (Pa), which is
V (Pa) = 2∆
i
(
a0
∫ ∆
i
0
L(x)dx+
∞∑
k=1
ak
∫ (k+1) ∆
i
k∆
i
L(x)dx
)
.
Similarly, we can compute V (Pb) by
V (Pb) = 2∆
i
(
b0
∫ ∆
i
0
L(x)dx+
∞∑
k=1
bk
∫ (k+1) ∆
i
k∆
i
L(x)dx
)
= V (Pa) + 2∆
i
(
a0δ
∫ D
i
0
L(x)dx− δ′
∞∑
k=1
ak
∫ (k+1)D
i
kD
i
L(x)dx
)
= V (Pa) + 2∆
i
a0δ
i
2∆
− a0
( ∞∑
k=1
ak
∫ ∆
i
0
L(x)dx−
∞∑
k=1
ak
∫ (k+1) ∆
i
k∆
i
L(x)dx
)
= V (Pa) + 2∆
i
a0δ
i
2∆
− a0
∞∑
k=1
ak
(∫ ∆
i
0
L(x)dx−
∫ (k+1) ∆
i
k∆
i
L(x)dx
)
≤ V (Pa),
where in the last step we used the fact that
(∫ ∆
i
0
L(x)dx− ∫ (k+1) ∆i
k∆
i
L(x)dx
)
≤ 0, since L(·)
is a monotonically increasing function for x ≥ 0.
Therefore, for given i ∈ N, we only need to consider P ∈ SP i,md with density sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai = e.
Next, we argue that among all probability distributions P ∈ SP i,md with density se-
quence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , } satisfying a0ai = e, we only need to consider those probability
distributions with density sequence also satisfying a1
ai+1
= e.
Given Pa ∈ SP i,md with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai = e and
a1
ai+1
< e, we can construct a new probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,md with density sequence
{b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } satisfying
b0
bi
= e,
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b1
bi+1
= e,
and V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb).
First, it is easy to see a1 is strictly less than a0, since if a0 = a1, then
a1
ai+1
= a0
ai+1
≥ a0
ai
= e.
Then we construct a new density sequence by increasing a1 and decreasing ai+1. More
precisely, we define a new sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } as
bk = ak,∀k 6= 1, k 6= i+ 1,
b1 = a1 + δ,
bi+1 = ai+1 − δ,
where δ = e
ai+1−a1
1+e
and thus b1
bi+1
= e.
It is easy to verify that {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } is a valid probability density sequence and the
corresponding probability distribution Pb satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.11).
Moreover, V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb). Therefore, we only need to consider P ∈ SP i,md with density
sequences {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai = e and a1ai+1 = e.
Using the same argument, we can show that we only need to consider P ∈ SP i,md with
density sequences {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying
ak
ai+k
= e,∀k ≥ 0.
Therefore,
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,pd
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
Due to Lemma A.10, we only need to consider probability distribution with symmetric,
monotonically decreasing (for x ≥ 0), and periodically decaying, piecewise constant probabil-
ity density function. Because of the properties of symmetry and periodic decay, for this class
of probability distributions, the probability density function over R is completely determined
by the probability density function over the interval [0,∆).
Next, we study what the optimal probability density function should be over the interval
[0,∆). It turns out that the optimal probability density function over the interval [0,∆) is
a step function. We use the following three steps to prove this result.
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A.2.7 Step 6
Lemma A.11. Consider a probability distribution Pa ∈ SP i,pd (i ≥ 2) with density sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }, and a0ai−1 < e. Then there exists a probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,pd
with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . }such that b0bi−1 = e, and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Proof. For each 0 ≤ k ≤ (i− 1), define
wk ,
+∞∑
j=0
e−j
∫ (j+ k+1
i
)∆
(j+ k
i
)∆
L(x)dx. (A.11)
Since L(cdot) satisfies Property 2.2 and V ∗ <∞, it is easy to show that the sum of the
series in (A.11) exists and is finite, and thus wk is well defined for all 0 ≤ k ≤ (i − 1). In
addition, it is easy to see
w0 ≤ w1 ≤ w2 ≤ · · · ≤ wi−1,
since L(x) is a monotonically increasing function when x ≥ 0.
Then
V (Pa) =
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pa(dx) = 2
i−1∑
k=0
wkak.
Since a0
ai−1
< e, we can scale a0 up and scale {a1, . . . , ai−1} down to derive a new valid
probability density function with smaller cost. More precisely, define a new probability
measure Pb ∈ SP i,pd with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } via
b0 , γa0,
bk , γ′ak,∀1 ≤ k ≤ i− 1,
for some γ > 1 and γ′ < 1 such that
b0
bi−1
= e.
To make {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } be a valid density sequence, i.e., to make the integral of the
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corresponding probability density function over R be 1, we have
i−1∑
k=0
bk =
i−1∑
k=0
ak =
1− e−
2
i
∆
.
Define t , 1−e−
2
i
∆
, then we have two linear equations on γ and γ′:
γa0 = e
γ′ (A.12)
γa0 + γ
′(t− a0) = t. (A.13)
From (A.12) and (A.13), we can easily get
γ =
etai−1
a0(t− a0 + eai−1) > 1
γ′ =
t
t− a0 + eai−1 < 1.
Then we can verify that the V (Pa) ≥ V (Pa). Indeed,
V (Pa)− V (Pb)
=
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pa(dx)−
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pb(dx)
= 2
i−1∑
k=0
wkak − 2
i−1∑
k=0
wkbk
= 2
(
(1− γ)w0a0 + (1− γ′)
i−1∑
k=1
wkak
)
≥ 2
(
(1− γ)w0a0 + (1− γ′)
i−1∑
k=1
w0ak
)
= 2 ((1− γ)w0a0 + (1− γ′)w0(t− a0))
= 2w0
(
a0 − ai−1e
t
t− a0 + eai−1 + (t− a0)
−a0 + eai−1
t− a0 + eai−1
)
= 0.
This completes the proof.
Therefore, due to Lemma A.11, for all i ≥ 2, we only need to consider probability
distributions P ∈ SP i,pd with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai−1 = e.
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More precisely, define
SP i,fr = {P ∈ SP i,pd|P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0
ai−1
= e}.
Then due to Lemma A.11,
Lemma A.12.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=3SPi,fr
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
A.2.8 Step 7
Next, we argue that for each probability distribution P ∈ SP i,fr (i ≥ 3) with density sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }, we can assume that there exists an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2), such that
aj = a0,∀0 ≤ j < k, (A.14)
aj = ai−1,∀k < j < i. (A.15)
More precisely,
Lemma A.13. Consider a probability distribution Pa ∈ SP i,fr (i ≥ 3) with density sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }. Then there exists a probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,fr with density
sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } such that there exists an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2) with
bj = a0,∀ 0 ≤ j < k, (A.16)
bj = ai−1,∀ k < j < i, (A.17)
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa). (A.18)
Proof. If there exists an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2) such that
aj = a0,∀ 0 ≤ j < k,
aj = ai−1,∀ k < j < i,
then we can set Pb = Pa.
86
Otherwise, let k1 be the smallest integer in {0, 1, 2, . . . , i− 1} such that
ak1 6= a0,
and let k2 be the biggest integer in {0, 1, 2, . . . , i− 1} such that
ak2 6= ai−1.
It is easy to see that k1 6= k2. Then we can increase ak1 and decrease ak2 simultaneously
by the same amount to derive a new probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,fr with smaller cost.
Indeed, if
a0 − ak1 ≤ ak2 − ai−1,
then consider a probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,fr with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bi−1, . . . }
defined as
bj = a0,∀0 ≤ j ≤ k1,
bj = aj,∀k1 < j ≤ k2 − 1,
bk2 = ak2 − (a0 − ak1),
bj = aj,∀k2 < j ≤ i− 1.
We can verify that V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb) via
V (Pa)− V (Pb)
=
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pa(dx)−
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pb(dx)
= 2(wk1bk1 + wk2bk2)− 2(wk1ak1 + wk2ak2)
= 2wk1(a0 − ak1) + 2wk2(ak2 − (a0 − ak1)− ak2)
= 2(a0 − ak1)(wk1 − wk2)
≤ 0,
where wi is defined in (A.11).
If a0 − ak1 ≥ ak2 − ai−1, then accordingly we can construct Pb ∈ SP i,fr by setting
bj = a0,∀0 ≤ j < k1,
bk1 = ak1 + (ak2 − ai−1),
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bj = aj,∀k1 < j ≤ k2 − 1,
bj = ai−1, ∀k2 ≤ j ≤ i− 1.
And similarly, it is easy to verify that V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb).
Therefore, continue in this way, and finally we will obtain a probability distribution
Pb ∈ SP i,fr with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } such that (A.16), (A.17) and (A.18)
hold.
This completes the proof.
Define
SP i,step = {P ∈ SP i,fr | P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }
satisfying(A.16) and (A.17) for some 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2)}.
Then due to Lemma A.13,
Lemma A.14.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=3SPi,step
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
A.2.9 Step 8
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Since {Pγ|γ ∈ [0, 1]} ⊆ SP , we have
V ∗ = inf
P∈SP
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) ≤ inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ(dx).
We prove the reverse direction in the following.
We first prove that for any P ∈ SP i,step ( i ≥ 3), there exists γ ∈ [0, 1] such that∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ(dx) ≤
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx).
Consider the density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } of P . Since P ∈ SP i,step, there exists
an integer 0 ≤ k ≤ i− 2 such that
aj = a0,∀0 ≤ j < k,
aj = a0e
−, ∀k < j ≤ i− 1.
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Let
γ′ ,
1−e−
2∆
− a0e−
a0(1− e−) ∈ [0, 1].
Then a(γ′) = a0.
It is easy to verify that
k
∆
i
≤ γ′∆ ≤ (k + 1)∆
i
.
The probability density functions of P and Pγ′ are the same when x ∈ [0, ki∆)∪[k+1i ∆,∆).
Because they periodically decay, the integral of probability density functions over [0,∆) is
1−e−
2
. Hence, we have
ak
∆
i
= a0(γ
′ − k
i
)∆ + e−a0(
k + 1
i
− γ′)∆.
Define β , i(γ′ − k
i
) ∈ [0, 1]. Then
ak = βa0 + (1− β)e−a0.
Define
w
(1)
k ,
+∞∑
j=0
e−j
∫ (j+γ′)∆
(j+ k
i
)∆
L(x)dx, (A.19)
w
(2)
k ,
+∞∑
j=0
e−j
∫ (j+ k+1
i
)∆
(j+γ′)∆
L(x)dx, . (A.20)
Note that wk = w
(1)
k + w
(2)
k . Since L(x) is a monotonically increasing function when x ≥ 0,
we have
w
(2)
k
w
(1)
k
≥ (j +
k+1
i
)∆− (j + γ′)∆
(j + γ′)∆− (j + k
i
)∆
=
k+1
i
− γ′
γ′ − k
i
.
Therefore, ∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx)−
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ′(dx)
=2wkak − 2
(
w
(1)
k a0 + w
(2)
k a0e
−
)
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=2
(
w
(1)
k + w
(2)
k
)
ak − 2
(
w
(1)
k a0 + w
(2)
k a0e
−
)
=2(ak − a0e−)w(2)k − 2(a0 − ak)w(1)k .
Since
ak − a0e−
a0 − ak =
β(a0 − a0e−)
(1− β)(a0 − a0e−)
=
β
1− β
=
γ′ − k
i
k+1
i
− γ′
≥ w
(1)
k
w
(2)
k
,
we have ∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx)−
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ′(dx)
=2(ak − a0e−)w(2)k − 2(a0 − ak)w(1)k
≥0.
Therefore,
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=3SPi,step
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx)
≥ inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ(dx).
We conclude
V ∗ = inf
P∈SP
∫
x∈R
L(x)P(dx) = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)Pγ(dx) = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫
x∈R
L(x)fγ(x)dx.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.4.
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A.3 Proof of Theorem 2.5
Proof of Theorem 2.5. Recall b , e−, and L(x) = |x|. We can compute V (Pγ) via
V (Pγ) =
∫
x∈R
|x|fγ(x)dx
= 2
∫ +∞
0
xfγ(x)dx
= 2
+∞∑
k=0
(∫ γ∆
0
(x+ k∆)a(γ)e−kdx+
∫ ∆
γ∆
(x+ k∆)a(γ)e−e−kdx
)
= 2∆2a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
e−k
(k + γ)2 − k2
2
+ e−(k+1)
(k + 1)2 − (k + γ)2
2
)
= 2∆2a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
e−k
γ2 + 2kγ
2
+ e−(k+1)
2k + 1− 2kγ − γ2
2
)
= 2∆2a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
(b+ (1− b)γ)ke−k + b+ (1− b)γ
2
2
e−k
)
= 2∆2a(γ)
(
(b+ (1− b)γ) b
(1− b)2 +
b+ (1− b)γ2
2
1
1− b
)
(A.21)
= 2∆2
1− b
2∆(b+ (1− b)γ)
(
(b+ (1− b)γ) b
(1− b)2 +
b+ (1− b)γ2
2
1
1− b
)
= ∆
(
b
1− b +
1
2
b+ (1− b)γ2
b+ (1− b)γ
)
,
where in (A.21) we use the formulas
+∞∑
k=1
bk =
1
1− b, (A.22)
+∞∑
k=1
kbk =
b
(1− b)2 . (A.23)
Note that the first term b
1−b is independent of γ. Define
g(γ) , b+ (1− b)γ
2
b+ (1− b)γ ,
and thus to minimize V (Pγ) over γ ∈ [0, 1], we only need to minimize g(γ) over γ ∈ [0, 1].
Since γ ∈ [0, 1], g(γ) ≤ 1. Also note that g(0) = g(1) = 1. So the optimal γ∗ which
minimizes g(γ) lies in (0, 1).
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Compute the derivative of g(γ) via
g′(γ) =
2γ(1− b)(b+ (1− b)γ)− (b+ (1− b)γ2)(1− b)
(b+ (1− b)γ)2
= (1− b)(1− b)γ
2 + 2bγ − b
(b+ (1− b)γ)2 .
Set g′(γ∗) = 0 and we get
γ∗ =
√
b− b
1− b
=
e−
1
2
 − e−
1− e−
=
1
1 + e

2
.
Therefore,
V (Pγ∗) = ∆
(
b
1− b +
1
2
b+ (1− b)γ∗2
b+ (1− b)γ∗
)
= ∆
e

2
e − 1 .
Due to Theorem 2.4, the minimum expectation of noise amplitude is V (Pγ∗) = ∆ e

2
e−1 .
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2.7
Proof of Theorem 2.7. Recall b , e−. Then we compute V (Pγ) for the cost function L(x) =
x2 via
V (Pγ)
=
∫
x∈R
x2fγ(x)dx
= 2
∫ +∞
0
x2fγ(x)dx
= 2
+∞∑
k=0
(∫ γ∆
0
(x+ k∆)2a(γ)e−kdx+
∫ ∆
γ∆
(x+ k∆)2a(γ)e−e−kdx
)
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= 2∆3a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
e−k
(k + γ)3 − k3
3
+ e−(k+1)
(k + 1)3 − (k + γ)3
3
)
= 2∆3a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
e−k
γ3 + 3kγ2 + 3k2γ
3
+ e−(k+1)
3k2 + 3k + 1− 3k2γ − 3kγ2 − γ3
3
)
= 2∆3a(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
(
1− γ3
3
b+
γ3
3
)e−k + (γ2 + (1− γ2)b)ke−k + (γ + (1− γ)b)k2e−k
)
= 2∆3a(γ)
(
(
1− γ3
3
b+
γ3
3
)
1
1− b + (γ
2 + (1− γ2)b) b
(1− b)2 + (γ + (1− γ)b)
b2 + b
(1− b)3
)
(A.24)
= 2∆3
1− b
2∆(b+ (1− b)γ)(
(
1− γ3
3
b+
γ3
3
)
1
1− b + (γ
2 + (1− γ2)b) b
(1− b)2 + (γ + (1− γ)b)
b2 + b
(1− b)3
)
= ∆2
(
b2 + b
(1− b)2 +
b+ (1− b)γ2
b+ (1− b)γ
b
1− b +
1
3
b+ (1− b)γ3
b+ (1− b)γ
)
, (A.25)
where in (A.24) we use formulas (A.22), (A.23) and
+∞∑
k=1
k2bk =
(b2 + b)
(1− b)3 . (A.26)
Note that the first term b
2+b
(1−b)2 is independent of γ. Define
h(γ) , b+ (1− b)γ
2
b+ (1− b)γ
b
1− b +
1
3
b+ (1− b)γ3
b+ (1− b)γ
=
(1−b)γ3
3
+ bγ2 + b
2
1−b +
b
3
b+ (1− b)γ ,
and thus to minimize V (Pγ) over γ ∈ [0, 1], we only need to minimize h(γ) over γ ∈ [0, 1].
Since γ ∈ [0, 1], h(γ) ≤ b
1−b +
1
3
. Also note that h(0) = h(1) = b
1−b +
1
3
. So the optimal
γ∗ which minimizes h(γ) lies in (0, 1).
Compute the derivative of h(γ) via
h′(γ) =
((1− b)γ2 + 2bγ)(b+ (1− b)γ)− (1−b
3
γ3 + bγ2 + b
2
1−b +
b
3
)(1− b)
(b+ (1− b)γ)2
=
2
3
(1− b)2γ3 + 2b(1− b)γ2 + 2b2γ − 2b2+b
3
(b+ (1− b)γ)2
.
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Set h′(γ∗) = 0 and we get
2
3
(1− b)2γ∗3 + 2b(1− b)γ∗2 + 2b2γ∗ − 2b
2 + b
3
= 0. (A.27)
Therefore, the optimal γ∗ is the real-valued root of the cubic equation (A.27), which is
γ∗ = − b
1− b +
(b− 2b2 + 2b4 − b5)1/3
21/3(1− b)2 . (A.28)
We plot γ∗ as a function of b in Figure 2.5, and we can see γ∗ → 1
2
as → 0, and γ∗ → 0
as → +∞. This also holds in the case L(x) = |x|.
Plug (A.28) into (A.25), and we get the minimum noise power
V (Pγ∗) = ∆2
(
b2 + b
(1− b)2 +
b+ (1− b)γ∗2
b+ (1− b)γ∗
b
1− b +
1
3
b+ (1− b)γ∗3
b+ (1− b)γ∗
)
= ∆2
2−2/3b2/3(1 + b)2/3 + b
(1− b)2 .
Due to Theorem 2.4, the minimum expectation of noise power is
V (Pγ∗) = ∆2 2
−2/3b2/3(1 + b)2/3 + b
(1− b)2
.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 2.9
Proof of Theorem 2.9. Let n = m+ 1, and define
ci ,
+∞∑
k=0
bkki, (A.29)
for nonnegative integer i.
First we compute V (Pγ) via
V (Pγ) = 2
+∞∑
k=0
(∫ γ∆
0
(x+ k∆)ma(γ)e−kdx+
∫ ∆
γ∆
(x+ k∆)ma(γ)e−(k+1)dx
)
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= 2a(γ)∆m+1
+∞∑
k=0
(
bk
(k + γ)m+1 − km+1
m+ 1
+ bk+1
(k + 1)m+1 − (k + γ)m+1
m+ 1
)
= 2∆na(γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(
bk
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
γikn−i
n
+ bbk
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
(1− γi)kn−i
n
)
= 2∆na(γ)
(
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
γicn−i
n
+ b
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
(1− γi)cn−i
n
)
= 2∆na(γ)
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(γi(1− b) + b)
n
=
2∆n(1− b)
2∆n
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(γi(1− b) + b)
γ(1− b) + b .
Let hi(γ) , γ
i(1−b)+b
γ(1−b)+b for i ≥ 2. Since hi(0) = hi(1) = 1 and hi(γ) < 1 for γ ∈ (0, 1), hi(γ)
achieves the minimum value in the open interval (0, 1).
Therefore, if we define h(γ) ,
∑n
i=1 (
n
i)cn−i(γi(1−b)+b)
γ(1−b)+b , the optimal γ
∗ ∈ [0, 1], which mini-
mizes V (Pγ), should satisfy
h′(γ∗) = 0,
where h′(·) denotes the first order derivative of h(·).
It is straightforward to derive the expression for h′(·):
h′(γ) =
(
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iiγi−1(1− b))(γ(1− b) + b)− (1− b)
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(γi(1− b) + b)
(γ(1− b) + b)2
=
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)γi(1− b)2 +
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iiγi−1(1− b)b−
∑n
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b)
(γ(1− b) + b)2 .
(A.30)
Therefore, γ∗ should make the numerator of (A.30) be zero, i.e., γ∗ satisfies
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)γi(1− b)2 +
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iiγi−1(1− b)b−
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b) = 0.
Since
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)γi(1− b)2 +
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−iiγi−1(1− b)b−
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b)
=
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)γi(1− b)2 +
n−1∑
i=0
(
n
i+ 1
)
cn−(i+1)(i+ 1)γi(1− b)b
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−
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b)
=c0(n− 1)γn(1− b)2 +
n−1∑
i=1
((
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)(1− b)2 +
(
n
i+ 1
)
cn−(i+1)(i+ 1)(1− b)b
)
γi
+ ncn−1(1− b)b−
n∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b)
=c0(n− 1)γn(1− b)2 +
n−1∑
i=1
((
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)(1− b)2 +
(
n
i+ 1
)
cn−(i+1)(i+ 1)(1− b)b
)
γi
−
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b),
γ∗ satisfies
c0(n− 1)γ∗n(1− b)2 +
n−1∑
i=1
((
n
i
)
cn−i(i− 1)(1− b)2 +
(
n
i+ 1
)
cn−(i+1)(i+ 1)(1− b)b
)
γ∗i
−
n∑
i=2
(
n
i
)
cn−ib(1− b) = 0. (A.31)
We can derive the asymptotic properties of γ∗ from (A.31). Before deriving the properties
of γ∗, we first study the asymptotic properties of ci, which are functions of b.
There are closed-form formulas for ci (i=0,1,2,3):
c0 =
+∞∑
k=0
bk =
1
1− b,
c1 =
+∞∑
k=0
bkk =
b
(1− b)2 ,
c2 =
+∞∑
k=0
bkk2 =
b2 + b
(1− b)3 ,
c3 =
+∞∑
k=0
bkk3 =
b3 + 4b2 + b
(1− b)4 .
In general, for i ≥ 1,
ci+1 =
+∞∑
k=0
bkki+1 =
+∞∑
k=1
bkki+1 = b+
+∞∑
k=1
bk+1(k + 1)i+1,
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bci+1 =
+∞∑
k=0
bk+1ki+1 =
+∞∑
k=1
bk+1ki+1.
Therefore,
ci+1 − bci+1 = b+
+∞∑
k=1
bk+1((k + 1)i+1 − ki+1)
= b+
+∞∑
k=1
bk+1
i∑
j=0
(
i+ 1
j
)
kj
= b+ b
i∑
j=0
(
i+ 1
j
) +∞∑
k=1
kjbk
= b+ b(
b
1− b +
i∑
j=1
(
i+ 1
j
)
cj)
=
b
1− b + b
i∑
j=1
(
i+ 1
j
)
cj,
and thus
ci+1 =
b
(1− b)2 +
b
1− b
i∑
j=1
(
i+ 1
j
)
cj. (A.32)
From (A.32), by induction we can easily prove that
• as b→ 0, ci → 0,∀i ≥ 1;
• as b→ 1, ∀i ≥ 0, ci → +∞, ci = Ω( i!(1−b)i+1 ) and
lim
b→1
ci+1
ci
(1− b) = i+ 1.
As b→ 0, since ci → 0 for i ≥ 1 and c0 = 1, the last two terms of (A.31) go to zero, and
thus from (A.31) we can see that γ∗ goes to zero as well.
As b→ 1, since ci = Ω( 1(1−b)i+1 ) and γ∗ is bounded by 1, the first term of (A.31) goes to
zero, and the dominated terms in (A.31) are(
n
2
)
cn−22(1− b)bγ∗ −
(
n
2
)
cn−2b(1− b) = 0.
Thus, in the limit we have γ∗ = 1
2
. Therefore, as b→ 1, γ∗ → 1
2
.
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This completes the proof.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 2.12 and Theorem 2.13
In this section, we prove Theorem 2.12 and Theorem 2.13, which give the optimal noise-
adding mechanisms in the discrete setting.
A.6.1 Outline of Proof
The proof technique is very similar to the proof in the continuous settings in Appendix A.2.
The proof consists of 5 steps in total, and in each step we narrow down the set of probability
distributions where the optimal probability distribution should lie:
• Step 1 proves that we only need to consider probability mass functions which are
monotonically increasing for i ≤ 0 and monotonically decreasing for i ≥ 0.
• Step 2 proves that we only need to consider symmetric probability mass functions.
• Step 3 proves that we only need to consider symmetric probability mass functions
which have periodic and geometric decay for i ≥ 0, and this proves Theorem 2.12.
• Step 4 and Step 5 prove that the optimal probability mass function over the interval
[0,∆) is a discrete step function, and they conclude the proof of Theorem 2.13.
A.6.2 Step 1
Recall SP denotes the set of all probability mass functions which satisfy the -differential
privacy constraint (2.16). Define
V ∗ , inf
P∈SP
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i).
First we prove that we only need to consider probability mass functions which are mono-
tonically increasing for i ≤ 0 and monotonically decreasing for i ≥ 0.
Define
SPmono , {P ∈ SP|P(i) ≤ P(j),P(m) ≥ P(n),∀i ≤ j ≤ 0, 0 ≤ m ≤ n}.
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Lemma A.15.
V ∗ = inf
P∈SPmono
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i).
Proof. We will prove that given a probability mass function Pa ∈ SP , we can construct a
new probability mass function Pb ∈ SPmono such that
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pa(i) ≥
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pb(i).
Given Pa ∈ SP , consider the sequence sa = {Pa(0),Pa(1),Pa(−1),Pa(2),Pa(−2), . . . }.
Use the same argument in Lemma A.5 and we can show Pa(i) > 0,∀ i ∈ Z. Let the sequence
sb = {b0, b1, b−1, b2, b−2, . . . } be a permutation of the sequence sa in descending order. Since∑+∞
i=−∞Pa(i) = 1, limi→−∞Pa(i) = limi→+∞Pa(i) = 0, and thus sb is well defined. Let pi be
the corresponding permutation mapping, i.e., pi : Z→ Z, and
bi = Pa(pi(i)).
Since L(·) is a symmetric function and monotonically decreasing for i ≥ 0, we have
L(0) ≤ L(1) ≤ L(−1) ≤ L(2) ≤ L(−2) ≤ · · ·
≤ L(i) ≤ L(−i) ≤ L(i+ 1) ≤ L(−(i+ 1)) ≤ · · · .
Therefore, if we define a probability mass function Pb with
Pb(i) = bi,∀i ∈ Z,
then
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pa(i) ≥
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pb(i).
Next, we only need to prove Pb ∈ SPmono, i.e., we need to show that Pb satisfies the
differential privacy constraint (2.16).
Due to the way how we construct the sequence sb, we have
b0 ≥ b1 ≥ b2 ≥ b3 ≥ · · · ,
b0 ≥ b−1 ≥ b−2 ≥ b−3 ≥ · · · .
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Therefore, it is both sufficient and necessary to prove that
bi
bi+∆
≤ e,∀i ≥ 0,
bi
bi−∆
≤ e,∀i ≤ 0.
Since Pa ∈ SP , ∀ i ∈ {pi(0)−∆, pi(0)−∆ + 1, pi(0)−∆ + 2, . . . , pi(0) + ∆},
Pa(pi(0))
Pa(i) ≤ e
.
Therefore, in the sequence sb there exist at least 2∆ elements which are no smaller than
b0e
−. Since b−∆ and b∆ are the 2∆th and (2∆ − 1)th largest elements in the sequence sb
other than b0, we have
b0
b−∆
≤ e and b0
b∆
≤ e.
In general, given i ∈ Z, we can use Algorithm 3 to find at least 2∆ elements in the
sequence sb which are no bigger than bi and no smaller than bie
−.
More precisely, given i ∈ Z, let j∗R and j∗L be the output of Algorithm 3. Note that
since the while loops in Algorithm 3 can take only at most 2(|i| + 1) steps, the algorithm
will always terminate. For all integers j ∈ [pi(j∗L) − ∆, pi(j∗L) − 1], Pa(j) is no bigger than
bi and is no smaller than Pa(j∗L)e−; and for all integers j ∈ [pi(j∗R) + 1, pi(j∗R) + ∆], Pa(j)
is no bigger than bi and is no smaller than Pa(j∗R)e−. Since Pa(j∗R),Pa(j∗L) ≥ bi, for all
j ∈ [pi(j∗L) − ∆, pi(j∗L) − 1] ∪ [pi(j∗R) + 1, pi(j∗R) + ∆], Pa(j) is no bigger than bi and is no
smaller than bie
−. Therefore, there exist at least 2∆ elements in the sequence sb which are
no bigger than bi and no smaller than bie
−.
If i ≤ 0, then bi−∆ is the 2∆th largest element in the sequence sb which is no bigger than
bi and no smaller than bie
−; and if i ≥ 0, then bi+∆ is the (2∆− 1)th largest element in the
sequence sb which is no bigger than bi and no smaller than bie
−. Therefore, we have
bi
bi+∆
≤ e,∀i ≥ 0,
bi
bi−∆
≤ e,∀i ≤ 0.
This completes the proof of Lemma A.15.
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Algorithm 3
j∗R ← i
while there exists some j which appears before i in the sequence {0, 1,−1, 2,−2, . . . } and
pi(j) ∈ [pi(j∗R) + 1, pi(j∗R) + ∆] do
j∗R ← j
end while
j∗L ← i
while there exists some j which appears before i in the sequence {0, 1,−1, 2,−2, . . . } and
pi(j) ∈ [pi(j∗L)−∆, pi(j∗L)− 1] do
j∗L ← j
end while
Output j∗R and j
∗
L.
A.6.3 Step 2
Next we prove that we only need to consider symmetric probability mass functions which
are monotonically decreasing when i ≥ 0.
Define
SPsym , {P ∈ SPmono| P(i) = P(−i), ∀ i ∈ Z}.
Lemma A.16.
V ∗ = inf
P∈SPsym
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i).
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Lemma A.3.
Given Pa ∈ SPmono, define a new probability mass function Pb with
Pb(i) , Pa(i) + Pa(−i)
2
,∀i ∈ Z.
It is easy to see Pb is a valid probability mass function and symmetric. Since the cost
function L(·) is symmetric,
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pa(i) =
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pb(i).
Next we show that Pb also satisfies the differential privacy constraint (2.16). For any
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i ∈ Z and |d| ≤ ∆, since Pa(i) ≤ ePa(i+ d) and Pa(−i) ≤ ePa(−i− d), we have
Pb(i) = Pa(i) + Pa(−i)
2
≤ e
Pa(i+ d) + ePa(−i− d)
2
= ePb(i+ d).
Therefore, Pb satisfies (2.16).
Finally, for any 0 ≤ i ≤ j,
Pb(i) = Pa(i) + Pa(−i)
2
≥ Pa(j) + Pa(−j)
2
= Pb(j).
So Pb ∈ SPmono, and thus Pb ∈ SPsym. We conclude
V ∗ = inf
P∈SPsym
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)P(i).
A.6.4 Step 3
Next we show that among all symmetric and monotonically decreasing (for i ≥ 0) probability
mass functions, we only need to consider those which are periodically and geometrically
decaying.
More precisely, define
SPpd , {P ∈ SPsym| P(i)P(i+ ∆) = e
,∀ i ∈ N}.
Then
Lemma A.17.
V ∗ = inf
P∈SPpd
V (P).
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Proof. Due to Lemma A.16, we only need to consider probability mass functions which are
symmetric and monotonically decreasing for i ≥ 0.
We first show that given Pa ∈ SPsym, if Pa0Pa∆ < e, then we can construct a probability
mass function Pb ∈ SPsym such that Pb0Pb∆ = e and
V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb).
Since Pa is symmetric,
V (Pa) = L(0)Pa(0) + 2
+∞∑
i=1
L(i)Pa(i).
Suppose Pa0Pa∆ < e
, then define a new symmetric probability mass function Pb with
Pb(0) , (1 + δ)Pa(0),
Pb(i) , (1− δ′)Pa(i),∀i ∈ Z\{0},
where
δ =
ePa(∆)Pa(0) − 1
1 + e Pa(∆)
1−Pa(0)
> 0,
δ′ =
ePa(∆)Pa(0) − 1
1
Pa(0) + e
Pa(∆)
Pa(0) − 1
> 0,
so that Pb(0)Pb(∆) = e
.
It is easy to see Pb ∈ SPsym, and
V (Pb)− V (Pa)
=δL(0)Pa(0)− 2δ′
+∞∑
i=1
L(i)Pa(i)
≤δL(0)Pa(0)− 2δ′
+∞∑
i=1
L(0)Pa(i)
≤δL(0)Pa(0)− δ′L(0)(1− Pa(0))
=0.
Therefore, we only need to consider P ∈ SPsym satisfying P(0)P(∆) = e.
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By using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma A.10, one can conclude that we
only need to consider P ∈ SPsym satisfying
P(i)
P(i+ ∆) = e
,∀i ∈ N. (A.33)
Therefore, V ∗ = infP∈SPpd V (P).
Proof of Theorem 2.12. In the case that ∆ = 1, due to Lemma A.17, the symmetry property
and (A.33) completely characterize the optimal noise probability mass function, which is the
geometric mechanism.
A.6.5 Step 4
Due to Lemma A.17, the optimal probability mass function P is completely characterized by
P(0),P(1), . . . ,P(∆−1). Next we derive the properties of optimal probability mass function
in the domain {0, 1, 2, . . . ,∆− 1}.
Since Lemma A.17 solves the case ∆ = 1, in the remaining of this section, we assume
∆ ≥ 2.
Define
SPstepλ , { P ∈ SPpd | ∃ k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆− 2},P(i) = P(0),∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k},
P(j) = λP(0),∀j ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,∆− 1}}.
Lemma A.18.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪λ∈[e−,1]SPstepλ
V (P).
Proof. If ∆ = 2, then for any P ∈ SPpd, we can set k = 0, and P ∈ SPstep P(∆−1)
P(0)
. Therefore,
Lemma A.18 holds for ∆ = 2.
Assume ∆ ≥ 3. First, we prove that we only need to consider probability mass function
P ∈ SPpd such that there exists k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∆− 2} with
P(i) = P(0), ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k − 1} (A.34)
P(j) = P(∆− 1),∀i ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,∆− 1}. (A.35)
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More precisely, let Pa ∈ SPpd, we can construct a probability mass function Pb ∈ SPpd
such that there exists k satisfying (A.34) and (A.35), and V (Pb) ≥ V (Pa).
The proof technique is very similar to proof of Lemma A.13. Suppose there does not
exists such k for Pa, then let k1 be the smallest integer in {1, 2, . . . ,∆− 1} such that
Pa(k1) 6= Pa(0),
and let k2 be the biggest integer in {0, 1, . . . ,∆− 2} such that
Pa(k2) 6= Pa(∆− 1).
It is easy to see that k1 < k2, and k1 6= 0. Then we can increase Pa(k1) and decrease Pa(k2)
simultaneously by the same amount to derive a new probability mass function Pb ∈ SPpd
with smaller cost. Indeed, if
Pa(0)− Pa(k1) ≤ Pa(k2)− Pa(∆− 1),
then consider a probability mass function Pb ∈ SPpd with
Pb(i) = Pa(0),∀0 ≤ i ≤ k1,
Pb(i) = Pa(i),∀k1 < i < k2,
Pb(k2) = Pa(k2)− (Pa(0)− Pa(k1)),
Pb(i) = Pa(i),∀k2 < i ≤ ∆− 1.
Define
w0 , L(0) + 2
∞∑
k=1
L(k∆)e−k,
wi , 2
∞∑
k=0
L(i+ k∆)e−k,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∆− 1}.
Note that since L(·) is a monotonically decreasing function when i ≥ 0, we have w0 ≤ w1 ≤
· · · ≤ w∆−1.
Then we can verify that V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa) via
V (Pb)− V (Pa)
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=
∆−1∑
i=0
Pb(i)wi −
∆−1∑
i=0
Pa(i)wi
= (Pa(0)− Pa(k1))(wk1 − wk2)
≤ 0.
If
Pa(0)− Pa(k1) ≥ Pa(k2)− Pa(∆− 1),
then we can define Pb ∈ SPpd by setting
Pb(i) = Pa(0),∀0 ≤ i < k1,
Pb(k1) = Pa(k1) + (Pa(k2)− Pa(∆− 1)),
Pb(i) = Pa(i),∀k1 < i < k2,
Pb(i) = Pa(∆− 1),∀k2 ≤ i ≤ ∆− 1.
And similarly, we have
V (Pb)− V (Pa) = (Pa(k2)− Pa(∆− 1))(wk1 − wk2) ≤ 0.
Therefore, continue in this way, and finally we will obtain a probability mass function
Pb ∈ SPpd such that there exists k to satisfy (A.34) and (A.35) and V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
From the above argument, we can see that in the optimal solution P∗ ∈ SPpd, the
probability mass function can only take at most three distinct values for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆−
1}, which are P∗(0),P∗(k), and P∗(∆− 1). Next we show that indeed either P∗(k) = P∗(0)
and P∗(k) = P∗(∆− 1), and this will complete the proof of Lemma A.18.
The optimal probability mass function P ∈ SPpd can be specified by four parameters
P(0), λ ∈ [e−, 1], k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,∆ − 2}, and P(k). We will show that when k and λ are
fixed, to minimize the cost, we have either P(k) = P(0) or P(k) = P(∆− 1) = λP(0).
Since
∑+∞
i=−∞P(i) = 1,
2
kP(0) + P(k) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0) = 1,
and thus P(k) = (1+P(0))(1−b)−2P(0)k−2λP(0)(∆−k−1)
2
.
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The cost for P is
V (P)
= P(0)
k−1∑
i=0
wi + P(∆− 1)
∆−1∑
i=k+1
wi + P(k)wk
= P(0)
k−1∑
i=0
wi + λP(0)
∆−1∑
i=k+1
wi + (
(1 + P(0))(1− b)− 2P(0)k − 2λP(0)(∆− k − 1)
2
)wk,
which is a linear function of the parameter P(0).
Since P(k) ≥ λP(0) and P(k) ≤ P(0), we have
1 = 2
kP(0) + P(k) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0)
≤ 2kP(0) + P(0) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0),
1 = 2
kP(0) + P(k) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0)
≥ 2kP(0) + λP(0) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0),
and thus the constraints on P(0) are
1− b
2k + 2 + 2λ(∆− k − 1)− 1 + b ≤ P(0) ≤
1− b
2k + 2λ(∆− k)− 1 + b. (A.36)
Since V (P) is a linear function of P(0), to minimize the cost V (P), either P(0) =
1−b
2k+2+2λ(∆−k−1)−1+b or P(0) = 1−b2k+2λ(∆−k)−1+b , i.e., P(0) should take one of the two extreme
points of (A.36). To get these two extreme points, we have either P(k) = P(0) or P(k) =
λP(0) = P(∆− 1).
Therefore, in the optimal probability mass function P ∈ SPpd, there exists k ≤ ∆ − 2
such that
P(i) = P(0),∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}
P(i) = P(∆− 1),∀i ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,∆− 1}.
This completes the proof of Lemma A.18.
107
A.6.6 Step 5
In the last step, we prove that although λ ∈ [e−, 1], in the optimal probability mass function,
λ is either e− or 1, and this will complete the proof of Theorem 2.13.
Proof. For fixed k ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆− 2}, consider P ∈ SPpd with
P(i) = P(0), ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k},
P(i) = λP(0),∀i ∈ {k + 1, k + 2, . . . ,∆− 1}.
Since
∑+∞
i=−∞P(i) = 1,
2
(k + 1)P(0) + (∆− k − 1)λP(0)
1− b − P(0) = 1,
and thus
P(0) = 1− b
2(k + 1) + 2(∆− k − 1)λ− 1 + b.
Hence, P is specified by only one parameter λ.
The cost of P is
V (P) =
∆−1∑
i=0
P(i)wi
= P(0)
k∑
i=0
wi + λP(0)
∆−1∑
k+1
wi
=
(1− b)(∑ki=0wi + λ∑∆−1i=k+1wi)
2(k + 1) + 2(∆− k − 1)λ− 1 + b
= (1− b)(C1 + C2
2(k + 1) + 2(∆− k − 1)λ− 1 + b),
where C1 and C2 are constant terms independent of λ. Therefore, to minimize V (P) over
λ ∈ [e−, 1], λ should take the extreme points, either e− or 1, depending on whether C2 is
negative or positive.
When λ = 1, then the probability mass function is uniquely determined, which is P ∈
SPpd with
P(i) = 1− b
2∆− 1 + b,∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,∆− 1},
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which is exactly Pr defined in (2.17) with r = ∆.
When λ = e−, the probability mass function is exactly Pr with r = k + 1.
Therefore, we conclude that
V ∗ = min
{r∈N|1≤r≤∆}
+∞∑
i=−∞
L(i)Pr(i).
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 3
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
In this section, we give detailed and rigorous proof of Theorem 3.1.
B.1.1 Outline of Proof
The key idea of the proof is to use a sequence of probability distributions with piecewise
constant probability density functions to approximate any probability distribution satisfying
the differential privacy constraint (3.6). The proof consists of 4 steps in total, and in each
step we narrow down the set of probability distributions where the optimal probability
distribution should lie:
• Step 1 proves that we only need to consider probability distributions which have sym-
metric and piecewise constant probability density functions.
• Step 2 proves that we only need to consider those symmetric and piecewise constant
probability density functions which are monotonically decreasing.
• Step 3 proves that the optimal probability density function should periodically decay.
• Step 4 proves that the optimal probability density function is staircase-shaped in the
multiple dimensional setting, and it concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
B.1.2 Step 1
Given P ∈ SP , define
V (P) ,
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd
L(x)P(dx1dx2 . . . dxd).
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Define
V ∗ , inf
P∈SP
V (P).
Our goal is to prove that V ∗ = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd L(x)fγ(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd.
If V ∗ = +∞, then due to the definition of V ∗, we have
inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd
L(x)fγ(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd ≥ V ∗ = +∞,
and thus infγ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd L(x)fγ(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd = V ∗ = +∞. So we only need to
consider the case V ∗ < +∞, i.e., V ∗ is finite. Therefore, in the rest of the proof, we assume
V ∗ is finite.
First we show that given any probability measure P ∈ SP , we can use a sequence
of probability measures with multiple dimensionally piecewise constant probability density
functions to approximate P .
Given i ∈ N and k ∈ N, define
Ai(k) = {x ∈ Rd|k∆
i
≤ ‖x‖1 < (k + 1)∆
i
} ⊂ Rd.
It is easy to calculate the volumn of Ai(k), which is
Vol(Ai(k)) =
2d
d!
(
(k + 1)d − kd) ∆d
id
.
.
Lemma B.1. Given P ∈ SP with V (P) < +∞, any positive integer i ∈ N, define Pi as the
probability distribution with probability density function fi(x) defined as
fi(x) = ai(k) ,
P(Ai(k))
Vol(Ai(k))
x ∈ Ai(k) for k ∈ N. (B.1)
Then Pi ∈ SP and
lim
i→+∞
V (Pi) = V (P).
Before proving Lemma B.1, we prove an auxiliary lemma which shows that for probability
mass function over Z2 satisfying the -differential privacy constraint, we can construct a new
probability mass function by averaging the old probability mass function over each `1-ball
and the new probability mass function still satisfies the -differential privacy constraint.
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Lemma B.2. For any given probability mass function P defined over the set Z2 satisfying
that
P(i1, j1) ≤ eP(i2, j2),∀|i1 − i2|+ |j1 − j2| ≤ ∆, (B.2)
define the probability mass function P˜ via
P˜(i, j) =
P(0, 0) (i, j) = (0, 0)p|i|+|j| (i, j) 6= (0, 0)
where pk ,
∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k P(i′,j′)
4k
,∀k ≥ 1.
Then P˜ is also a probability mass function satisfying the differential privacy constraint,
i.e.,
P˜(i1, j1) ≤ eP˜(i2, j2),∀|i1 − i2|+ |j1 − j2| ≤ ∆. (B.3)
Proof. Due to the way we define P˜ , we have∑
(i,j)∈Z2
P˜(i, j) =
∑
(i,j)∈Z2
P(i, j) = 1,
and thus P˜ is a valid probability mass function defined over Z2.
Next we prove that P˜ satisfies (B.3). To simplify notation, define p0 , P(0, 0). Then we
only need to prove that for any k1, k2 ∈ N such that |k1 − k2| ≤ ∆, we have
pk1 ≤ epk2 .
Due to the symmetry property, without loss of generality, we can assume k1 < k2.
The easiest case is k1 = 0. When k1 = 0, we have k2 ≤ ∆ and
P(0, 0) ≤ eP(i, j),∀|i|+ |j| = k2. (B.4)
The number of distinct pairs (i, j) satisfying |i| + |j| = k is 4k for k ≥ 1. Sum up all
inequalities in (B.4), and we get
4k2P(0, 0) ≤ e
∑
(i,j)∈Z2:|i|+|j|=k2
P(i, j)
⇔P(0, 0) ≤ e
∑
(i,j)∈Z2:|i|+|j|=k2 P(i, j)
4k2
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⇔p0 ≤ epk2 .
For general 0 < k1 < k2, let ∆
′ , k2 − k1 ≤ ∆. Define Bk via
Bk , {(i, j) ∈ Z2||i|+ |j| = k},∀k ∈ N.
Then the differential privacy constraint (B.2) implies that
P(i1, j1) ≤ eP(i2, j2), ∀(i1, j1) ∈ Bk1 , (i2, j2) ∈ Bk2 , |i1 − i2|+ |j1 − j2| = ∆′. (B.5)
The set of points in Bk forms a rectangle, which has 4 corner points and 4(k− 1) interior
points on the edges. For each corner point in Bk1 , which appears in the left side of (B.5),
there are (2∆′ + 1) points in Bk2 close to it with an `
1 distance of ∆′. And for each interior
point in Bk1 , there are (∆
′+ 1) points in Bk2 close to it with an `
1 distance of ∆′. Therefore,
there are in total 4(2∆′ + 1) + 4(k1 − 1)(∆′ + 1) distinct inequalities in (B.5).
If we can find certain nonnegative coefficients such that multiplying each inequality in
(B.5) by these nonnegative coefficients and summing them up gives us∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k1 P(i′, j′)
4k1
≤ e
∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k2 P(i′, j′)
4k2
,
then (B.3) holds. Therefore, our goal is to find the “right” coefficients associated with each
inequality in (B.5). We formulate it as a matrix filling-in problem in which we need to choose
nonnegative coefficients for certain entries in a matrix such that the sum of each row is k1+∆
′
k1
,
and the sum of each column is 1.
More precisely, label the 4k1 points in Bk1 by {I1, I2, I3, . . . , I4k1}, where we label the
topmost point by 1 and sequentially label other points clockwise. Similarly, we label the
4k2 points in Bk2 by {O1, O2, O3, . . . , O4k2}, where we label the topmost point by 1 and
sequentially label other points clockwise.
Consider the following 4k1 by 4k2 matrix M , where each row corresponds to the point in
Bk1 and each column corresponds to the point in Bk2 , and the entry Mij in the ith row and
jth column is the coefficient corresponds to inequality involved with the points Ii and Oj. If
there is no inequality associated with the points Ii and Oj, then Mij = 0.
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In the case k1 = 2 and ∆
′ = 3, the zeros/nonzeros pattern of M has the following form:
x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x
0 x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x x x 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x x x

,
where x denotes an entry which can take any nonnegative coefficient.
For general k1 and k2, the pattern of M is that the first, (k1 + 1)th, (2k1 + 1)th and
(3k1 +1)th rows can have 2∆
′+1 nonzero entries, and all other rows can have ∆′+1 nonzero
entries.
We want to show that∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k1 P(i′, j′)
4k1
≤ e
∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k2 P(i′, j′)
4k2
,
or equivalently,
(1 +
∆′
k1
)
∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k1
P(i′, j′) ≤ e
∑
(i′,j′)∈Z2:|i′|+|j′|=k2
P(i′, j′).
Therefore, our goal is to find nonnegative coefficients to substitute each x in the matrix
such that the sum of each column is 1 and the sum of each column is (1 + ∆
′
k1
). We will give
explicit formulas on how to choose the coefficients.
The case k1 = 1 is trivial. Indeed, one can set all diagonal entries to be 1, and set all
other nonzero entries to be 1
2
. Therefore, we can assume k1 > 1.
Consider two different cases: k1 ≤ ∆′ and k1 ≥ ∆′ + 1.
We first consider the case k1 ≤ ∆′. Due to the periodic patterns in M , we only need to
consider rows from 1 to k1 + 1. Set all entries to be zero except that we set
M11 = M22 = · · · = Mk1k1 = 1,
M2,∆′+2 = M3,∆′+3 = · · · = Mk1+1,k1+∆′+1 = 1
M1,j =
∆′
2k1(∆′ − k1 + 1) , j ∈ [k1 + 1,∆
′ + 1] ∪ [4k1 −∆′ + 1, 4k1]
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Mk1+1,j =
∆′
2k1(∆′ − k1 + 1) , j ∈ [k1 + 1,∆
′ + 1] ∪ [2k1 + 1 + ∆′, k1 + 1 + 2∆′]
Mi,j =
1− ∆′
k1(∆′−k1+1)
k1 − 1 .
It is straightforward to verify that the above matrix M satisfies the properties that the
sum of each column is 1 and the sum of each row is (1 + ∆
′
k1
). Therefore, we have
pk1 ≤ epk2 ,∀0 < k1 < k2, k1 ≤ k2 − k1 ≤ ∆.
Next we solve the case k1 ≥ ∆′ + 1. Again due to the periodic patterns in M , we only
need to consider the nonzero entries in rows from 1 to k1+1. We use the following procedures
to construct M :
1. For the first row, set M11 = 1 and set all other 2∆
′ nonzero entries to be 1
2k1
.
2. For the second row, M22 is uniquely determined to be 1 − 12k1 . Set the next ∆′ − 1
nonzero entries in the second row to be 1
k1
, i.e., M2j =
1
k1
for j ∈ [3,∆′ + 1]. The last
nonzero entry M2,∆′+2 is uniquely determined to be
(1 +
∆′
k1
)− (1− 1
2k1
)− ∆
′ − 1
k1
=
3
2k1
.
3. For the third row, the first nonzero entry M33 is uniquely determined to be 1− 12k1− 1k1 =
1− 3
2k1
. Set the next ∆′ − 1 nonzero entries to be 1
k1
, i.e., M3j =
1
k1
for j ∈ [4,∆′ + 2].
The last nonzero entry M3,∆′+3 is uniquely determined to be
(1 +
∆′
k1
)− (1− 3
2k1
)− ∆
′ − 1
k1
=
5
2k1
.
4. In general, for the ith row (i ∈ [2, k1 − 1]), the first nonzero entry Mii is set to be
Mii = 1− 2i−32k1 , and the next ∆′ − 1 nonzero entries are 1k1 , and the last nonzero entry
Mi,i+∆′ =
2i−1
2k1
.
5. For (k1 + 1)th row, by symmetry, we set Mk1+1,k1+1 = 1 and set other 2∆
′ nonzero
entries to be 1
2k1
.
6. The nonzero entries in the k1th row are uniquely determined. Indeed, we have
Mk1,k1 = 1−
2k1 − 3
2k1
,
115
Mk1,k1+∆′ = 1−
1
2k1
,
Mk1,k1+j =
1
k1
, j ∈ [2,∆′ − 1].
It is straightforward to verify that each entry in M is nonnegative and M satisfies the
properties that the sum of each column is 1 and the sum of each row is (1 + ∆
′
k1
). Therefore,
we have
pk1 ≤ epk2 ,∀0 < k1 < k2, k1 ≥ ∆′ + 1 = k2 − k1 + 1.
Therefore, for all k1, k2 ∈ N such that |k2 − k1| ≤ ∆, we have
pk1 ≤ epk2 .
This completes the proof of Lemma B.2.
Proof of Lemma B.1. First we prove that Pi ∈ SP , i.e., Pi satisfies the differential privacy
constraint (3.6).
By the definition of fi(x), fi(x) is a nonnegative function, and∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Rd
fi(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd
=
+∞∑
k=0
ai(k)Vol(Ai(k))
=
+∞∑
k=0
P(Ai(k))
=P(Rd) = 1.
So Pi is a valid probability distribution.
Next we show that fi(x) satisfies the differential privacy constraint. For fixed i, on the
x1 − x2 plane, we can use the lines x2 = x1 + ki∆ and x2 = −x1 + ki∆ for all k ∈ Z to
divide each Ai(k) into distinct squares with the same size (each Ai(k) will be divided into
8k + 4 squares). By taking the average of the probability density function over each square,
we reduce the probability density function to a discrete probability mass function over Z2
satisfying -differential privacy constraint. Then apply Lemma B.2, and we have
ai(k1) ≤ eai(k2),∀k1, k2 ∈ N with |k1 − k2| ≤ i.
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Given x,y ∈ Rd such that ‖x− y‖1 ≤ ∆, let k1, k2 be the integers such that
x ∈ Ai(k1),
y ∈ Ai(k2).
Then |k1 − k2| ≤ i. Therefore,
fi(x) ≤ efi(y),
which implies that the probability distribution Pi satisfies the differential privacy constraint
(3.6).
Therefore, for any integer i ≥ 1, Pi ∈ SP .
Next we show that
lim
i→+∞
V (Pi) = V (P).
To simplify notation, we use dx to denote dx1dx2 . . . dxd.
Given δ > 0, since V (P) is finite, there exists T ∗ = m∆ > 1 for some m ∈ N such that∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)P(dx) < δ
2
.
For each Ai(k) we have∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Ai(k)
L(x)Pi(dx) =
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Ai(k)
‖x‖1Pi(dx)
≤ Pi(Ai(k))(k + 1)∆
i
= P(Ai(k))(k + 1)∆
i
≤ 2P(Ai(k))k∆
i
≤ 2
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
Ai(k)
L(x)P(dx).
Therefore,∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)Pi(dx) ≤ 2
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)P(dx)
≤ 2δ
2
= δ.
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L(x) is a bounded function when ‖x‖1 ≤ T ∗, and thus by the definition of Riemann-Stieltjes
integral, we have
lim
i→∞
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)Pi(dx) =
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)P(dx).
So there exists a sufficiently large integer i∗ such that for all i ≥ i∗∣∣∣∣∫ ∫ . . . ∫{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗} L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫ ∫
. . .
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ.
Hence, for all i ≥ i∗
|V (Pi)− V (P)|
=
∣∣∣∣∫
Rd
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
Rd
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣
= |
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)P(dx)
+
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)P(dx)|
≤
∣∣∣∣∫{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗} L(x)Pi(dx)−
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1<T ∗}
L(x)P(dx)
∣∣∣∣
+
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)Pi(dx) +
∫
{x∈Rd|‖x‖1≥T ∗}
L(x)P(dx)
≤ (δ + δ + δ
2
)
≤ 5
2
δ.
Therefore,
lim
i→+∞
V (Pi) = V (P).
Define SP i,sym , {Pi|P ∈ SP} for i ≥ 1, i.e., SP i,sym is the set of probability distri-
butions satisfying differential privacy constraint (3.6) and having symmetric and piecewise
constant (over Ai(k) ∀k ∈ N) probability density functions.
Due to Lemma B.1,
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Lemma B.3.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,sym
V (P).
Therefore, to characterize V ∗, we only need to study probability distributions with sym-
metric and piecewise constant probability density functions.
B.1.3 Step 2
Given P ∈ Psym, we call {ai(0), ai(1), ai(2), . . . } the density sequence of Pi ∈ SP i,sym, where
ai(k) is defined in (B.1) ∀k ∈ N.
Next we show that indeed we only need to consider those probability distributions with
symmetric and piecewise constant probability density functions the density sequences of
which are monotonically decreasing.
Define
SP i,md , {P|P ∈ SP i,sym, and the density sequence of P is monotonically decreasing}.
Then
Lemma B.4.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,md
V (P).
Proof. We first show that among SP i,sym, to minimize the cost we only need to consider
these probability distributions with density sequences {a0, a1, a2, . . . } satisfying that a0 ≥ a1.
Indeed, given Pa ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence {a0, a1, a2, . . . } such that a0 < a1, there
exists Pb ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence {b0, b1, b2, . . . } such that b0 ≥ b1 and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Consider the probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence {b0, b1, b2, , . . . }
defined as
b0 = (1 + δ)a0,
bk = (1− δ′)ak,∀k ≥ 1,
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where we choose δ > 0 and 0 < δ′ < 1 such that
b0 = b1, (B.6)
+∞∑
k=0
bkVol(Ai(k)) =
+∞∑
k=0
akVol(Ai(k)) = 1. (B.7)
Equation (B.7) makes Pb be a valid probability distribution. One can easily solve
(B.6) and (B.7), and write down the explicit expression for δ, δ′. The density sequence
{b0, b1, b2, . . . } satisfies b0 ≥ b1 (indeed, we have b0 = b1), and it is easy to verify that it
satisfies the differential privacy constraint, i.e.,
bk1 ≤ ebk2 ,∀k1, k2 ∈ N with |k1 − k2| ≤ i.
Note that C(‖x‖1) is a monotonically increasing function of ‖x‖1, and compared to Pa,
Pb moves some probability of SP i,md from the (higher cost) area {x|‖bx‖ ≥ ∆i } to the (lower
cost) area {x|‖bx‖ ≤ ∆
i
}, and thus we have
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Therefore, among SP i,sym, to minimize the cost we only need to consider these probability
distributions with density sequences {a1, a2, a3, . . . } satisfying that a0 ≥ a1.
Next we show that among SP i,sym with density sequences {a1, a2, a3, . . . } satisfying a0 ≥
a1, to minimize the cost we only need to consider these probability distributions with density
sequences also satisfying that a1 ≥ a2.
Given Pa ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence {a1, a2, a3, . . . } such that a0 ≥ a1 and a1 < a2,
there exists Pb ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence {b1, b2, b3, . . . } such that b0 ≥ b1 and
b1 ≥ b2.
If i ≤ 2, we can construct Pb by scaling up a0, a1 and scale down ak for all k ≥ 2. More
precisely, define Pb with density sequence {b0, b1, b2, . . . } via
bk = (1 + δ)ak, k ≤ 1,
bk = (1− δ′)ak, k ≥ 2,
for some δ > 0 and 0 < δ′ < 1 such that
b2 = b1,
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+∞∑
k=0
bkVol(Ai(k)) =
+∞∑
k=0
akVol(Ai(k)) = 1.
So we have b0 ≥ b1 ≥ b2. It is easy to check that Pb satisfies the differential privacy constraint,
and V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa) using the fact that C(‖x‖1) is a monotonically decreasing function in
terms of ‖x‖1.
If i ≥ 3, then without loss of generality we can assume a2 ≤ a0. Indeed, if a2 > a0, we
can scale up a0, a1 and scale down ak for all k ≥ 2 to make a2 = a0, and this operation
will preserve the differential privacy constraint and decrease the cost. Note that in this
case we cannot use the same scaling operation to make a2 ≤ a0, because it is possible that
after the scaling operation a0
ak
> e for some 3 ≤ k ≥ i, which violates the differential privacy
constraint. Hence, we can assume a0 ≥ a2 > a1. Let ak′ be the largest value in {a3, . . . , a2+i}.
If
ak′
a2
< e, we can scale up a1 and scale down a2 until a1 = a2 or
ak′
a2
= e. It is easy to see
this scaling operation will preserve differential privacy and decrease the cost. If after this
scaling operation we have a2 = a1, then we are done. Suppose a1 is still bigger than a2.
Then a2 is the smallest element in {a2, a3, . . . , a2+i}. Therefore, we have max2≤k≤i a0ak = a0a2 .
Then we can scale up a0, a1 and scale down ak for k ≥ 2 until a1 = a2. This operation
will preserve the differential privacy constraint and decrease the cost. If we call the final
probability distribution we obtained Pb, we have Pb ∈ SP i,sym, and the density sequence
satisfying b0 ≥ b1 ≥ b2 (indeed, b1 = b2), and V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
By induction, we can show that among all probability distributions in SP i,sym, to mini-
mize the cost we only need to consider probability distributions with monotonically decreas-
ing density sequence.
Suppose among SP i,sym to minimize the cost we only need to consider probability distri-
bution with density sequence {a0, a1, a2, . . . } satisfying a0 ≥ a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an. Then we
can show that among SP i,sym to minimize the cost we only need to consider probability dis-
tribution with density sequence {a0, a1, a2, . . . } satisfying a0 ≥ a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an ≥ an+1.
Indeed, given Pa ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence {a0, a1, a2, . . . } satisfying a0 ≥ a1 ≥
a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an, we can construct Pb ∈ SP i,sym with density sequence {b0, b1, b2, . . . } satisfying
b0 ≥ b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn ≥ bn+1,
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
If an+1 ≤ an, then we can choose Pb = Pa.
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Suppose an+1 > an. Without loss of generality, we can assume
an+1 ≤ ak, for k ≤ n+ 2− i. (B.8)
If an+1 > an+2−i, then we can scale up {a0, a1, . . . , an} and scale down {an+1, an+2, . . . } until
an+1 = ak. It is easy to verify that this scaling operation will preserve the differential privacy
constraint and decrease the cost.
Let k∗ be the smallest integer such that ak∗ < an+1. Note that by (B.8) we have n+3−i ≤
k∗ ≤ n. Let aj be the biggest element in {an+2, an+3, . . . , an+1+i}. Due to the differential
privacy constraint, we have
aj
an+1
≤ e. Then we can scale up ak∗ and scale down an+1 until
ak∗ = an+1 or
aj
an+1
= e. This operation will preserve the differential privacy constraint
and decrease the cost. If after this scaling operation ak∗ is still bigger than an+1, then we
can scale up {a0, a1, . . . , an} and scale down {an+1, an+2, . . . } until ak∗ = an+1. Due to the
fact that an+1 is the smallest element in {an+1, an+2, . . . , an+1+i}, this scaling operation will
preserve the differential privacy constraint and decrease the cost. Therefore, we will have
an+1 ≤ ak∗ .
Repeat the above steps for each k ∈ k∗ + 1, k∗ + 2, . . . , n such that ak < an+1. If we call
the final probability distribution we obtained Pb, we have Pb ∈ SP i,sym, and the density
sequence satisfying
b0 ≥ b1 ≥ b2 ≥ · · · ≥ bn,
and V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Hence, among SP i,sym to minimize the cost we only need to consider probability distri-
bution with density sequence {a0, a1, a2, . . . } satisfying a0 ≥ a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · ≥ an ≥ an+1.
Therefore, among all probability distributions in SP i,sym, to minimize the cost we only
need to consider probability distributions with monotonically decreasing density sequence.
We conclude that
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,md
V (P).
This completes the proof of Lemma B.4.
B.1.4 Step 3
Next we show that among all symmetric and piecewise constant probability density functions,
we only need to consider those which are geometrically decaying.
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More precisely, given positive integer i,
SP i,pd , { P | P ∈ SP i,md, and P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , }
satisfying
ak
ak+i
= e,∀k ∈ N},
then
Lemma B.5.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,pd
V (P).
Proof. Due to Lemma B.4, we only need to consider probability distributions with symmetric
and piecewise constant probability density functions which are monotonically decreasing.
We first show that given Pa ∈ SP i,md with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , }, if
a0
ai
< e, then we can construct a probability distributions Pb ∈ SP i,md with density sequence
{b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . , } such that b0bi = e and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Define a new sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } by scaling up a0 and scaling down {a1, a2, . . . }.
More precisely, define {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } via
b0 = a0(1 + δ),
bk = ak(1− δ′),∀ k ≥ 1,
for some δ > 0 and 0 < δ′ < 1 such that
b0
bi
= e,
+∞∑
k=0
bkVol(Ai(k)) =
+∞∑
k=0
akVol(Ai(k)) = 1.
So {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } is a valid probability density sequence. Let Pb be the corresponding
probability distribution. It is easy to check that Pb satisfies the differential privacy constraint,
i.e.,
bk
bk+i
≤ e,∀k ≥ 0.
Hence, Pb ∈ SP i,md. Since C(‖bx‖1) is a monotonically increasing function of ‖x‖1, we have
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V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Therefore, for given i ∈ N, we only need to consider P ∈ SP i,md with density sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai = e.
Next, we argue that among all probability distributions P ∈ SP i,md with density se-
quence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . , } satisfying a0ai = e, we only need to consider those probability
distributions with density sequence also satisfying a1
ai+1
= e.
Given Pa ∈ SP i,md with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai = e and
a1
ai+1
< e, we can construct a new probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,md with density sequence
{b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } satisfying
b0
bi
= e,
b1
bi+1
= e,
and V (Pa) ≥ V (Pb).
First, it is easy to see a1 is strictly less than a0, since if a0 = a1, then
a1
ai+1
= a0
ai+1
≥ a0
ai
= e.
We can construct a new density sequence by increasing a1 and decreasing ai+1 to make
a1
ai+1
.
More precisely, we define a new sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } as
bk = ak,∀k 6= 1, k 6= i+ 1,
b1 = a1(1 + δ),
bi+1 = ai+1(1− δ′),
where δ > 0 and δ′ > 0 are chosen such that b1
bi+1
= e and
+∞∑
k=0
bkVol(Ai(k)) =
+∞∑
k=0
akVol(Ai(k)) = 1.
It is easy to verify that {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } is a valid probability density sequence and the
corresponding probability distribution Pb satisfies the differential privacy constraint (3.6).
Moreover, V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa). Therefore, we only need to consider P ∈ SP i,md with density
sequences {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying a0ai = e and a1ai+1 = e.
Use the same argument, we can show that we only need to consider P ∈ SP i,md with
density sequences {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying
ak
ai+k
= e,∀k ≥ 0.
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Therefore,
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=1SPi,pd
V (P).
Due to Lemma B.5, we only need to consider probability distribution with a symmetric,
monotonically decreasing, and geometrically decaying piecewise constant probability density
function. Because of the properties of symmetry and periodic (geometric) decay, for this
class of probability distributions, the probability density function over Rd is completely
determined by the probability density function over the set {x ∈ Rd|‖x‖1 < ∆}.
Next, we study what the optimal probability density function should be over the set
{x ∈ Rd|‖x‖1 < ∆}. It turns out that the optimal probability density function over the set
{x ∈ Rd|‖x‖1 < ∆} is a step function. We use the following three steps to prove this result.
B.1.5 Step 4
Lemma B.6. Consider a probability distribution Pa ∈ SP i,pd (i ≥ 2) with density sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }. Then there exists an integer k(i) and a probability distribution Pb ∈
SP i,pd with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } such that
b0 = b1 = b2 = · · · = bk(i),
b0
bi−1
= e,
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
Proof. For 0 ≤ k ≤ i− 1, define
wk ,
+∞∑
j=0
e−j
∫ ∫
· · ·
∫
(j+ k
i
)∆≤‖x‖1<(j+ ki )∆
C(x)dx1dx2 . . . dxd,
and
uk ,
+∞∑
j=0
e−jVol(Ai(ji+ k).
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Then the cost V (Pa) =
∑i−1
k=0wkak, and the constraint on ak is that
a0 ≥ a1 ≥ · · · ≥ ai−1,
a0 ≤ ai−1e,
+∞∑
k=0
ukak = 1.
Therefore, to minimize V (P) among all probability distributions P ∈ SP i,pd, we need to
solve the following linear programming problem
minimize
a0,a1,...,ai−1
i−1∑
k=0
wkak,
subject to a0 ≥ a1 ≥ · · · ≥ ai−1,
a0 ≤ ai−1e,
+∞∑
k=0
ukak = 1.
Let
hk ,
wk
uk
.
In the following we show that when d = 2, there exists an integer k(i) such that
h0 ≥ h1 ≥ · · · ≥ hk(i), (B.9)
hk(i) ≤ hk(i)+1 ≤ · · · ≤ hi−1, (B.10)
h0 ≤ hi−1. (B.11)
When d = 2,
hk =
wk
uk
=
4
3
∆3
i3
∑+∞
j=0 e
−j(1 + 3(ji+ k) + 3(ij + k)2
2∆
2
i2
∑+∞
j=0 e
−j(1 + 2(ji+ k))
=
2
3
∆
i
3i2c2 + (6ik + 3i)c1 + (1 + 3k + 3k
2)c0
(1 + 2k)c0 + 2ic1
.
Let g(k) =, 3i2c2+(6ik+3i)c1+(1+3k+3k2)c0
(1+2k)c0+2ic1
. It is easy to compute the derivative of g(k) with
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respect to k:
g′(k) =
6c20k
2 + 6c20k + c
2
0 + 12c0c1ik + 6c0c1i− 6c2c0i2 + 12c21i2
((1 + 2k)c0 + 2ic1)2
.
Note that the numerator of g′(k) is an increasing function of k, and
g′(0) = c20 + 6c0c1i− 6c2c0i2 + 12c21i2
=
b(6i2 − 6i+ 1)− 1
(b− 1)3 < 0,
for sufficiently large i, and
g′(i− 1) = 6i
2 − 6i+ 1− b
(1− b)3 > 0.
Therefore, hk first increases as k increases, and then decreases as k increases to i − 1.
Hence, there exists an integer k(i) such that (B.9) and (B.10) hold.
Next we compare hi−1 and h0:
hi−1 − h0 = wi−1
ui−1
− w0
u0
=
2
3
∆
i
(3i− 2)(b− 1)2(i− 1)
(2bi− b+ 1)(b+ 2i− 1) > 0.
Hence, (B.11) also holds.
Now we are ready to prove Lemma B.6.
Suppose ak(i) < ak(i)−1. We can scale up ak(i) and scale down ak(i)−1 to make ak(i) =
ak(i)−1. Since hk(i) ≤ hk(i)−1, i.e., wk(i)uk(i) ≤
wk(i)−1
uk(i)−1
, this scaling operation will not increase the
cost V (Pa). Now we have ak(i) = ak(i)−1.
Suppose ak(i) = ak(i)−1 < ak(i)−2. Then we can scale up ak(i) and ak(i)−1, and scale down
ak(i)−2 to make ak(i) = ak(i)−1 = ak(i)−2. Since hk(i) ≤ hk(i)−1 ≤ hk(i)−2, this scaling operation
will not increase the cost V (Pa). Now we have ak(i) = ak(i)−1 = ak(i)−2.
After k(i) steps of these scaling operations, we can make a0 = a1 = · · · = ak(i), and this
will not increase the cost V (Pa).
Finally, if a0
ai−1
< e, we can scale up a0, a1, . . . , ak(i), and scale down ai−1 to make a0ai−1 =
e. Since hi−1 ≥ h0 ≥ h1 ≥ · · · ≥ hk(i), this scaling operation will not increase the cost
V (Pa).
Let Pb be the probability distribution we obtained after the k(i) + 1 steps of scaling
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operations. Then Pb ∈ SP i,pd, and its density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } satisfies
b0 = b1 = b2 = · · · = bk(i),
b0
bi−1
= e,
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa).
This completes the proof of Lemma B.6.
Therefore, due to Lemma B.6, for sufficiently large i, we only need to consider probability
distributions P ∈ SP i,pd with density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . } satisfying
a0 = a1 = a2 = · · · = ak(i), (B.12)
b0
bi−1
= e. (B.13)
More precisely, define
SP i,fr = { P ∈ SP i,pd | P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }
satisfying (B.12) and (B.13) }.
Then due to Lemma B.6,
Lemma B.7.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=3SPi,fr
V (P).
Next, we argue that for each probability distribution P ∈ SP i,fr (i ≥ 3) with density
sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }, we can assume that there exists an integer k(i)+1 ≤ k ≤ (i−2),
such that
aj = a0,∀0 ≤ j < k, (B.14)
aj = ai−1,∀k < j < i. (B.15)
More precisely,
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Lemma B.8. Consider a probability distribution Pa ∈ SP i,fr (i ≥ 3) with density sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }. Then there exists a probability distribution Pb ∈ SP i,fr with density
sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } such that there exists an integer k(i) + 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2) with
bj = a0,∀ 0 ≤ j < k, (B.16)
bj = ai−1,∀ k < j < i, (B.17)
and
V (Pb) ≤ V (Pa). (B.18)
Proof. If there exists an integer k(i) + 1 ≤ k ≤ (i− 2) such that
aj = a0,∀ 0 ≤ j < k,
aj = ai−1,∀ k < j < i,
then we can let Pb = Pa.
Otherwise, let k1 be the smallest integer in {k(i) + 1, k(i) + 2, . . . , i− 1} such that
ak1 6= a0,
and let k2 be the biggest integer in {k(i) + 1, k(i) + 2, . . . , i− 1} such that
ak2 6= ai−1.
It is easy to see that k1 6= k2. Then we can scale up ak1 and scale down ak2 simultaneously
until either ak1 = a0 or ak2 = ai−1. Since hk , wkuk is an increasing function of k when k > k(i),
and k(i) < k1 < k2, this scaling operation will not increase the cost.
After this scaling operation we can update k1 and k2, and either k1 is increased by one
or k2 is decreased by one.
Therefore, continue in this way, and finally we will obtain a probability distribution
Pb ∈ SP i,fr with density sequence {b0, b1, . . . , bn, . . . } such that (B.16), (B.17), and (B.18)
hold.
This completes the proof.
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Define
SP i,step = { P ∈ SP i,fr | P has density sequence {a0, a1, . . . , an, . . . }
satisfying (B.16) and (B.17) for some k(i) < k ≤ (i− 2) }.
Then due to Lemma B.8,
Lemma B.9.
V ∗ = inf
P∈∪∞i=3SPi,step
V (P).
As i → ∞, the probability density function of P ∈ SP i,fr will converge to a multiple
dimensional staircase function. Therefore, for d = 2 and the cost function L(x) = ‖x‖1,∀x ∈
R2, then
inf
P∈SP
∫ ∫
R2
L(x)P(dx1dx2) = inf
γ∈[0,1]
∫ ∫
R2
L(x)fγ(x)dx1dx2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
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APPENDIX C
PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 4
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof of Theorem 4.2 . Consider a feasible solution to the optimization problem (4.8) with
primal variables
pk =
δ k = 1 + i∆, for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 12δ − 10 otherwise .
The corresponding value of the objective function is
2δ
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆).
Therefore,
VLB ≤ 2δ
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆). (C.1)
We claim that the above primal variables are the optimal solution. We prove this claim by
constructing the corresponding dual variables.
Associating dual variables µ with the constraint in (4.9), yk with the constraint in (4.10),
we have the dual linear program:
VLB = max µ− 2δ
∞∑
k=0
yk
such that µ ≥ 0, yk ≥ 0,∀k ∈ N, (C.2)
1
2
µ− y0 ≤ 0, (C.3)
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µ−
k∑
i=max(0,k−∆+1)
yk ≤ L(k),∀k ≥ 1. (C.4)
The complementary slackness conditions require that
µ− y0 − y1 = L(1),
µ−
1+k∆∑
i=2+(k−1)∆
yk = L(1 + k∆), for k = 1, 2, . . . , 1
2δ
− 1,
yk = 0,∀k ≥ ( 1
2δ
− 1)∆ + 2.
Consider the following dual variables:
µ = L(1 + ∆
2δ
),
yk = 0,∀k ≥ ( 1
2δ
− 1)∆ + 2,
yk = L(k + ∆)− L(k + ∆− 1) + y(k + ∆),∀2 ≤ k ≤ ( 1
2δ
− 1)∆ + 1,
y1 =
1
2δ∑
i=1
(L(1 + i∆)− L(i∆)) ≥ 0,
y0 = µ− L(1)− y1 = L(1 + ∆
2δ
)− L(1)−
1
2δ∑
i=1
(L(1 + i∆)− L(i∆)) ≥ 0.
It is easy to verify that these dual variables satisfy the constraints of the dual linear
program, and the value of the objective function is
µ− 2δ
+∞∑
k=0
yk =µ− 2δ
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
(µ− L(1 + i∆))
=2δ
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆).
Therefore, by weak duality we have
VLB ≥ 2δ
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆).
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Due to (C.1), we conclude
VLB = 2δ
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆).
C.2 Proof of Corollary 4.5
Proof of Corollary 4.5. First we compute the lower bound VLB via
VLB = 2
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
δL(1 + i∆)
= 2δ
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
(1 + i∆)2
= 2δ
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
(1 + 2i∆ + i2∆2)
= 2δ(
1
2δ
+ 2∆
1
2δ
( 1
2δ
− 1)
2
+ ∆2
( 1
2δ
− 1) 1
2δ
(2 1
2δ
− 1)
6
)
= 1 + ∆(
1
2δ
− 1) + ∆
2
12δ2
+
∆2
6
− ∆
2
4δ
= Θ(
∆2
12δ2
).
The upper bound is
VUB = 2
∆
2δ
−1∑
i=1
δ
∆
L(i) + δ
∆
L( ∆
2δ
)
= 2
δ
∆
( ∆
2δ
− 1) ∆
2δ
(∆
δ
− 1)
6
+
δ
∆
∆2
4δ2
=
1
6
(
∆2
2δ2
+ 1− 3∆
2δ
) +
∆
4δ
=
∆2
12δ2
+
1
6
= Θ(
∆2
12δ2
).
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Therefore, the multiplicative gap goes to one as δ → 0, i.e.,
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
= 1.
C.3 Proof of Corollary 4.7
Proof of Corollary 4.7. Using the fact that L(·) is a monotonically increasing function for
k ≥ 0, we have
VUB − VLB = 2
∆
2δ
−1∑
i=1
δ
∆
L(i) + δ
∆
L( ∆
2δ
)− 2δ
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
L(1 + i∆)
≤ −2δL(1) + δ
∆
L( ∆
2δ
) + 2δL( ∆
2δ
− 1)
≤ (2 + 1
∆
)δL( ∆
2δ
).
Therefore,
VUB
VLB
= 1 +
VUB − VLB
VLB
≤ 1 + (2 +
1
∆
)δL( ∆
2δ
)
2δ
∑ 1
2δ
−1
i=0 L(1 + i∆)
≤ 1 + (2 +
1
∆
)δL( ∆
2δ
)
2δL(1 + ( 1
2δ
− 1)∆) ,
and thus
lim
δ→0
VUB
VLB
≤ 1 + (1 + 1
2∆
)C.
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C.4 Proof of Theorem 4.8
Proof of Theorem 4.8. Consider the feasible primal variables {pk}k∈N defined as
Pk =
abi for k = 1 + i∆, 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 10 otherwise . (C.5)
It is straightforward to verify that the above primal variables satisfy the constraints of the
relaxed linear program, and the corresponding value of the objective function is
2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆).
We prove it is also the optimal value by constructing the optimal dual variables for the
corresponding dual linear program.
Associating dual variables µ, y0, y1, yi with the primal constraints in (4.19), (4.20), (4.21),
and (4.22), respectively, we have the dual linear program:
VLB := min µ− (2δ + e − 1)
+∞∑
k=0
yk (C.6)
such that µ ≥ 0, yk ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ N (C.7)
1
2
µ− 1 + e

2
y0 − e
 − 1
2
y1 − e
 − 1
2
+∞∑
k=2
yk ≤ 0 (C.8)
µ− ey0 − ey1 − (e − 1)
+∞∑
k=2
yk ≤ L(1) (C.9)
µ− e
k∑
l=max(0,k−∆+1)
yl − (e − 1)
+∞∑
l=k+1
yl ≤ L(k),∀k ≥ 2. (C.10)
If the primal variables defined in (C.5) are the optimal solution, the complementary
slackness conditions require that the corresponding dual variables satisfy that
µ = L(1) + e(y0 + y1) + (e − 1)
+∞∑
l=2
yl
µ = L(1 + ∆) + e
1+∆∑
l=2
yl + (e
 − 1)
+∞∑
l=2+∆
yl
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µ = L(1 + k∆) + e
1+k∆∑
l=2+(k−1)∆
yl + (e
 − 1)
+∞∑
l=2+k∆
yl,∀1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1,
yl = 0,∀l ≥ 2 + (n− 1)∆.
Consider the following dual variables defined via
µ = L(1 + (n− 1)∆),
yk = 0,∀k ≥ 2 + (n− 2)∆,
yk = b(yk+∆ + L(k + ∆)− L(k + ∆− 1)),∀2 ≤ k ≤ 1 + (n− 2)∆,
y1 =
n−1∑
i=1
bi(L(1 + i∆)− L(i∆)),
y0 =
n−1∑
i=1
bi(L(i∆)− L(1 + (i− 1)∆)).
We verify that the above dual variables satisfy the inequality (C.8) in the following
(1 + e)y0 + (e
 − 1)y1 + (e − 1)
+∞∑
k=2
yk − µ ≥ 0
⇔y0 − y1 + e(y0 + y1) + (e − 1)
+∞∑
k=2
yk − µ ≥ 0
⇔y0 − y1 + µ− L(1)− µ ≥ 0
⇔y0 − y1 − L(1) ≥ 0
⇔
n−1∑
i=1
bi(2L(i∆)− L(1 + (i− 1)∆)− L(1 + i∆)) ≥ L(1).
It is easy to verify that the dual variables satisfy the constraints (C.7), (C.8), (C.9), and
(C.10) in the dual linear program. Next we compute the corresponding value of the objective
function
µ− (2δ + e − 1)
+∞∑
k=0
yk
=µ− (2δ + e − 1)(y0 + y1 + µ− L(1)− e
(y0 + y1)
e − 1 )
=µ− 2δ + e
 − 1
e − 1 (µ− L(1)− y0 − y1)
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=L(1 + (n− 1)∆)− 2δ + e
 − 1
e − 1 (L(1 + (n− 1)∆)− L(1)−
n−1∑
i=1
bi(L(1 + i∆)− L(1 + (i− 1)∆)))
=2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆),
which is also the value of the objective function in the primal problem achieved by the primal
variables defined in (C.5). Therefore, we conclude that
VLB = 2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆).
C.5 Proof of Corollary 4.12
Proof of Corollary 4.12. For the cost function L(k) = |k|,
VLB = 2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆)
= 2
n−1∑
k=0
abk(1 + k∆)
= 1 + 2a∆
n−1∑
k=0
bkk
= 1 + 2a∆(
b− bn
(1− b)2 −
(n− 1)bn
1− b ).
Given δ > 0, VLB is a decreasing function of . Therefore, to lower bound
VuniformUB
VLB
in
the regime  ≤ δ, we only need to consider the case  = δ. Thus, in the following we set
 = δ.
Since
∑n−1
k=0 ab
k = 1
2
, we have
a
1− bn
1− b =
1
2
⇔ bn = 1− 1− b
2a
.
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As δ → 0, 1−b
2a
= 1−e
−
2
δ+ e
−1
2
e
→ 1
3
, and thus
lim
δ→0
bn = 1− 1
3
=
2
3
,
n = Θ(
log(3
2
)

).
Note that a = Θ(3
2
δ) as δ → 0.
Therefore, as δ → 0,
VLB ≈ 2∆a(
1− 2
3
2
−
log( 3
2
)

2
3

)
≈ 2∆3
2
δ(
1
3δ2
−
2
3
log(3
2
)
δ2
)
=
∆
δ
(1− 2 log 3
2
)
≈ 0.19∆
δ
.
Recall V uniformUB =
∆
4δ
.
Therefore,
lim
=δ→0
VUB
VLB
=
1
4(1− 2 log 3
2
)
≈ 1.32,
and thus
lim
≤δ→0
VUB
VLB
≤ 1
4(1− 2 log 3
2
)
≈ 1.32.
C.6 Proof of Corollary 4.13
Proof of Corollary 4.13. Using the same argument in the proof of Corollary 4.12, we can set
 = δ.
For the cost function L(k) = k2,
VLB = 2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆)
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= 2
n−1∑
k=0
abk(1 + k∆)2
= 1 + 4a∆
n−1∑
k=0
bkk + 2a∆2
n−1∑
k=0
bkk2
≈ 2a∆2
n−1∑
k=0
bkk2
= 2∆2
δ + e
−1
2
e
−b+ 2( b(1−bn−1)
(1−b)2 − (n−1)b
n
1−b )− b
2(1−bn−2)
1−b − (n− 1)2bn
1− b
≈ 2∆2 3
2

2(
1− 2
3
2
− 23 log( 32 )
2
)− 1
3
− 2
3
(log( 3
2
))2
2

≈ 3∆
2
2
(
2
3
− 4
3
log(
3
2
)− 2
3
(log(
3
2
))2)
=
∆2
2
(2− 4 log(3
2
)− 2(log(3
2
))2)
≈ ∆
2
202
=
∆2
20δ2
Recall V uniformUB =
∆2
12δ2
.
Therefore,
lim
=δ→0
V uniformUB
VLB
=
1
12(2− 4 log(3
2
)− 2(log(3
2
))2)
≈ 5
3
,
and thus
lim
≤δ→0
V uniformUB
VLB
≤ 1
12(2− 4 log(3
2
)− 2(log(3
2
))2)
≈ 5
3
.
C.7 Proof of Corollary 4.14
Proof of Corollary 4.14. For the cost function L(k) = |k|,
VLB = 2
n−1∑
k=0
abkL(1 + k∆)
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= 2
n−1∑
k=0
abk(1 + k∆)
= 1 + 2a∆
n−1∑
k=0
bkk
= 1 + 2a∆(
b− bn
(1− b)2 −
(n− 1)bn
1− b ).
Given  > 0, VLB is a decreasing function of δ. Therefore, to lower bound
V
Lap
UB
VLB
in the
regime δ ≤ , we only need to consider the case δ = . Thus, in the following we set δ = .
Following the same calculations in the proof of Corollary 4.12, we have
VLB ≈ ∆
δ
(1− 2 log 3
2
)
≈ 0.19∆
δ
= 0.19
∆

.
On the other hand, we have
V
Lap
UB = 2
+∞∑
k=1
1− λ
1 + λ
λkk
=
2e−

∆
1− e−2 ∆
≈ ∆

,
as → 0.
Therefore,
lim
=δ→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
=
1
1− 2 log 3
2
≈ 5.29,
and thus
lim
≤δ→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
≤ 1
1− 2 log 3
2
≈ 5.29.
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C.8 Proof of Corollary 4.15
Proof of Corollary 4.15. Using the same argument in the proof of Corollary 4.14, we can set
 = δ.
For the cost function L(k) = k2, following the same calculations in the proof of Corollary
4.13, we have
VLB ≈ ∆
2
2
(2− 4 log(3
2
)− 2(log(3
2
))2)
≈ ∆
2
202
.
On the other hand, we have
V
Lap
UB = 2
+∞∑
k=1
1− λ
1 + λ
λkk2
=
2λ
(1− λ)2
≈ 2∆
2
2
,
as → 0.
Therefore,
lim
=δ→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
=
2
(2− 4 log(3
2
)− 2(log(3
2
))2)
≈ 40,
and thus
lim
≤δ→0
V
Lap
UB
VLB
≤ 2
(2− 4 log(3
2
)− 2(log(3
2
))2)
≈ 40.
C.9 Proof of Theorem 4.16
Proof of Theorem 4.16. Consider the dual program of the linear program (4.27),
VLB := max µ− δ
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
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such that y
(1)
i1
, y
(2)
i2
, . . . , y
(d)
id
≥ 0,∀i1 ∈ Z, i2 ∈ Z, . . . , id ∈ Z
µ−
∑
i1∈[k1−∆+1,k1]
y
(1)
i1
− · · · −
∑
id∈[kd−∆+1,kd]
y
(d)
id
≤ |k1|+ |k2|+ · · ·+ |kd|,∀(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zd.
Consider a candidate solution with
µ =
d∆
2δ
and for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
y
(m)
i =

µ
d
i = 0
max(µ
d
− k∆, 0) i = k∆, for k ∈ Z, k ≥ 1
max(µ
d
− (|k| − 1)∆− 1, 0) i = k∆, for k ∈ Z, k ≤ −1
0 otherwise
.
It is easy to verify that this candidate solution satisfies the constraints, and the corre-
sponding value of the objective function is
µ− δ
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
=µ− δd
∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
=µ− δd
 µd∆∑
i=0
(
µ
d
− i∆) +
µ
d∆
−1∑
i=0
(
µ
d
− i∆− 1)

=µ− δd
( µ
d
( µ
d∆
+ 1)
2
+
(µ
d
+ ∆− 2) µ
d∆
2
)
=µ− δd( µ
2
d2∆
+
µ
d
− µ
d∆
)
=µ− δ( µ
2
d∆
+ µ− µ
∆
)
=
d∆
4δ
− ∆− 1
2
d.
Therefore, we have
VLB ≥ d∆
4δ
− ∆− 1
2
d.
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C.10 Proof of Theorem 4.17
Proof of Theorem 4.17. Consider the dual program of the linear program (4.27),
VLB := max µ− δ
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
such that y
(1)
i1
, y
(2)
i2
, . . . , y
(d)
id
≥ 0,∀i1 ∈ Z, i2 ∈ Z, . . . , id ∈ Z
µ−
∑
i1∈[k1−∆+1,k1]
y
(1)
i1
− · · ·−
∑
id∈[kd−∆+1,kd]
y
(d)
id
≤ |k1|2 + |k2|2 + · · ·+ |kd|2,∀(k1, . . . , kd) ∈ Zd.
To avoid integer-rounding issues, assume that 1
2δ
is an integer. Consider a candidate
solution with
µ =
d∆2
4δ2
and for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
y
(m)
i =

µ
d
i = 0
µ
d
− k2∆2 i = k∆, for 1 ≤ k ≥ 1
2δ
µ
d
− ((|k| − 1)∆ + 1)2 i = k∆, for − 1
2δ
≤ k ≤ −1
0 otherwise
.
It is easy to verify that this candidate solution satisfies the constraints, and the corre-
sponding value of the objective function is
µ− δ
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
= µ− δd
∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
= µ− δd
 12δ∑
i=0
(
µ
d
− i2∆2) +
1
2δ
−1∑
i=0
(
µ
d
− (i∆ + 1)2)

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= µ− δd
(
(
1
2δ
+ 1)
µ
d
−∆2
1
2δ
( 1
2δ
+ 1)(1
δ
+ 1)
6
+
1
2δ
µ
d
− 1
2δ
−∆2 (
1
2δ
− 1) 1
2δ
(1
δ
− 1)
6
−∆ 1
2δ
(
1
2δ
− 1)
)
= µ− δd
(
(
1
δ
+ 1)
µ
d
− ∆
2 1
2δ
( 1
2δ2
+ 1)
3
− 1
2δ
−∆ 1
2δ
(
1
2δ
− 1)
)
=
d∆2
12δ2
+ (
1
∆
− 1)d∆
2
4δ
+
1−∆
2
d+
d∆2
6
.
Therefore, we have
VLB ≥ d∆
2
12δ2
+ (
1
∆
− 1)d∆
2
4δ
+
1−∆
2
d+
d∆2
6
.
C.11 Proof of Theorem 4.25
Proof of Theorem 4.25. Consider a candidate solution with µ =
d∆ log 3
2
β
(assuming k , µ
d∆
is
an integer), and for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
y
(m)
i =

0 i ≤ −k∆
eβy
(m)
i−∆ + 1 i ∈ [−k∆ + 1, 0]
max(eβy
(m)
i−∆ − 1, 0) i ≥ 0
.
It is easy to verify that the above candidate solution satisfies the constraints of the dual
linear program. We can derive the analytical expression for ymi , which is
y
(m)
i =

0 i ≤ −k∆
e(k−j)β−1
eβ−1 i ∈ [−(j + 1)∆ + 1,−j∆], for j ∈ [0, k − 1]
max(ejβ e
kβ−2
eβ−1 +
1
eβ−1 , 0) i ∈ [(j − 1)∆ + 1, j∆]
.
To avoid integer-rounding issues, assume that n , 1
β
log 1
2−ekβ =
log 2
β
is an integer. Then
the value of the objective function with this candidate solution is
µ− β
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
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=µ− βd
∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
=µ− βd∆
(
k∑
i=1
eiβ − 1
eβ − 1 +
n∑
i=1
(eiβ
ekβ − 2
eβ − 1 +
1
eβ − 1)
)
=µ− βd∆
(
eβ(1−ekβ)
1−eβ − k
eβ − 1 +
ekβ − 2
eβ − 1
eβ(1− enβ)
1− eβ +
n
eβ − 1
)
=
d∆ log 3
2
β
− βd∆
 eβ(1− 32 )1−eβ − log 32β
eβ − 1 +
−1
2
eβ − 1
eβ(1− 2)
1− eβ +
log 2
β(eβ − 1)

=
d∆ log 3
2
β
− βd∆
(
eβ
2(eβ − 1)2 −
log 3
2
β(eβ − 1) −
eβ
2(eβ − 1)2 +
log 2
β(eβ − 1)
)
=Θ
(
d∆
β
(log
3
2
− 1
2
+ log
3
2
+
1
2
− log 2)
)
= log
9
8
Θ
(
d∆
β
)
≈Θ
(
0.1178
d∆
β
)
,
as β , max(, δ)→ 0.
Therefore,
lim
max(,δ)→0
V ′LB
d∆
β
≥ log 9
8
≈ 0.1178.
C.12 Proof of Theorem 4.26
Proof of Theorem 4.26. Let α = 3
2
. Consider a candidate solution with µ = d∆
2 log2 α
β2
(as-
suming k ,
√
µ
d
∆
= logα
β
is an integer), and for all m ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d},
y
(m)
i =

0 i ≤ −k∆
eβy
(m)
i−∆ + 2|i|+ 1 i ∈ [−k∆ + 1, 0]
max(eβy
(m)
i−∆ − (2i+ 1), 0) i ≥ 0
.
It is easy to verify that the above candidate solution satisfies the constraints of the dual
linear program.
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Define
z1 =
2
eβ − 1 ,
z2 =
1− 2eβ∆
eβ−1
eβ − 1 ,
z3 =
2
1− eβ ,
z4 =
1− 2eβ∆
1−eβ
1− eβ .
We can derive the analytical expression for ymi , which is
y
(m)
i =
0 i ≤ −k∆e(k−k′)β (z1(k∆ + j) + z2)− z1(k′∆ + j)− z2 i = −(k′∆ + j) ,
where k′ ∈ [0, k − 1], j ∈ [0,∆− 1], and for i = (m− 1)∆ + j, where j ∈ [1,∆],m ≥ 1,
y
(m)
i = max(am,j, 0),
where
am,j , emβ (z1(k∆ + ∆− j) + z2)− z1(∆− j)− z2 − z3(∆− j) + z4)
− z4 − z3((m− 1)∆ + j).
For each j ∈ [1,∆], and we are interested in finding the number m(j) such that am(j),j = 0.
As β → 0, from am(j),j = 0, we get
em(j)βekβ(
2
β
k∆− 2∆
β2
) = −2∆
β2
− 2
β
m(j)∆ + o(
1
β2
).
Therefore,
m(j) =
log γ
β
+ o(
1
β
),
where γ is the solution to
γα(logα− 1) = −(1 + log γ).
When α = 3
2
, we have γ ≈ 1.7468.
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Therefore, the value of the objective function is
µ− β
(∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
+
∑
i2∈Z
y
(2)
i2
+ · · ·+
∑
id∈Z
y
(d)
id
)
=µ− βd
∑
i1∈Z
y
(1)
i1
=µ− βd
 k−1∑
k′=0
∆−1∑
j=0
y
(1)
−(k′∆+j) +
∆∑
j=1
m(j)∑
m=1
y
(1)
(m−1)∆+j

=
d∆2 log2 α
β2
−
βd
(
1− e−kβ
1− e−β e
kβ((z1k∆ + z2)∆ + z1
∆(∆− 1)
2
)− z1∆2k(k − 1)
2
− z1k∆(∆− 1)
2
− z2k∆
)
− βd
∆∑
j=1
(
eβ(1− em(j)β)
1− eβ (e
kβ(z1(k∆ + ∆− j) + z2)− z1(∆− j)
− z2 − z3(∆− j) + z4)− z4m(j)− z3∆m(j)(m(j) + 1)
2
+ z3(∆− j)m′)
=
d∆2
β2
(log2 α− (α− 1)(2 logα− 2) + log2 α− 2 logα + (1− γ)α(2 logα− 2)
− 2 log γ − log2 γ) + o( 1
β2
)
=
d∆2
β2
(
2 log2 α− 2− 2αγ logα + 2αγ − 2 log γ − log2 γ)+ o( 1
β2
)
≈0.0177d∆
2
β2
+ o(
1
β2
),
as β , max(, δ)→ 0.
Therefore,
lim
max(,δ)→0
V ′LB
d∆2
β2
≥ 0.0177.
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